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Introduction
On Saturday morning, 18th March 2000, Iridium LLC, ”The World’s First Hand-
held Global Satellite Telephone and Paging Service Provider” shut down its operations.1
The USD 5bn project, launched in November 1998 by the consortium of, among others,
Motorola, Lockheed Martin, Sprint and Raytheon, turned out to be one of the biggest
ﬁnancial disasters in the history of technically advanced communication projects. Irid-
ium was established to provide a telephone connection from each point on the globe,
including the peaks of Himalaya, Amazonian forests and African deserts. In order to
meet this objective Iridium placed 66 satellites on the orbit located 781 kilometers
above the Earth. Via a portable phone that transmitted a signal directly to/from one
of the satellites, the user was able to obtain a connection with any operating telephone
network. The Iridium analysts believed that this additional ﬂexibility oﬀered by their
new system would be highly appreciated by the target users and would compensate
them for relatively high costs (USD 3,000 for a telephone and up to USD 7 per call
per minute). The oﬀer was initially directed to businesspeople, explorers, and wealthy
travelers. The market potential was estimated as high. However, by the end of 1999
the ﬁrm managed to get only 50 thousand out of 700 thousand planned subscribers.
The loss reported in the ﬁrst quarter of 1999 alone amounted to USD 500m with mis-
erable revenue of USD 1.5m. The book value of the company’s debt already exceeded
USD 4.4bn. Eventually, the investment made by Iridium LLC appeared to be far from
what is in the ﬁnance textbooks meant by ’a value-creating project’.2
1The citation and the relevant data are based on the information available at the time at the
website www.iridium.com.
2Finally , the assets of Iridium LLC have been purchased bya newlyestablished ﬁrm Iridium Satel-
lite LLC that continues to provide satellite telecommunication services (see also www.iridium.com).
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1.1 NPV vs. Irreversibility and Uncertainty
What lesson for capital budgeting managers emerges from the Iridium case? Most
of the ﬁnance textbooks present the net present value (NPV) rule as a valid criterion for
evaluating capital investment projects. According to this rule, one needs to estimate
the present value of the expected stream of cash ﬂow generated by a new factory or a
product line. Subsequently, the present value of the expenditures necessary to launch
the factory or the product line has to be deducted from the discounted cash inﬂow.
A positive diﬀerence (a positive net present value) implies that the project should be
undertaken. In other words, NPVanalysis suggests that minimal present value of cash
inﬂows necessary for undertaking the project, V ∗, must be equal to
V
∗ = I, (1.1)
where I is the investment cost.
Of course, there are a lot of technical issues arising while calculating NPVof
an investment project. The problems associated with determining the probabilities
of particular scenarios, ﬁnding an appropriate discount rate or even with quantifying
inﬂation and exchange rate risk need to be resolved (cf. Schockley and Arnold, 2002).
However, the basic principle remains very simple: the sign of NPVdetermines whether
a given project should be undertaken or not.
As pointed out by Dixit and Pindyck (1996), the idea of NPVis based on one
of the following crucial and often overlooked assumptions:
• investment is either fully reversible (i.e. the invested money can be recovered if
the uncertain market conditions turn out to be unfavorable ex post), or
• a ﬁrm is facing a now-or-never decision.
In most real-life situations, however, none of the above conditions is met.
The Iridium project, which comprised of a network of 66 satellites with virtu-
ally no alternative use, was totally irreversible (NASA or any other organization was
not interested in acquiring the satellites after the bankruptcy was announced). More-
over, after the decision to stop the project, all the satellites ought to be destroyed at
an additional cost of USD 30-50m over the subsequent two years. Another aspect of
this particular investment is related to its timing. The decision to start the project
was obviously not a now-or-never choice; some ﬂexibility to postpone the project ex-
isted, especially until more reliable estimates concerning highly uncertain demand were
available. And just the demand uncertainty constitutes the third distinct feature of
the project.1.2. REAL OPTIONS AND INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3
1.2 Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty
The need of developing valuation models that are capable of capturing such fea-
tures of investment as irreversibility, uncertainty as well as timing ﬂexibility has re-
sulted in a vast amount of literature on real options and investment under uncertainty.3
In his seminal paper Myers (1977) draws attention to the optimal exercise strategies of
real options as being the signiﬁcant source of corporate value. Brennan and Schwartz
(1985) are one of the ﬁrst to adopt the modern option pricing techniques (see Black
and Scholes, 1973, and Merton, 1973) to evaluate natural resource investments. The
price of the commodity is used as an underlying stochastic variable upon which the
value of the investment project is contingent. McDonald and Siegel (1986) derive the
optimal exercise rule for a perpetual investment option when both the value of the
project and the investment costs follow correlated geometric Brownian motions. The
authors show that for realistic values of model parameters it can be optimal to wait
with investing until the present value of the project exceeds the present cost of in-
vestment by a factor of 2. This reﬂects substantial value of waiting in the presence of
irreversibility and uncertainty. Majd and Pindyck (1987) contribute to the literature
by considering the eﬀect of a time to build on the optimal exercise rule. The optimal
choice of the project’s capacity is analyzed by Pindyck (1988) and Dangl (1999). Dixit
(1989) analyzes the eﬀects of uncertainty on the magnitude of hysteresis in the models
with entry and exit. Dixit and Pindyck (1996) present a detailed overview of this early
literature and constitute an excellent introduction to the techniques of dynamic pro-
gramming and contingent claims analysis, which are widely applicable in the area of
real options and investment under uncertainty. An introduction to real options, which
is closer in the spirit to the ﬁnancial options theory, is presented by Trigeorgis (1996).
The 1990s brought a vast number of applications of the existing real op-
tions framework. They include, among others, managing R&D projects (Pennings,
1998), natural resources investment (Trigeorgis, 1990), real estate (Williams, 1993),
energy (Kulatilaka, 1993, and Pindyck, 1993), aerospace industry (Sick, 1999), bank-
ing (Panayi and Trigeorgis, 1998), technology adoption (Grenadier and Weiss, 1997),
merger policy (Mason and Weeds, 2002) and biotechnology sector (Ottoo, 1998, and
Woerner, 2001).4 Shackleton and Wojakowski (2001) analyze a ﬁnite-maturity real
3A reader being unfamiliar with this approach is referred to the Appendix where a standard real
option model is analyzed.
4For a varietyof real options applications see the 1998 special issue of the Quarterly Review of
Economics and Finance, 38, entitled: ”Real Options: Developments and Applications” (ed. G.E.
Pinches). The collections of papers compiled byGrenadier (2000), Brennan and Trigeorgis (2000),4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
option to switch among two streams of revenues when the switching is costless.
Some recent contributions relax the assumption concerning perfect information
about the project’s value and introduce learning eﬀects. Thijssen et al. (2001) analyze
the optimal investment timing when the information about the project’s value is driven
by a Poisson process. Bernardo and Chowdhry (2002) analyze optimal option exercise
policy when the ﬁrm is learning about its capabilities by applying the ﬁltering approach
of Liptser and Shiryayev (1978). Finally, Decamps et al. (2001) investigate the optimal
investment rule when the ﬁrm observes the value of the process (market index) which is
imperfectly correlated with unobservable demand process. In Chapter 2 we introduce
incomplete information and learning about the ﬁrm’s investment cost.
The empirical literature on real options is quite limited but growing, as the
project level data become more easily available. The classic contributions include Pad-
dock et al. (1988) who analyze the valuation of oﬀshore petroleum leases, Quigg (1993)
investigating the behavior of real estate prices in Seattle, and Berger et al. (1996),
who on the basis of the diﬀerences between the ﬁrms’ market values and their dis-
counted cash ﬂow (DCF) valuations try to estimate the value of the option to abandon
operations.
1.3 Imperfect Competition
The extensive process of deregulation taking place in the last decade, combined
with a wave of mergers and acquisitions, has resulted in an oligopolistic structure of
a large number of sectors. A shift towards such a structure takes place not only in
traditional regulated markets (telecommunications, energy, transportation) but also in
more competitive industries (fast-moving consumer goods, car manufacturing, pharma-
ceuticals). Imperfect competition in the ﬁrm’s product market requires that strategic
interactions with other ﬁrm(s) are taken into account. The gap between capital bud-
geting and strategic planning has already been recognized by Myers (1987) and has
been conﬁrmed by Zingales (2000).
Real option models taking into account imperfect competition among the ﬁrms
are based on several contributions on timing games within the area of non-cooperative
game theory. The ﬁrst model describing the optimal timing of entry has been presented
by Reinganum (1981). In this paper, the author derives the optimal strategies of the
leader and the follower and shows that the leader realizes a positive relative surplus.
and Schwartz and Trigeorgis (2001) are also of interest.1.3. IMPERFECT COMPETITION 5
This result is due to the assumption that ﬁrms use open-loop strategies, i.e. their
roles are predetermined. We use the same assumption in Chapter 5. The problem of
endogenous selection mechanism has been addressed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).
In their set-up, in which the ﬁrms play closed-loop strategies, the roles of the ﬁrms are
not predetermined and, as a consequence, the ﬁrms’ strategies are history-dependent
(time-consistent). Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) show that there is rent equalization of
the leader and the follower, which is the result of the preemption game played by the
ﬁrms. This framework is applied in Chapters 3 and 4.
The ﬁrst model that combines these game-theoretical insights with the opti-
mal option exercise rule is Smets (1991). He analyzes the trade-oﬀ between the value
of waiting with constructing a production facility in an emerging economy and the
threat of being preempted by a competitor. Grenadier (1996) applies a version of this
model to analyze an increase in construction activity during market downturn. Huis-
man and Kort (1999) present an endogenous selection mechanism based on which the
roles of the leader and the follower are determined. Mason and Weeds (2003) extend
this framework and allow for positive externalities among the competitors. The latter
feature allows them for obtaining a negative relationship between uncertainty and the
leader’s investment threshold. Boyer et al. (2002) develop a general model of evolu-
tion of duopolists’ capacities, which nests, as its special cases, the new market model
and the model with ﬁrms already competing in the product market. Applications of
strategic real option games in the internet and aircraft manufacturing sectors have been
presented by Perotti and Rossetto (2000), and Shackleton et al. (2003), respectively.
Discrete time strategic real option models include Smit and Ankum (1993), Smit and
Trigeorgis (1998), and Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998).
Games of incomplete information constitute a fruitful avenue of contemporary
strategic real options research. Grenadier (1999) considers informational cascades in
a situation where multiple agents optimally exercise their options not only on the
basis of their private noisy signals but also taking into account the actions of the
others. Decamps and Mariotti (2000) and Thijssen et al. (2001) consider games in
which ﬁrms learn about the proﬁtability of the market by observing their competitors.
Lambrecht (2000) analyzes optimal strategic investment in patents when the type of
the competitor is unknown and shows that it may be optimal to let patents ”sleep”
for some time before the commercialization phase takes place. Finally, Lambrecht and
Perraudin (2003), develop a model of a preemption game under incomplete information,
in which the payoﬀ of the follower drops to zero after the investment of the leader.
Another class of real options contributions are the models of industry equi-6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
librium. These models include Williams (1993), Leahy (1993), and Grenadier (2002)
with an all-equity ﬁnancing assumption and Fries et al. (1997) with a debt and equity
ﬁnancing assumption.
1.4 Debt Financing
There are two types of agency problems that result in a suboptimal investment
policy in the presence of debt ﬁnancing. First, as shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976),
debt ﬁnancing results in the owner-manager shifting towards more risky projects and,
as an eﬀect, in the expropriation of the debtholders’ wealth. Another eﬀect of debt
on the ﬁrm’s investment policy has been discussed by Myers (1977). It is shown that
since investment is associated with a wealth transfer from the equityholders to the
debtholders, some of the good investment opportunities (those whose NPVdoes not
fully compensate for the wealth transfer) will expire unexercised.
The impact of debt ﬁnancing on investment has been analyzed in a dynamic
real options framework by a number of authors. Mello and Parsons (1992) analyze the
binary decision to abandon or resume a production process and estimate the agency
costs of debt. For reasonable parameter values they obtain that a suboptimal operating
policy lowers the value of the ﬁrm by more than 4% of the total debt value. The
magnitude of the agency costs has also been estimated by Mauer and Ott (2000), who
essentially develop a dynamic version of the model of Myers (1977). For some scenarios
they obtain that the agency cost of debt associated with underinvestment amount to
up to 3% of the debt value. Titman and Tsyplakov (2002) show in a dynamic model
with a continuous investment ﬂow that an equity value-maximizing ﬁrm has a lower
investment rate than a ﬁrm maximizing the value of all its claims. A similar result
is obtained by Moyen (2002). Lambrecht (2001), and Khadem and Perraudin (2003)
build upon strategic models in the spirit of Brander and Lewis (1986), and Maksimovic
(1995), and perform a dynamic analysis of exit strategies where duopolists are ﬁnanced
by equity and debt. Their theoretical results support the empirical evidence that ”the
ﬁttest and the fattest” ﬁrms, i.e. those with the highest proﬁtability and the highest
interest coverage, are more likely to remain in the market (cf. Zingales, 1999). However,
in equilibrium an exit of the less levered ﬁrm occurs with positive probability. Finally,
Fries et al. (1997) investigate the optimal capital structure in the industry equilibrium
taking into account market volatility and possibility of a free entry. A common feature
of all the above mentioned contributions assumed a single type of non-renegotiable
debt. As we show in Chapter 6, relaxing this assumption may lead to new interesting1.5. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 7
insights.
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis consists of the introduction, which is followed by ﬁve chapters. In
Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, the investment decisions of all-equity ﬁnanced ﬁrms are ana-
lyzed. Consequently, all the investment decisions are made optimally as to maximize
the value of the ﬁrm. In Chapter 6, the impact of debt ﬁnancing on investment is
considered.
In Chapter 2 we develop a non-strategic model in which the impact of a policy
change on investment behavior is analyzed. Withdrawal of the investment tax credit, or
a change in the preferential tax treatment of foreign investor constitute some examples
of the policy change that is of our interest. The policy change is modeled as an upward
jump in the eﬀective investment cost (cf. Hassett and Metcalf, 1999, for a tax credit
interpretation) and is triggered by the value of the project reaching an upper barrier.
The ﬁrm has incomplete information concerning the trigger value of the process for
which the jump occurs and updates its beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. The uncertainty
concerning the moment of the change can be explicitly accounted for by changing the
variance parameter of the underlying probability distribution. The optimal investment
threshold maximizing the value of the ﬁrm is derived and non-monotonicity of this
threshold in trigger value uncertainty is shown.
Chapter 3 contains an analysis of a ﬁrm’s decision to replace an existing pro-
duction facility with a new, more cost-eﬃcient one. Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) ﬁnd
that, in a two-period model, increased product market uncertainty could encourage
the ﬁrm to invest strategically in the new technology. We extend their framework to
a continuous-time model and show that, in contrast with the two-period model, more
uncertainty always increases the expected time to invest. Furthermore, it is shown
that under increased uncertainty the probability of the optimal production facility re-
placement within a given time period always decreases for time periods longer than the
time to reach the optimal Jorgensonian threshold calculated for the deterministic case.
For smaller time periods there are contrary eﬀects so that the relationship between
uncertainty and the probability of investing is in this case humped (cf. Sarkar, 2000,
who ﬁrst documents the non-monotonicity of the investment-uncertainty relationship
in a real options framework).
Chapter 4 considers the impact of investment cost asymmetry on the value of
the ﬁrm and optimal real option exercise strategies of ﬁrms under imperfect competi-8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
tion (cf. Grenadier, 1996, for a limiting case with identical ﬁrms). Both ﬁrms have an
opportunity to invest in a project enhancing ceteris paribus the proﬁt ﬂow. We show
that three types of equilibria exist (which extends, e.g., Huisman, 2001, Ch. 8, who
obtains two types of equilibria in a new market model). Furthermore, we derive critical
levels of cost asymmetry separating the equilibrium regions. The presence of strategic
interactions leads to counterintuitive results. First, a marginal increase in the invest-
ment cost of the ﬁrm with the cost disadvantage can increase this ﬁrm’s own value.
Second, such a cost increase can result in a decrease in the value of the competitor.
Subsequently, we discuss the welfare implications of the optimal exercise strategies and
show that ﬁrms being identical can result in a socially less desirable outcome than if
one of the competitors has a signiﬁcant investment cost disadvantage. Finally, we prove
that proﬁt uncertainty always delays investment, even in the presence of a strategic
option of becoming the ﬁrst investor.
Chapter 5 addresses the issue of the value of ﬂexibility in quality choice (cf.
Pennings, 2002, for a model addressing similar issues but using a diﬀerent model for-
mulation). Firms decide about quality of their products when they enter the market
upon incurring a sunk cost. Flexibility in quality choice induces ceteris paribus earlier
investment, and the value of ﬂexible quality increases with demand uncertainty. We
ﬁnd that the possibility of competitive entry more than doubles the relative value of
ﬂexibility. We also show that ﬂexible quality serves as an entry deterrent control, while
it can still be set at the optimal monopoly level. Furthermore, we extend the theory of
strategic real options, from which it is known that the follower’s investment timing is
irrelevant for the decision of the leader if the roles of the ﬁrms are predetermined. The
addition of a second control (quality) results in the leader’s investment timing being
inﬂuenced by the follower’s expected entry. Finally, we show that the follower can be
driven out of the market due to an ”aggressive” quality choice of the leader in high
states of demand.
Chapter 6 analyzes the ﬁrm’s optimal investment and liquidation policy in
the presence of debt ﬁnancing and the equityholders’ option to renegotiate the debt.
We show that the presence of the renegotiation option (”soft debt”) exacerbates the
underinvestment problem described by Myers (1977). The detrimental impact of the
renegotiation option on the investment policy results from the fact that in the presence
of the renegotiation option the wealth transfer to the debtholders, which occurs upon
investment, is greater. This is due to a signiﬁcant reduction in the probability of
strategic default occurring upon undertaking the investment project. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that the liquidation policy in the presence of debt diﬀers from the optimal1.6. APPENDIX: STANDARD REAL OPTIONS MODEL 9
liquidation policy under all-equity ﬁnancing. Even after removing the eﬀects of the tax
shield by excluding taxes, it holds that the liquidation policy is aﬀected by the second-
best investment policy, thus liquidation occurs ineﬃciently early. Also, the impact of
a growth opportunity on the optimal bankruptcy and renegotiation timing is analyzed
and it is shown that high shareholders’ bargaining power combined with the presence
of growth options can make strategic default more likely.
1.6 Appendix: Standard Real Options Model
In this section we present the standard investment model as described by McDon-
ald and Siegel (1986), and extensively analyzed by Dixit and Pindyck (1996). The
basic problem is to ﬁnd the optimal timing of an irreversible investment, I,g i v e nt h a t
the value of the investment project follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM)
dV (t)=αV (t)dt + σV (t)dw (t), (1.2)
where parameter α denotes the deterministic drift parameter, σ is the instantaneous
standard deviation, and dw is the increment of a Wiener process.





, where Ω is the state space, F is the σ-
algebra representing measurable events, and P is the actual probability measure. The
ﬁltration is the augmented ﬁltration generated by the Brownian motion and satisﬁes
the usual conditions.5 The deterministic riskless interest rate is r and the drift rate α
satisﬁes α<rso that ﬁnite valuations can be obtained. The ﬁrm is risk-neutral and
maximizes the value of the investment option, F (V ), by choosing the threshold value
of V at which the project is undertaken.
Since there are no intermediate payoﬀs to the holder of the investment option,
the Bellman equation in the continuation region (i.e. before exercising the option) can
be written as
rFdt = E [dF (V )]. (1.3)
Equation (1.3) means that for a risk-neutral ﬁrm, the expected rate of change in the
value of the investment opportunity over the time interval dt equals the riskless rate.
Applying Itˆ o’s lemma to the RHS of (1.3), and dividing both sides of the equation by
dt results in the following ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE):
5A ﬁltration {Ft} satisﬁes the usual conditions if it is right continuous and F0 contains all the































Moreover, it holds that β1 > 1a n dβ2 < 0. In order to ﬁnd the value of the investment
option, F (V ), and the optimal investment threshold, V m, the following boundary
conditions are applied to (1.5):
F (V
m)=V




F (0) = 0. (1.9)
Conditions (1.7) and (1.8) are called the value-matching and the smooth-pasting con-
ditions, respectively, and ensure continuity and diﬀerentiability of the value function
at the investment threshold. Condition (1.9) ensures that the investment option is
worthless at the absorbing barrier V = 0. Consequently, it implies that A2 =0 .
Substitution of (1.5) into (1.7)-(1.9) and some algebraic manipulation yield the






Since β1 > 1, the optimal investment threshold is strictly larger than 1 (cf. NPVrule
given by (1.1)). This reﬂects the value of waiting associated with the uncertainty of
the project’s value and the irreversibility of the investment decision. The value of the
option to invest, F (V ), is given by







where V m−I is just a NPVof the project at the moment of undertaking the investment.
The second factor is a stochastic discount factor which reﬂects the present value of $1
received when the cash ﬂow process hits the investment threshold V m.1.6. APPENDIX: STANDARD REAL OPTIONS MODEL 11
The value of the optimal investment threshold is positively related both to
the volatility of the project’s value as well as to its growth rate (the higher σ and α
are, the higher V must be reached for the project to be undertaken). F(V ) increases
with the volatility of the value of the project (β1 is a decreasing function of σ and F is
decreasing with β1) which results from the convex payoﬀ of the investment opportunity.
Moreover, F is increasing with the growth rate, α, since the eﬀective discount rate of
future cash ﬂow decreases linearly with α.
Finally, the expected time to hit the investment threshold V m starting from











for σ2 < 2α,
∞ for σ2 ≥ 2α.
(1.12)
Since the expected time to reach the investment threshold is inﬁnite for a suﬃciently
high volatility of process (1.2), another measures are often used to characterize invest-
ment timing. They include the probability of investing within a certain time horizon
(cf. Sarkar, 2000, and Chapters 3 and 6 of this thesis), and the median time to invest
(cf. Grenadier, 1996).
6For a derivation of the probabilitydistribution of the ﬁrst passage time see Harrison (1985) for a
formal exposition and Dixit (1993) for a heuristic approach.12 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTIONChapter 2
Discrete Change in Investment Cost
2.1 Introduction
Corporate investment opportunities may be represented as a set of (real) options
to acquire productive assets. In the literature it is widely assumed that the present
values of cash ﬂows generated by these assets are uncertain and that their evolution
can be described by a stochastic process. Consequently, identiﬁcation of the optimal
exercise strategies for real options plays a crucial role in capital budgeting and in the
maximization of a ﬁrm’s value.
So far, the real options literature provides relatively little insight into the im-
pact of structural changes of the economic environment on the investment decisions of
a ﬁrm. The existing papers (see overview in Chapter 1) mainly consider continuous
changes in the value of relevant variables. Most of the time, this results in the as-
sumption that the entire uncertainty in the economy can be described by a geometric
Brownian motion process.
It is often more realistic to model an economic variable as a process that makes
infrequent but discrete jumps.1 In such cases use is made of a Poisson (jump) process.
An interesting application is provided by Hassett and Metcalf (1999), who analyze
the impact of an expected reduction in the investment tax credit. In their setting a
Poisson process describes the changes in the tax regime that aﬀect the value of the
investment opportunity. Within such a framework the implicit assumption is made
that the ﬁrm has virtually no information about the mechanisms governing the shocks
in the economy.
1For instance, recent tax debates across Europe are a signiﬁcant source of uncertaintyassociated
with discountinuous changes in the economic environment.
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When a change in the economic environment reﬂects a new policy implemented
by the authority, it may be more realistic to assume that the ﬁrm has some conjecture
about the expected moment of the change. Referring to the example of the investment
tax credit, the ﬁrm typically expects the reduction to be imposed when the economy is
booming and an active pro-investment policy is no longer needed or desired. Conversely,
applying the Poisson based methodology is equivalent to assuming that it is time itself
and not the state of economic environment that governs the change.
Moreover, the ﬁrm can to some extent assess the precision of its conjecture
concerning the moment of change, i.e. the variance of the estimate of the timing of
the future event. A Poisson based approach does not allow for including this type of
uncertainty in the analysis since it entails a single parameter characterizing the arrival
rate of the jump. Consequently, such a modelling approach lacks degrees of freedom
necessary for capturing both the expectation and the precision of this expectation.
In this chapter we propose a method to model the impact of a policy change
on the investment strategy of the ﬁrm that takes into account the type of information
possessed by the ﬁrm while making the investment decision. In our approach the
subjective expectation concerning the moment of the change as well as the level of
imprecision of such a conjecture serve as input parameters. We model the policy change
as being triggered by a suﬃciently high realization of a stochastic process related to
the value of the investment opportunity. This, for instance, reﬂects the fact that - as
we already argued - a tax credit reduction is more likely to occur when the economy is
booming. Hence, the moment of the reduction depends on the state of the economy.
This is in contrast with the models based on the Poisson process where the probability
of the change is constant over time.2
There are other economic situations in which it is realistic to impose a certain
relationship between the occurrence of the shock and the state of the economy. A
foreign direct investment decision to purchase a privatized enterprise where the local
government may increase the oﬀering price after the performance of the enterprise
improves, can also be perceived as an option with an embedded risk of an increase in
the strike price. A non-exclusive investment opportunity for which a competitive bid
can be expected can serve as another example.3
2Hassett and Metcalf (1999) tryto correct this byletting the arrival rate depend on the output
price. But still it is then possible that an investment subsidyis reduced for low output prices, while
the subsidywas maintained under high output prices. This kind of inconsistencyin the authority ’s
behavior is no longer possible under our approach.
3See Smets (1991) and Cherian and Perotti (1999) for a discussion of the eﬀects of strategic
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We consider the possibility of an upward jump in the (net) investment cost.
This jump is caused, for instance, by the reduction of an investment tax credit. It
occurs at the moment that an underlying variable reaches a certain trigger. Here, the
underlying variable is the value of the investment project. The ﬁrm is not aware of
the exact value of the trigger but it knows the probability distribution underlying the
trigger. Taking into account consistent authority behavior, the ﬁrm knows that a jump
will not occur as long as the current value of the variable remains below the maximum
that this variable has attained in the past. When the underlying variable reaches a
new maximum and still the jump does not occur, the ﬁrm updates its conjecture about
the value of the barrier.
Consequently, our objective is to determine the optimal timing of an irre-
versible investment when the investment cost is subject to change and the ﬁrm has
incomplete information about the moment of the change. It is clear that the value
of the investment opportunity drops to zero at the moment that the investment cost
jumps to inﬁnity. However, we mainly consider scenarios where the cost of investment
is still ﬁnite after the upward jump occurred. In this respect this work generalizes
Berrada (1999), Schwartz and Moon (2000), and Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), in
which the value of the project drops to zero at the unknown point of time.4
Our main results are the following. An equation is derived that implicitly
determines the value of the project at which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between investing and
refraining from the investment. This value is the optimal investment threshold and it is
shown that this threshold is decreasing with the hazard rate of the cost-increase trigger.
For the most frequently used density functions it holds that, for a given value of the
project, the hazard rate ﬁrst increases and then decreases with trigger value uncertainty.
This leads to the conclusion that the investment threshold decreases with the trigger
value uncertainty when the uncertainty is low, while it increases with uncertainty for
high uncertainty levels. Hence, for a policy maker interested in accelerating investment,
an optimal (strictly positive) level of the trigger value uncertainty can be identiﬁed
which is the level corresponding to the minimal investment threshold. Furthermore, it is
shown that the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the change delays investment.
This implies that an eﬀective policy stimulating early investment should minimize the
investors’ uncertainty about the size of the expected change.
In Section 2.2 the model with the investment cost jump resulting from a policy
change is introduced. Section 2.3 provides the major results and Section 2.4 contains a
4However, the unknown trigger in Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) is chosen endogenouslybythe
ﬁrm’s competitor.16 CHAPTER 2. DISCRETE CHANGE IN INVESTMENT COST
numerical analysis including some comparisons with Poisson based models. Section 2.5
extends the model to allow for a stochastic size of the jump in the cost. In Section 2.6
we present the implications of our model for the authority that considers an investment
tax credit policy change, and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Framework of the Model
In this section we develop the model that allows for incorporating the impact of the
expected policy change on the ﬁrm’s investment strategy. The value of the investment
project follows a geometric Brownian motion
dV (t)=αV (t)dt + σV (t)dw (t), (2.1)
where parameter α denotes the deterministic drift parameter, σ is the instantaneous
standard deviation, and dw is the increment of a Wiener process. The riskless rate is
r and it holds that α<r . The ﬁrm is assumed to be risk-neutral and it maximizes the
value of the investment option, F (V ). If the value of the investment project reaches
a critical level, a change in the value of a certain policy instrument is imposed and, as
a result, an eﬀective increase in the investment cost occurs.5 This instrument can be
interpreted, among others, as a reduction in the investment tax credit, an increase in
the cost of capital via lending rates or an increase in the oﬀering price for a privatized
enterprise. Allowing for a broader interpretation, an arrival of a competitive ﬁrm
oﬀering a higher bid for a particular project belongs to the set of potential sources of
the investment cost shock as well.
We denote by V ∗ such a realization of the process for which the new policy is
imposed and the investment cost changes from Il to Ih,w h e r eIh >I l. At this stage
we assume that Ih is deterministic. Later we consider Ih to be stochastic and discuss
implications of such an extension. The ﬁrm does not know the value of V ∗ but knows
only its cumulative density function, Ψ(V ∗). Ψ(·) is continuous and twice diﬀerentiable
everywhere in the interior of its domain. To provide a simple interpretation, we assume
that Ψ(·) is completely deﬁned by its ﬁrst two moments and is time-independent.
Consequently, if the investment cost has not increased by time τ, while   V is the highest
realization of the process so far, the cost will not increase at any u>τas long as
5If, instead, a downward change in investment cost is considered, the same solution methodology
can be applied as in the remainder of the paper. Consequently, a unique realization of the underlying
process has to be found for which the marginal cost of waiting beyond the optimal investment threshold
equals the beneﬁt of waiting associated with the expected decrease in the investment cost.2.2. FRAMEWORK OF THE MODEL 17
V (t) ≤   V for all t ≤ u. Hence, the probability of the jump in investment cost is a
function of V alone.
In order to restrict our analysis to the most interesting case, we impose the













<V∗ − Il, (iii)
(2.2)
where V and V are the lower and the higher bound of the domain of Ψ(·), respectively.
















and Vh (≡ β1Ih/(β1 − 1)) is the unconditional optimal investment threshold corre-
sponding to the cost Ih.6 Assumptions (i) and (ii) ensure that the problem is relevant,
i.e. that the policy change has not occurred yet and that there is a positive probability
that the change will take place before the optimal threshold corresponding to Il is
reached. Assumption (iii) states that ex post it is never optimal to wait with investing
until the upward change in cost occurs.
2.2.1 Value of the Investment Opportunity
Since the value of the project that triggers the increase in the investment cost is
not known beforehand, two scenarios are possible. In the ﬁrst scenario the investment
occurs before the change in the investment cost, and in the second scenario the invest-
ment takes place after the upward change. Consequently, the value of the investment
opportunity reﬂecting the structure of the expected payoﬀ, has the following form:
Fs(V,   V |I = Il)=ps(  V )E
 









(V (Th) − Ih)e
−rTh 
, (2.4)
where ps(  V ) is the conditional (on the highest realization of V ,   V ) probability that the
investment cost will not increase before the investment is made optimally, and Ts and
Th denote the ﬁrst passage time corresponding to the optimal investment threshold
61B denotes an indicator function of B such that 1B (x)=
￿
1 x ∈ B
0 x/ ∈ B
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at the low and at the high cost, respectively. After rearranging and including these
expectations, we obtain the following maximization problem that allows for ﬁnding the
optimal investment threshold:







 β1 1 − Ψ(Vs)










1 − Ψ(  V )
  
. (2.5)
Vs is the optimal investment threshold in case the investment takes place before the
change in cost, and   V is the highest realization of the process so far. Hence, the ratio
(1 − Ψ(Vs))/(1 − Ψ(  V )) is the probability that the jump in the investment cost will
not occur by the moment V is equal to Vs, given that the shock has not occurred for
V smaller than   V . Equation (2.5) is therefore interpreted as follows: the value of the
investment opportunity is equal to the weighted average of the values of two investment
opportunities. They correspond to the investment cost Il and Ih, respectively, given
that the investment is made optimally (at Vs if the cost is still equal to Il and at Vh if
the upward change has already occurred).7
The value of the investment opportunity depends on the highest realization of
the process,   V.A higher   V (thus a one closer to Vs) implies a lower probability of the
cost-increase trigger falling into the interval (  V,V s) and, as a consequence, a higher
probability of making the investment at the lower cost, Il. In order to calculate the
value of the investment opportunity, we ﬁrst need to establish the value of Vs by solving
the maximization problem.
2.2.2 Optimal Investment Threshold
The optimal investment threshold, Vs, is determined by maximizing the value of
the investment opportunity or the RHS of the Equation (2.5).
7It is worth pointing out that for Ih →∞the value of the investment opportunityboils down to:






￿β 1 − Ψ(Vs)
1 − Ψ(￿ V )
, (2.6)
which directlycorresponds to the result of Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003). In the other limiting
case, i.e. for Ih → Il, the value of investment opportunityconverges to






which is the formula obtained byMcDonald and Siegel (1986).2.3. SOLUTION CHARACTERISTICS 19








+ h(Vs) ≥ 0, (2.8)
the investment is made optimally at Vs which is the solution to the following equation:
h(Vs)V
2














1−Ψ(x) denotes the hazard rate and ψ(x) ≡
∂Ψ(x)
∂x .8
Proof. See the Appendix.
A suﬃcient condition for (2.8) to hold is that the hazard rate has to be non-
decreasing in V .9 Condition (2.8) is satisﬁed for most of the common density functions
as, e.g., exponential, uniform and Pareto.10
2.3 Solution Characteristics
In this section we analyze how the optimal threshold is aﬀected by changes in
the parameters characterizing the dynamics of the project value. In particular, we
determine the direction of the impact of the project value uncertainty and of the
changes in the investment costs under both policy regimes. Subsequently, we examine
how the uncertainty concerning the moment of imposing the change inﬂuences the
ﬁrm’s optimal investment rule.
2.3.1 Changing the Parameters of the Investment Opportu-
nity
We are interested in how potential changes in the characteristics of the investment
opportunity inﬂuence the optimal investment rule. For this purpose we formulate the
following proposition.
8In our case, the hazard rate has the following interpretation. The probabilityof the upward change
in the investment cost occurring during the nearest increment of the value of the project, dV ,( g i v e n
that the cost-increase has not occurred bynow) is equal to the appropriate hazard rate multiplied by
the size of the value increment, i.e. to h(V ;·)dV .
9More precisely, the elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to the value of the process evaluated
at the optimal investment threshold has to be larger than or equal to −1.
10In fact, the hazard rate based on the Pareto function is decreasing at the order of 1/x and the
property(2.8) is still met.20 CHAPTER 2. DISCRETE CHANGE IN INVESTMENT COST
Proposition 2.2 The eﬀects on the investment threshold level of the changes in










∀Il,I h satisfying 0 <I l <I h, ∀β1 ∈ (1,r/α) if α>0 and ∀β1 ∈ (1,∞) if α ≤ 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Consequently, the optimal threshold (ceteris paribus) increases with the initial
investment cost and decreases with the magnitude of the potential cost-increase as well
as in the parameter β1. The latter implies that the threshold increases with uncertainty
of the value of the project and decreases with the wedge between interest rate and the
project’s growth rate.
2.3.2 Impact of Policy Change
The optimal investment rule depends not only on the characteristics of the project
itself but also on the ﬁrm’s conjecture about the probability distribution underlying
the expected policy change. The parameters of this distribution can be inﬂuenced by
actions of the authority. For instance, an information campaign about the expected
changes in the investment tax credit leads to a reduction of the variance (often to
zero) of the distribution underlying the value triggering the change. Therefore, it
is important to know how changes in the uncertainty related to the project value
triggering the jump in the investment cost inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s optimal investment
rule. Knowing that the ﬁrms are going to act optimally, the authority can implement
a desired policy, which is, for instance, accelerating the investment expenditure, by
changing the level of the ﬁrms’ uncertainty about the tax strategy. We come back to
this point in Section 2.6, where policy implications for the authority are considered.
Hazard Rate
The hazard rate of the arrival of the cost-increase trigger is one of the basic inputs
for calculating the optimal investment threshold. Although it is exogenous to the ﬁrm,
it may well be controlled by another party such as the authority. Here, we determine2.3. SOLUTION CHARACTERISTICS 21
the impact of its change on the ﬁrm’s investment rule. Later, we discuss some of the
policy implications of the obtained result.
From (2.9) the following result can be obtained.
Proposition 2.3 The optimal investment threshold is decreasing with the corre-








Proof. See the Appendix.
This result implies that an increasing incremental probability of the jump leads
to an earlier optimal exercise. The intuition is quite simple: an increasing probability
of a partial deterioration of the investment opportunity after a small appreciation in
the project value reduces the value of waiting.
Furthermore, (2.13) implies that for any parameter of the density function
underlying the jump, θ, the following condition holds:











Using (2.14) we can establish how the investment threshold is aﬀected by changes in
the parameters of the distribution function underlying the occurrence of the jump.
Trigger Value Uncertainty
Now the aim is to analyze how the optimal investment threshold is aﬀected by
uncertainty related to the value of the cost-increase trigger. To do so, due to (2.14),
we only need to establish the sign of the relationship between the hazard rate and the
uncertainty related to the value of the trigger. We measure the trigger-value uncertainty
by applying a mean-preserving spread (see Rotschild and Stiglitz, 1970)
If the cost-increase trigger, V ∗, is known with certainty, the investment is made
optimally at an inﬁnitesimal instant before V ∗ is reached. At this point, the hazard
rate is zero (there is no risk that the cost increases before this trigger is reached). As
the uncertainty marginally increases, the hazard rate is aﬀected by: 1) the value of
the density function underlying the trigger, denoted by ψ(V ∗), and 2) a change in the
value of the survival function, 1−Ψ(V ∗). It can be shown that, for the most frequently
used density functions, such as normal, uniform, exponential and Pareto, the value of
the hazard rate, for any V ∈ [V (0),E[V ∗]), ﬁrst increases and then decreases with22 CHAPTER 2. DISCRETE CHANGE IN INVESTMENT COST
the mean-preserving spread. An example for the normal density function is shown in
Figure 2.1.11
























Figure 2.1: The relationship between the hazard rate and standard deviation of a normal
density function N (150,ω 2). Hazard rates are plotted for V =1 0 0 , 120 and 140.
We conclude that, for each degree of the trigger value uncertainty, there exists
such a value of V< E [V ∗], say  V ,t h a tf o rV ∈ [V (0),  V ) the hazard rate increases,
and for V ∈ ( V,E[V ∗]) decreases, with this uncertainty. This form of the relation-
ship between the hazard rate and the uncertainty implies (via Proposition 2.3) that
Vs decreases with the uncertainty if it falls into the interval [V (0),  V ) and increases
otherwise. Consequently, in order to determine the sign of the eﬀect of uncertainty on
Vs, we need to establish the relative position of Vs with respect to  V .
We denote the standard deviation of the density function underlying the cost-
increase trigger by ω. Since the expression for Vs is already known (see (2.9)), all we









11Although the concepts of the mean-preserving spread and increased standard deviation are, in
general, not equivalent, they may be treated as such for the types of density functions referred to in
this chapter.
12Although ￿ V (ω) cannot be written explicitly in a general form, its values corresponding to a given
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For the most frequently used density functions it can be shown that  V decreases with
uncertainty. Consequently, for a relatively low degree of uncertainty, it holds that
Vs <  V (<E[V ∗]). Since for V< V the hazard rate increases in ω, Vs falls when
the uncertainty rises. After the uncertainty reaches a critical level, say ωe, at which
Vs =  V, the hazard rate at Vs decreases with ω and the optimal threshold begins
to increase. This implies that optimal investment threshold attains its minimum for
ω = ωe. Now, we are able to formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4 Consider the following unrestrictive conditions
lim
ω→∞
ψ(V,·)=0 , ∀V and
ψ(V,·) is unimodal.
(2.16)
Then, there exists a non-monotonic relationship between the optimal investment thresh-
old and the trigger value uncertainty. At a low degree of uncertainty, the marginal in-
crease in uncertainty leads to an earlier optimal investment. The reverse is true for a
high degree of uncertainty. There exists a unique ωe, such that Vs(ωe)= V (ωe), which
separates the areas of low and high uncertainty levels.
Proof. Proposition 2.4 directly follows from the analysis performed so far.
The interpretation of the proposition is relatively simple. At low levels of uncer-
tainty concerning the policy change the ﬁrm responds to an increase of this uncertainty
by investing earlier (i.e. at a lower V ). This is because the chance of earlier imple-
mentation of the policy change increases. However, when this uncertainty becomes
suﬃciently high, the ﬁrm is more willing to ignore the information about the expected
change since the quality of this information has deteriorated too much. The marginal
impacts of a higher probability of an early change and of the increased ”noisiness” of
the ﬁrm’s conjecture oﬀset exactly at the level of uncertainty equal to ωe.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the relationship between the uncertainty, ω, and the
optimal investment threshold. From Figure 2.2 it can be seen that the optimal invest-
ment threshold is ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing with the uncertainty concerning
the value of the trigger. The minimum is always reached when Vs(ω) intersects  V (ω).
The hazard rate increases with ω in the area located to the south-west from  V (ω)
and decreases in the north-eastern region. The opposite holds for Vs. Moreover, the
optimal threshold is higher if the expected change in the investment cost is smaller (cf.
Proposition 2.2).
From Figure 2.3 it can be noticed that the point,  V , at which the derivative
of the hazard rate is equal to zero decreases when the trigger uncertainty increases.24 CHAPTER 2. DISCRETE CHANGE IN INVESTMENT COST



















Figure 2.2: The relationship between the uncertainty, ω, and the optimal investment thresh-
old, Vs, for diﬀerent magnitudes of the high investment cost (Ih = 120,150 and 200). The
values are calculated for a normal density function with mean 150. The original investment
cost, Il equals 100. An intersection of Vs and  V corresponds to the minimal investment
threshold, Vs(ωe). The parameters of the underlying process are: α =0 ,r=0 .025 and
σ =0 .1.
As long as Vs <  V , the optimal threshold also decreases (cf. the location of V L
s ).
When the standard deviation is equal to ωe, Vs equals  V . After a further increase in
the uncertainty,  V continues to decrease and Vs starts to increase (cf. V H
s ). For a
suﬃciently high degree of uncertainty Vs tends to the unconditional threshold, denoted
by Vl (≡ β1Il/(β1 − 1)).13
2.4 Comparative Statics
In this section we provide a numerical illustration of the results of our model. In
Table 2.1 the relationship between the uncertainty about the timing of the jump in the
investment cost and the optimal investment threshold is shown for diﬀerent levels of
the after-shock investment cost. The results are grouped in three panels corresponding
to the diﬀerent combinations of the rate of growth and volatility of the project’s value.
13The necessary and suﬃcient condition for lim
ω→∞Vs = Vl is lim















Figure 2.3: The relationship between V and the derivative of the hazard rate with respect
to the trigger value uncertainty. The optimal investment thresholds, V Min
s ,V H
s ,a n dV L
s ,
correspond to uncertainty levels equal to, higher that, and lower than, respectively, the level
of uncertainty triggering the earliest investment. Vl is the optimal investment threshold in
the absence of the expected policy change.
The results indicate a clear non-monotonic dependence of the optimal invest-
ment threshold on the uncertainty related to the occurrence of the shock. For example,
consider the case where α =0 .02 and σ =0 .1. When the ﬁrm’s conjecture about the
expected occurrence of the shock is relatively precise (ω = 5), the possibility of dou-
bling the eﬀective investment cost results in the expected timing of undertaking the
project being equal to 4.91 years.14 When the uncertainty concerning the occurrence of
the jump becomes moderately higher (ω = 25), the ﬁrms is expected to invest within
2.78 years. Finally, when the ﬁrm’s conjecture about the moment of the shock is highly
imprecise (ω = 100), the expected time to invest equals 9.67 years. If the project is
about to deteriorate completely after the shock in the economy, the expected timing
of investment shortens signiﬁcantly, especially if the uncertainty concerning the occur-
rence of the shock is high. For ω = 5 it is equal to 4.13 years, and for ω =2 5i ti s
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optimal to invest immediately. In the case corresponding to a very high imprecision of
the conjecture (ω = 100) the expected time to invest equals 3.80 years.
E [V ∗] = 160 Vs
Ih ω 1 0 0 5 02 51 0 5
110 186.48 177.91 169.62 162.32 159.57
125 176.96 166.88 158.90 153.95 154.10
150 169.02 158.64 151.65 149.62 151.99
200 161.85 151.68 145.98 146.76 150.71
500 152.76 143.32 139.64 143.93 149.47
∞ 148.22 NOW NOW 142.74 148.94
Vl = 200 α =0 .02 σ =0 .1 r =0 .05
110 153.41 150.18 147.36 147.40 150.42
125 149.08 144.74 142.11 144.45 149.04
150 145.39 140.59 138.53 142.69 148.25
200 142.21 NOW NOW 141.45 147.69
500 NOW NOW NOW 140.35 147.20
∞ NOW NOW NOW 140.11 147.10
Vl = 158.77 α =0 .01 σ =0 .1 r =0 .05
110 302.09 281.54 271.10 302.07 302.07
125 270.82 248.50 236.21 230.52 201.37
150 246.79 223.99 210.45 203.01 201.22
200 225.19 202.79 188.74 179.47 176.70
500 194.54 174.42 162.24 155.32 154.80
∞ 160.54 145.73 140.46 144.60 149.97
Vl = 371.85 α =0 .02 σ =0 .3 r =0 .05
Table 2.1: The optimal investment thresholds calculated for three diﬀerent combinations of
the rate of growth and volatility of the project’s value. NOW means that investment takes
place immediately. The results are presented for the following parameter values: investment
cost before the jump Il = 100, investment cost after the jump ranging from 110 to inﬁnity,
standard deviation of the probability distribution underlying the policy change, ω, ranging
from 5 to 100. The initial value of the process equals V (0) = 140.
The direction of the impact of change in the growth rate and/or volatility of
the project’s value is consistent with the conclusions in the existing real options liter-2.4. COMPARATIVE STATICS 27
ature: the change in both parameters results in an increase in the optimal investment
threshold.
In Table 2.2 we show the values corresponding to the investment opportunity
and probabilities that the investment is made before the increase in the investment
cost (provided that the cost still equals Il at V (0)). It can be seen that a higher
magnitude of the change in the investment cost results in i) deteriorating the value
of the investment opportunity, and ii) an increased probability of investing before the
shock occurs (which is a direct consequence of the lower optimal threshold).
E [V ∗] = 160 F (V ),P(Vs <V∗|V ∗ >V(0))
Ih ω 1 0 0 5 02 51 0 5
110 61.54 66.65 70.58 71.24 66.00
0.68 0.55 0.44 0.42 0.53
125 55.82 57.11 56.94 53.25 48.66
0.75 0.68 0.66 0.74 0.88
150 50.93 50.01 48.28 46.28 45.27
0.80 0.78 0.80 0.87 0.95
200 46.69 44.70 42.93 43.01 43.92
0.85 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.97
500 42.16 40.51 40.00 40.86 42.98
0.91 0.96 1.00 0.97 0.98
∞ 40.62 40.00 40.00 40.30 42.66
0.94 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.97
Vl = 200 α =0 .02 σ =0 .1 r =0 .05
Table 2.2: The values of the investment opportunity and probabilities of investing at Il for
the following parameter values: investment cost before the jump Il = 100, investment cost
after the jump ranging from 110 to inﬁnity, standard deviation of the probability distribution
underlying the policy change ranging from 5 to 100. The initial value of the process equals
V (0) =  V =1 4 0 .
An interesting observation can be made upon analyzing the relationship be-
tween the trigger-value uncertainty and the value of the investment opportunity. The
non-monotonicity of this relationship results from the interaction of two opposite ef-
fects. First, increasing the variance, ω, implies lower quality of the ﬁrm’s information
about the moment of the policy change. This factor aﬀects the value of the investment28 CHAPTER 2. DISCRETE CHANGE IN INVESTMENT COST
opportunity negatively. On the other hand, higher uncertainty makes the probability
of survival on the interval [V (0),V s] become higher. This enhances the value of the
investment opportunity.15 It appears that in situations where the magnitude of the
change in the investment cost is small, the value of the project is the highest for a
moderate precision of the conjecture about the timing of the change. Conversely, if the
investment opportunity is to deteriorate completely upon the occurrence of the shock,
the value of the project is most likely to be equal to its static NPV, i.e. the value of
the project minus investment cost, for a moderate precision of the conjecture.
To provide some intuition of how the results of our model correspond to the
outcome of Poisson based models, in which the whole information about the shock is
aggregated in a single arrival parameter, we present some comparative statics compar-
ing both approaches in Table 2.3.16
Vl = 200.00 Ih =1 5 0
λ E [V ∗] VP
1
λ ω(λ) Vs (ω(λ))
0.01 627.44 191.64 100 1031.90 196.61
0.05 188.98 172.25 20 56.91 166.49
0.10 162.66 161.11 10 24.42 152.51
0.25 148.66 148.48 48 .92 142.49
0.33 146.51 145.47 36 .66 140.98
0.50 144.26 141.67 24 .33 NOW
α =0 .02 σ =0 .1 r =0 .05
Table 2.3: The optimal investment thresholds based on the model with the policy change
triggered by trigger V ∗,V s(ω(λ)), compared with the outcomes of the Poisson based model,
VP,w i t ht h ea r r i v a lr a t eλ ranging from 0.01 to 0.50 where the initial value of the process
equals V (0) = 140 and the investment cost before the jump Il =1 0 0 .ω(λ) is a geometric
average of an upward and downward deviation from E [V ∗], that are associated with the
expected ﬁrst passage time 1
λ.17
15The positive impact on the value of the investment opportunity results from the fact that condi-
tional on V ∗ >V(0) the cumulative density function of V ∗ is decreasing in ω for suﬃciently large ω.
This is equivalent, by deﬁnition, to the increase of the value of the conditional survival function.
16In order to calculate the optimal thresholds based on the Poisson arrivals, we apply a similar
methodology as Dixit and Pindyck (1996), pp. 305-306.
17Consequently, ω (λ) is deﬁned as ω (λ) ≡ E
￿
(E [V ∗] − V sd−)(V sd+ − E [V ∗]), where V sd+
(V sd−) is the upward (downward) deviation from E [V ∗] such that the expected ﬁrst-passage time
of reaching V sd+ (E [V ∗]) when the process originates at E [V ∗]( V sd−)e q u a l s 1
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In Table 2.3 E [V ∗] is selected in such a way that its expected ﬁrst passage time
is equal to the expected time of a Poisson jump of a given arrival rate. Moreover, the
level of uncertainty concerning the cost-increase trigger corresponds to the standard
deviation of the trigger implied by the Poisson process. It appears that the slope of the
relationship between the cost-increase trigger uncertainty and the optimal investment
threshold is higher when our model is used than in the Poisson based approach. In
other words, the resulting investment thresholds will be more responsive to the changes
in ω. Consequently, for high levels of cost-increase trigger uncertainty, the optimal
investment threshold under our approach will be higher than for Poisson based models
(a cost increase trigger combined with very noisy information will not have a substantial
eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s investment behavior). Conversely, if the prediction of the policy
change is more reliable, the ﬁrm will invest more carefully (therefore earlier).
Finally, in Table 2.4 we show the outcomes of the Poisson based model in which
the arrival rate is positively related to the value of the project.
Vl = 200.00 λVa r|V =VPVar = λ λVa r|V =V0 = λ
λ E [V ∗] VP dV PVar dV PVar
0.01 627.44 191.64 5.195 × 10−5 192.52 7.143 × 10−5 190.20
0.05 188.98 172.75 2.875 × 10−4 173.71 3.511 × 10−4 170.69
0.10 162.66 161.11 6.160 × 10−4 162.49 7.143 × 10−4 160.33
0.25 148.66 148.48 1.675 × 10−3 149.24 1.178 × 10−3 148.53
0.33 146.51 145.47 2.284 × 10−3 145.96 2.357 × 10−3 145.64
0.50 144.26 141.67 3.520 × 10−3 142.07 3.571 × 10−3 141.95
α =0 .02 σ =0 .1 r =0 .05
Table 2.4: The optimal investment threshold, VP,a n dVPVar, calculated according to the
Poisson based model with a constant and a variable arrival rate λ = Vd , respectively. The
initial value of the process equals V (0) = 140, the investment cost before the jump Il = 100,
and the investment cost after the jump Ih = 150. Parameter d corresponding to the variable
arrival rate is a solution to λ = VPVard in column 4 and λ = V0d in column 6, while the
relevant λ i sp r e s e n t e di nc o l u m n1.
Table 2.4 illustrates the impact on the optimal investment threshold of intro-
ducing a variable arrival rate. The arrival rate increases with the value of the project.
For the ﬁrst set of solutions (columns 4-5) the variable λ(V ) equals λ in column 1 ex-
a c t l ya tt h el e v e lo fV triggering the investment, i.e. λ(VPVar)=λ. Analogously, the
second set of solutions (columns 5-6) correspond to such a normalization upon which30 CHAPTER 2. DISCRETE CHANGE IN INVESTMENT COST
the variable rate λ(V ) equals to a constant λ in column 1 at V (0). Despite the fact
that the variable λ has been normalized in two extreme ways, the diﬀerences in out-
comes are relatively small. Therefore, we conclude that introducing a variable arrival
rate in the Poisson-based model does not signiﬁcantly alter the ﬁrm’s investment rule.
2.5 Extension: Stochastic Jump Size
In this section we relax the assumption that the magnitude of the change in the
investment cost is known beforehand. The ﬁrm is assumed to know only the density
function of the size of the jump. Consequently, the random variable Ih is distributed




and Ih > 0.
Moreover, we impose a condition








that ensures that the ﬁrm prefers incurring the cost Il to spending the stochastic
amount Ih.18
Like in the deterministic case, the value of the investment opportunity, Fs,
reﬂects the structure of the expected payoﬀs maximized with respect to the optimal
investment threshold, Vs. For stochastic Ih, the value of the investment opportunity
becomes (cf. (2.5)):
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Equation (2.18) can be interpreted analogously to (2.5), where the second component
is the expected value of the option to invest after the upward change in the investment
cost occurs. We prove that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.5 In case of a stochastic size of the jump in the investment cost, the













18The LHS of (2.17) has a natural interpretation presented in the remainder of the section.2.5. EXTENSION: STOCHASTIC JUMP SIZE 31
in expression (2.9) for the optimal threshold.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Formula (2.19) can be interpreted as a certainty equivalent of the high in-
vestment cost. In other words, the investment policy of the ﬁrms is identical in the
following two cases: i) investment cost Ih is stochastic and distributed according to
Φ(Ih), and ii) Ih is deterministic and equal to I∗
h. This allows for a relatively simple
analysis of the impact on the optimal investment timing of the uncertainty concerning
the magnitude of the jump.
The impact of the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the jump can be



















Since, by (2.11), ∂Vs
∂Ih < 0, the threshold is higher in the case of a stochastic jump.
This result can be explained in the following way. The value of the investment
opportunity is a convex function of the new investment cost, Ih (cf. (2.4)). Therefore,
the gains from below average realizations of the jump are assigned a larger weight by the
ﬁrm than the symmetric losses resulting from above-average realizations. Consequently,
the ﬁrm is going to wait longer if the realizations are random than in the case when
all of them are equal to the average.
Compared to the basic model where investment cost is constant, the threat of
an upward change in the investment cost reduces the optimal investment threshold.
Now, we can see that the uncertainty in the size of the jump mitigates this reduction of
the threshold value. Again, it holds that increased uncertainty raises the option value
of waiting.
Apart from the overall diﬀerence between the uncertain and deterministic out-
come, we are interested in the marginal impact of uncertainty on the optimal investment
strategy. In other words, we aim at establishing how the investment threshold behaves
for diﬀerent degrees of uncertainty concerning the size of the jump. Therefore, we com-
pare the investment triggers corresponding to a relatively small and a high degree of
uncertainty. For this purpose, we use the concept of mean preserving spread (Rotschild32 CHAPTER 2. DISCRETE CHANGE IN INVESTMENT COST
and Stiglitz, 1970). In this setting, the eﬀect of increasing uncertainty is examined by
replacing the original random variable Ih (’low uncertainty’ case) by a new random
variable Ih +ξ (’high uncertainty’ case), where E[ξ]=0a n dσξ ∈ (0,∞). By applying
Jensen’s inequality it can be proved that the expected value of a convex function (in
our case f(Ih)=I
1−β1
h ) increases as its argument undergoes a mean preserving spread
(cf. Hartman, 1976). Consequently, an increase in the uncertainty leads to a higher
expected value of I
1−β1
h which corresponds to a lower I∗
h. This observation results in
the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1 Increasing the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the jump
of the investment cost (in a mean-preserving spread sense) leads to a higher optimal
investment threshold and is equivalent to decreasing the expected magnitude of the jump.
The impact on the optimal investment rule of uncertainty related to the mag-
nitude of the change in the cost is monotonic. Furthermore, (2.11) implies that a lower
potential increase in the investment cost is associated with a higher optimal invest-
ment threshold. In Table 2.5 we present the numerical results illustrating the impact
of the uncertainty related to the magnitude of the change on the optimal investment
threshold.
V ∗ =1 6 0 Vs
Ih Ih ω 1 0 0 5 02 51 0 5
150 150 169.02 158.64 151.65 149.62 151.99
125 175 169.34 158.96 151.92 149.76 152.06
100 200 170.39 160.02 152.83 150.26 152.29
50 250 177.29 167.25 159.23 154.18 154.21
25 275 192.81 186.54 179.08 171.64 168.60
Vl = 200 α =0 .02 σ =0 .1 r =0 .05
Table 2.5: The impact of the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the change in the
investment cost on the optimal investment threshold, where investment cost before the jump
Il = 100.
The numerical results in Table 2.5 illustrate that a higher degree of uncertainty
associated with the magnitude of the potential cost-increase results in a later invest-
ment (the ﬁrst row of Table 2.5 corresponds to the third row of Table 2.1). Therefore,
in the investment credit example, increasing this type of uncertainty has the same
eﬀect on the investment as the reduction of the magnitude of the change.2.6. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INVESTMENT CREDIT TAX POLICY CHANGE33
2.6 Implications for the Investment Credit Tax Pol-
icy Change
In our setting, the way in which the policy change is implemented by the authority





. Consequently, as a result of the policy change,
the investment cost is subject to increase by a proportion
Ih
Il . The increase is triggered
by the project’s value reaching the level V ∗ and ω corresponds to the precision of
the ﬁrm’s conjecture concerning the moment of change. To simplify the example we
assume that the ratio
Ih
Il is predetermined by the current amount of the tax credit (and
is a priori common knowledge). The variables V ∗ and ω are the authority’s decision
variables.
As we already know, in case of a single ﬁrm whose investment opportunity
satisﬁes (2.2), a decrease in a deterministic V ∗ results in a lower optimal threshold.
Consequently, a reduction in the trigger value is going to accelerate this ﬁrm’s invest-
ment. However, in case of multiple heterogenous ﬁrms, due to the fact that a reduction
of V ∗ makes condition (2.2, iii) tighter, lowering the trigger has two opposite eﬀects.
First, as in the single-ﬁrm case, it leads to an earlier investment for those ﬁrms for
which Assumption (iii) (cf. (2.2)) is still satisﬁed. On the other hand, it results in
the other ﬁrms waiting longer and investing at a high cost (i.e. those ﬁrms for which
Assumption (iii) does not hold any longer). Hence, if the ﬁrms are suﬃciently het-
erogeneous, reducing V ∗ does not yield the desired eﬀect of accelerating aggregate
investment.
Therefore, the authority may prefer to resort to another instrument, such as
ω. From Proposition 2.4 it can be concluded that there exists a U-shaped relationship
between ω and the optimal threshold, Vs. Since Vs reaches a minimum for a certain
(strictly positive) degree of uncertainty, ωe, the optimal strategy of the authority in-
terested in accelerating the investment is to generate suﬃciently (but not excessively)
imprecise information about the conditions triggering the change. In purely analyti-
cal terms, this corresponds to setting the standard deviation of the density function
associated with the conjecture about the policy change trigger, Ψ(V ∗), to ωe.
Since ﬁnding the true value of ωe can be diﬃcult in practice, we brieﬂy discuss
the impact on the investment behavior of misspecifying the optimal ω.As m a l ld e v i -
ation from ωe results in a small relative delay in investment. Consequently, it is still
desirable for the authority to create informational noise. However, if the misspeciﬁca-
tion of ωe is large, it can happen that the resulting optimal investment threshold, Vs,i s34 CHAPTER 2. DISCRETE CHANGE IN INVESTMENT COST
higher than the threshold corresponding to the case where V ∗ is known to the ﬁrm. In
this case the authority is better oﬀ by revealing the value of V ∗ to the investing ﬁrm. It
is possible to ﬁnd a critical level of ω,d e ﬁ n e da sω, above which the optimal threshold
is greater than the one corresponding to the known V ∗. According to Proposition 2.1,




















If it is assumed that increasing the uncertainty by the authority is equivalent
to applying a mean preserving spread, the change in the optimal investment threshold
at ω is discontinuous. Since the mean preserving spread implies that a policy change
occurs at V ∗ = E [V ∗], imposing a level of uncertainty ω>ω results in the investment
being made after the change in the cost occurs, i.e. at Vh (  Vs). Therefore, increasing
ω beyond ω leads to a considerable delay of the investment.
We conclude that the level of uncertainty concerning the value of the policy





[0,ω)\ωe : feasible (suboptimal) level of uncertainty,
ωe : optimal level of uncertainty,
[ω,∞) : excess uncertainty resulting in an investment delay.
The threat of the policy change accelerates investment most signiﬁcantly if the degree
of uncertainty concerning the moment of the change is equal to ωe. Therefore, from
the point of view of the authority, this is the optimal level of the trigger value uncer-
tainty. Revealing the value of V ∗ by the authority (ω = 0) makes the ﬁrm invest an
instant before V ∗ is reached. Excessive uncertainty (above ω) implies that information
concerning the policy change is too unreliable to trigger investment before V ∗ is hit.
As an eﬀect, the optimal investment threshold exceeds the threshold corresponding to
the known V ∗. Consequently, there exists a set of feasible, though suboptimal, levels
of uncertainty ω ∈ [0,ω)\ωe for which the optimal investment threshold is lower than
V ∗. For this set the threat of change remains high enough to trigger early investment.
The implications related to uncertainty in the magnitude of the policy change
are straightforward, thus not requiring additional analysis. As shown in Section 2.5,
an increase in the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the change leads to a delay
19Equation (2.22) is also satisﬁed for ω = 0,since the optimal threshold in the deterministic case is
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of the moment of investment. Consequently, ensuring that the magnitude of the policy
change is known beforehand to potential investors lies in the interest of the authority
interested in accelerating investment.
2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we consider an investment opportunity of a ﬁrm, where the in-
vestment cost is irreversible and subject to an increase resulting from a policy change.
The value of the cost-increase trigger is unknown to the ﬁrm but the ﬁrm knows the
underlying density function instead. This corresponds to a situation where the ﬁrm
has some information concerning the authority’s future policy and this information
is incomplete. Moreover, it is taken into account that a policy change mainly occurs
under certain economic conditions.
We show that the threat of a policy change resulting in a higher investment
cost leads to a reduction in the option value of waiting. Consequently, the ﬁrm in-
vests earlier than in the case of a constant investment cost. The optimal investment
threshold decreases with the magnitude of the change in investment cost and increases
with market volatility (the latter result also holds for the Dixit and Pindyck, 1996,
framework). One of our main results is that the impact of trigger value uncertainty on
the optimal investment threshold is non-monotonic. If the uncertainty is suﬃciently
low, then the investment threshold is negatively related to the trigger value uncer-
tainty. However, a rise in the uncertainty beyond a certain critical point reverses this
relationship and leads to an increase of the optimal investment threshold.
Moreover, we extend the analysis by considering the case where the magnitude
of the change is stochastic. This additional source of uncertainty results in a delay of
investment. Increasing the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the change leads
to an outcome that is closer to the unconditional optimal threshold.
We apply our results to determine the optimal design of a change in the au-
thority’s policy, where the authority’s aim is to accelerate investment undertaken by
the ﬁrm. There exists a certain (strictly positive) level of the uncertainty concerning
the policy change trigger that is associated with the earliest investment. Hence, a pol-
icy maker interested in accelerating investment should aim at achieving that particular
level of uncertainty. In addition, in order to stimulate the ﬁrm to invest early, the au-
thority should make sure that the magnitude of the policy change is known beforehand
to potential investors.36 CHAPTER 2. DISCRETE CHANGE IN INVESTMENT COST
2.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1. The implicit solution for the optimal investment thresh-
old is found by calculating the ﬁrst order condition of (2.5). By diﬀerentiating (2.5)





(Vs − β1Vs + β1Il)
1 − Ψ(Vs)
1 − Ψ(  V )


























































which in a straightforward way leads to (2.9).
In order to prove that (2.9) is the expression for the maximal value of the

























￿ (Vs)Vs + h(Vs))
 


















− (β1 − 1). (2.24)2.8. APPENDIX 37
















The sign of the ﬁrst component can be determined by noting that the lower bound
of Vs, denoted by Vs, is a solution to the following equation (cf. (2.2, iii)):






For Vs = Vs the second factor in the ﬁrst component of (2.24) is equal to zero and for
Vs >V s it is positive. Therefore the whole expression is negative if (2.8) holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Let us deﬁne the LHS of (2.9) as a function:
H(Vs,I l,I h,β1) (2.27)
= h(Vs)V
2












Diﬀerentiating (2.27) with respect to Il,I h and β1, respectively, yields:
∂H
∂Il
= −(Vsh(Vs)+β1) < 0,
∂H
∂Ih


































∀Il,I h satisfying 0 <I l <I h, ∀β1 ∈ (1,r/α)i fα>0a n d∀β1 ∈ (1,∞)i fα ≤ 0.






















+( β1 − 1).
From the proof of Proposition 2.1 (cf. (2.26)) it is known that under condition (2.8)
∂H
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which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. By diﬀerentiating (2.27) with respect to the hazard














The inequality holds since both factors are positive (cf. (2.26)). Since ∂H
∂Vs is also
positive, we directly obtain the sign of (2.13).
Proof of Proposition 2.5. Equation (2.19) requires the optimal investment
threshold with a deterministic size of the jump to be equal to the threshold with a
jump with a stochastic size distributed according to Φ(Ih). Since the maximization
problem with a stochastic size of the jump can be expressed as follows:
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the expression for the optimal investment threshold is a slight modiﬁcation of (2.9):
h(Vs)V
2


















































which is equivalent to (2.19).Chapter 3
Demand Uncertainty in a Cournot
Model
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider a continuous-time model in which a ﬁrm makes a de-
cision to replace a production facility with a new, cost-eﬃcient one. The ﬁrm operates
in an uncertain economic environment under imperfect competition. The model fol-
lowsSmets (1991) and Grenadier (1996) in assuming that i) there are two identical
ﬁrms competing in the product market, and ii) the value of the ﬁrm depends on the
value of a stochastic process but is otherwise time independent. The payoﬀ functions
are derived from the ﬁrm’s reaction curves in the oligopolistic market. We determine
the optimal replacement strategies, calculate the expected replacement timing and
determine the probabilities of making optimal replacement within given time intervals.
Under either perfect competition or a monopolistic market structure, the mod-
ern theory of investment under uncertainty (cf. Section 1.6 of this thesis and Dixit and
Pindyck, 1996, Ch. 5) predicts that the ﬁrm will wait longer with investing if uncer-
tainty is higher. This is due to the fact that investment is irreversible and the ﬁrm has
an option to postpone it until some uncertainty is resolved. However, if (i) more than
one ﬁrm holds the investment opportunity, and (ii) the ﬁrm’s investment decision di-
rectly inﬂuences payoﬀs of its competitor(s), opposite eﬀects of increasing uncertainty
with respect to the investment timing can arise. First, increasing uncertainty enhances
the value of the option to wait. Second, the value of an early strategic investment
(made in order to achieve the ﬁrst mover advantage) can signiﬁcantly increase as well.
Huisman and Kort (1999) show that in a continuous-time duopoly model with proﬁt
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uncertainty (cf. Smets, 1991, and Grenadier, 1996) the eﬀect of a change in the value
of the option to wait on the optimal investment threshold is always stronger than the
impact of strategic interactions.1 This implies a negative relationship between uncer-
tainty of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt ﬂow and investment. On the contrary, Kulatilaka and Perotti
(1998) ﬁnd that product market uncertainty may, in some cases, stimulate investment.2
The latter authors consider a two-period setting in which (one of the) duopolistic ﬁrms
can invest in a cost-reducing technology. The payoﬀ from investment is convex in the
size of the demand since an increase of demand has a more-than-proportional eﬀect on
the realized duopolistic proﬁts (ﬁrms are responding to higher demand by increasing
both output and price). Taking into account Jensen’s inequality, Kulatilaka and Perotti
(1998) conclude that higher volatility of the product market can accelerate investment.
The aim of this chapter is to determine the eﬀects of product market uncer-
tainty on investment in a continuous-time setting. To do so, we begin the analysis by
describing the equilibrium strategies that occur in the resulting real option game in the
model with product market uncertainty. We show that, contrary to the models based
on proﬁt uncertainty, the type of equilibrium depends on the investment cost: if this
cost is suﬃciently low (high), a preemptive (simultaneous) equilibrium occurs.3 Fur-
thermore, we prove that the minimal demand level triggering the investment increases
with uncertainty for both ﬁrms. This result holds both for the case in which the invest-
ment is associated with replacing an existing asset and for the case in which the ﬁrms
have to decide when to start up production. Moreover, we show that, in expectation,
product market uncertainty delays investment. We thus can conclude that the result
of Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) does not carry over to a continuous-time setting. Fi-
nally, we analyze the probability of asset replacement within a given time interval. It
turns out that the replacement probability decreases with uncertainty for time inter-
vals longer than the time to reach the optimal Jorgensonian threshold calculated for
the deterministic case.4 For shorter intervals there are two opposite eﬀects which leads
1In fact,the option eﬀect and strategic the eﬀect may work in the same direction. Boyer et al.
(2002) show that an increase in uncertainty can result in a the equilibrium in which ﬁrms opt for a
late simultaneous investment instead of an earlier sequential entry.
2Proﬁt uncertainty is associated with the proﬁt function following a geometric Brownian motion,
whereas product market uncertainty relates to random shifts in the demand curve.
3This implies that the type of equilibrium can easily be aﬀected by e.g. the authority. The rule
imposed by Germany’s telecom regulator enabling six companies which acquired the third generation
mobile-phone licenses to share the costs of building a new infrastructure,may serve as an example of
such an action. See The Economist,9th June 2001
4At such a threshold the ﬂow revenues are equal to the ﬂow costs associated with investment.3.2. FRAMEWORK OF THE MODEL 41
to a humped relationship between uncertainty and the probability of replacement (cf.
Sarkar, 2000).
The model is presented in Section 3.2, while the value functions and replace-
ment thresholds are derived in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 contains a description of the
equilibria and in Section 3.5 the eﬀect of uncertainty on replacement thresholds is
determined. In Section 3.6 the decision to start production in a new market is ana-
lyzed. Section 3.7 examines how uncertainty inﬂuences replacement timing and the
probability of investment within a given time interval. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Framework of the Model
Consider a risk-neutral ﬁrm that has an investment opportunity to replace its
existing production facility with a technologically superior one. The ﬁrm operates in a
duopoly, in which, in line with basic microeconomic theory, the following inverse linear
demand function holds:
p(t)=A(t) − Q(t). (3.1)
For each t ∈ [0,∞), p(t) is the price of a non-durable good/service oﬀered by the ﬁrm
and can be interpreted as the instantaneous cash ﬂow per unit sold, A(t) is a measure
of the size of the demand, and Q(t) is the total amount of the good supplied to the
market. Parameter A(t) follows a geometric Brownian motion
dA(t)=αA(t)dt + σA(t)dw(t), (3.2)
where α is the instantaneous drift parameter, σ is the instantaneous standard deviation,
dt is the time increment, and dw(t) is the standard Wiener increment.5
The other ﬁrm operating in the market is identical to the ﬁrst, both are proﬁt-
maximizers and compete in quantities (` al aCournot).6 The initial constant marginal
cost of supplying a unit of the good is K and setting up the new production facility
reduces this cost from K to k. In order to start using the new facility, Firm i, i ∈
{1,2}, has to incur an irreversible cost I. Simple algebraic manipulation results in the
5Such a formulation implies that demand is driven by consumers’ tastes (a varying maximal val-
uation) and by replication of consumers (a varying mass of consumers). Models with multiplicative
proﬁt uncertainty,such as Huisman (2001),Ch. 7-9,and Boyer et al. (2002),are equivalent,under
zero marginal cost assumption,to demand driven by the changes in consumers’ tastes.
6Quantity competition yields the same output as a two-stage game in which the capacities are
chosen ﬁrst and,subsequently,the ﬁrms are competing in prices (see Tirole,1988,p. 216).42 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL

























Superscript 1 (0) in πij indicates which ﬁrm replaced (did not replace) its production







The proﬁt of the only ﬁrm which replaced the production facility is higher than in the
proﬁt of a ﬁrm in a situation where two ﬁrms made the replacement. In turn, the latter
proﬁt exceeds the proﬁt of symmetric ﬁrms operating the existing facility, which is still
higher than the proﬁt of the only ﬁrm which did not replace its production asset.
Admittedly, the chosen model formulation is one out of many possibilities. We
choose this speciﬁcation in order to be able to make comparisons with the results of the
two-period model of Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998). This chapter can be seen therefore
as a ﬁrst fully dynamic investigation of the impact of product market uncertainty on
investment timing. Extensions can include multiplicative rather than additive demand
uncertainty, variable marginal costs, and Bertrand competition.
We summarize the problem by describing the strategy space of the ﬁrms. Deﬁne
a simple strategy of Firm i (i ∈ {1,2}) as a tuple of real-value functions (Gi (·),p i (·)) :
[0,∞) × Ω → [0,1] × [0,1], such that for all ω ∈ Ω it holds that (cf. Thijssen et al.,
2002, and Boyer et al., 2002):
(i) Gi (·;ω) is non-decreasing and right-continuous with left limits,
(ii) pi (·;ω) is right diﬀerentiable and right-continuous with left limits,
(iii)i fpi(t;ω)=0a n dt = inf{u|pi (u;ω) > 0}, then the right derivative of pi (t;ω)
is positive.
Now the strategy space for Firm i is given by the set Si = {(Gi(·),p i (·))|Gi(·)
satisﬁes (i), and pi (·)s a t i s ﬁ e s( ii)a n d( iii)}. The strategy space of the game is then
7We assume that K ￿ A(0),so that the probability weighted discount factor associated with the
event {A(t) < 2K − k} is negligible. Waiving this assumption would not signiﬁcantly contribute to
our results and would be done at the expense of explicit analytical formulae for the optimal investment
thresholds (cf. Dixit and Pindyck,1996,p. 191).3.3. VALUE FUNCTIONS AND REPLACEMENT THRESHOLDS 43
S = S1 × S2. To determine the ﬁrms’ optimal policies we use the subgame perfect
equilibrium concept, while the ﬁrms’ strategies are assumed to satisfy intertemporal
consistency and α-consistency conditions (for the deﬁnitions see Fudenberg and Tirole,
1985, p. 393, and Thijssen et al., 2002, p. 9, respectively).8
3.3 Value Functions and Replacement Thresholds
In this section we establish the value of the ﬁrms and their optimal replacement
thresholds. There are three possibilities concerning the timing of Firm i’s investment
relatively to the decision of the competitor (Firm j). First, Firm i may invest before
Firm j does and, therefore, become the leader. Alternatively, Firm j may invest sooner
and Firm i becomes the follower. Finally, the ﬁrms may invest simultaneously.
The standard approach used to solve dynamic games is to analyze the problem
backwards in time. Consequently, we begin with the optimal strategy of the follower.
Then, the decision of the leader is analyzed. Finally, we discuss the case of joint
investment.
3.3.1 Follower
Consider the case of the ﬁrm that replaces as second (follower). Since the other ﬁrm
(leader) has already replaced its production facility, the follower’s replacement decision
is not aﬀected by strategic interactions (the follower chooses its optimal threshold as
if the roles of the ﬁrms are preassigned). From (3.5) and (3.6) it is obtained that after
replacing the asset by the leader, the value of the follower at the moment of making
the investment by the leader, t,e q u a l s
V
F (t)=E






















where T F is the random stopping time associated with replacing the production facility
by the follower. The ﬁrst row of (3.8) is the expected discounted cash ﬂow received until
replacement. At T F the follower makes the replacement and from now on produces
against a lower marginal cost k. The expected discounted cash ﬂow after replacement
is captured by the second row of (3.8).
8Our notation diﬀers from Thijssen et al. (2002),where our function pi is denoted by αi.44 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
Let us consider the optimal replacement strategy of the follower. In investment
problems of this type (cf. Section 1.6) a threshold value of A exists at which the ﬁrm is
indiﬀerent between investing and refraining from investment. Consequently, the value
of the ﬁrm is maximized when replacement of the production facility takes place as soon
as A exceeds this threshold value. Using standard dynamic programming methodology













Solving the diﬀerential equation (3.9) and excluding the existence of speculative bubbles
gives
V (A)= CA
















      
PV of expected cash ﬂow
, (3.10)




2β (β − 1) + αβ − r =0 , (3.11)
and
  ≡ r − 2α − σ
2, (3.12)
δ ≡ r − α. (3.13)
From (3.10) it can be seen that there are two components contributing to the value of
the ﬁrm. The ﬁrst component corresponds to the value of the ﬂexibility to replace the
production facility. The remainder of the RHS of (3.10) reﬂects the present value of the
expected cash ﬂow given that the ﬁrm produces with the existing technology forever.
Convexity of the value of the ﬁrm in A implies that a ﬁnite valuation is obtained only
if the condition r − 2α − σ2 > 0 is satisﬁed.9
9In order to assess how restrictive the condition r − 2α − σ2 > 0 is,we calculate the maximum
feasible growth rate of demand using the parameters of Dixit and Pindyck (1996),Ch. 6,and of a
representative US Standard and Poor’s 500 ﬁrm (as reported in Morellec,2001). By applying Itˆo’s
lemma one can show that the volatility of the process proportional to the square of the original
process equals two times the volatility of the original process. Hence,since the cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm is
proportional to A2,its instantaneous volatility equals twice the volatility of A.T h i si m p l i e st h a t ,f o r
the parameter set of Dixit and Pindyck (r =4 %a n dσ = 20%),the standard deviation of the demand
can be estimated at the 10% level (0.20/2),whereas for the representative S&P 500 ﬁrm ( r =6 %a n d
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To derive the optimal replacement threshold we apply the value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions to (3.10) and the value of the ﬁrm after the replacement net


























9r (K − k)
4
9 (K − k)
δ. (3.16)







Note that the optimal threshold (3.16) is increasing with uncertainty (via β1)a n di n
the wedge δ.11 The value of the follower (at the moment at which the leader invests)
can now be calculated by substituting C, as derived from (3.14) and (3.15), into (3.10).
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− I if A>A F.
(3.18)
3.3.2 Leader
Having established the optimal replacement rule of the follower, we are ready to
determine the payoﬀ of the ﬁrm that invests as the leader. The value function of the
10The value matching condition equalizes the value of the ﬁrm before the replacement (including
the replacement option),as in (3.10),and the value after the replacement net of the associated sunk
cost. Upon observing that the value after the replacement corresponds to the expected cash ﬂow from














condition (3.14) is obtained. Condition (3.15) is obtained by taking the derivatives of (3.14) with
respect to A.
11Increasing the wedge δ also has an indirect eﬀect because it positively aﬀects β1, but that eﬀect
is dominated by the direct eﬀect on AF.46 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
leader, evaluated at the moment of investing, t,i s
V
L (t)=E

















The ﬁrst two components of (3.19) correspond to the present value of the leader’s
proﬁts realized until the moment of the follower’s investment, net of the leader’s sunk
cost. The second integral corresponds to the discounted perpetual stream of proﬁts
obtained after the investment of the follower.
Analogous to expression (3.18) of the follower problem, we can express the
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− I if A>A F.
(3.20)
The ﬁrst row of (3.20) corresponds to the net present value of the leader proﬁts without
the follower ever making the investment. The second row reﬂects the present value of
future proﬁts lost due to the follower’s investment. This loss is caused by the fact that
after the follower has invested, the follower can produce in a cheaper way, which makes
it a stronger competitor for a leader. The last row represents the net present value of
proﬁts in a situation where it is optimal for the follower to invest immediately.
3.3.3 Simultaneous Investment
It is possible that the ﬁrms decide to invest simultaneously. The value function of









































9 (K − k)
δ. (3.23)3.4. EQUILIBRIA 47
Expression (3.21) can be interpreted analogous to (3.8) and (3.19). Consequently, the




   































− I if A>A S.
(3.24)
The last row equals the value of the ﬁrm when the simultaneous investment is made
immediately. In such a case, the value of the ﬁrm is denoted by V J (A).
3.4 Equilibria
Since both ﬁrms are ex ante identical, it is natural to consider symmetric re-
placement strategies and assume the ﬁrms’ roles being endogenous, i.e. that it is not
determined beforehand which ﬁrm will be the ﬁrst to replace. There are two types
of equilibria that can occur under this choice of strategies. We start by presenting
the preemptive equilibrium, which is followed by a description of the simultaneous
equilibrium.
3.4.1 Preemptive Equilibrium
The ﬁrst type of equilibrium is a preemptive equilibrium where Firm i is the leader
and Firm j is the follower. Let us deﬁne AP to be the root of
ξ (A) ≡ V





. In the Appendix we prove that the root exists, it is unique,
ξ (A) < 0f o rA<A P,a n dξ (A) > 0f o rA ∈
 
AP,A F 
. A s s u m ef o rt h em o m e n t
that A(0) <A P. Since on the interval
 
AP,A F 
the payoﬀ of the leader is higher
than the payoﬀ of the follower, each ﬁrm will have an incentive to be the leader at the
moment that A(t) ∈
 
AP,A F 
. In the search for an equilibrium we reason backwards
in terms of the values of A (note that equation (3.2) does not imply that A increases




holds that the leader’s payoﬀ is higher than the payoﬀ of the follower. This implies
that (without loss of generality) Firm i has an incentive to be the ﬁrst investor there.
Firm j anticipates this and would invest at A − ε. Repeating this reasoning we reach
an equilibrium in which Firm i invests at AP and Firm j waits with replacement until
demand equals AF. Note that if both ﬁrms invest at AP with probability one, they end48 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
up with the low payoﬀ V J(AP). At A = AP simultaneous replacement is not proﬁtable





















Figure 3.1: The values of the leader, V L, optimal simultaneous replacement, V S,a n de a r l y
simultaneous replacement, V J, relative to the value function of the follower, V F,f o ras e to f
parameter values resulting in a preemptive replacement at AP (leader) and AF (follower).
Figure 3.1 depicts the payoﬀs (relative to the follower payoﬀ) associated with
the preemptive equilibrium. Since the ﬁrms are identical it is not clear beforehand
which of them will be the leader. In order to formalize the analysis of how the roles
of the ﬁrms are determined, we adopt the approach of Thijssen et al. (2002). This
approach extends the perfect equilibrium concept of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) to
stochastic games. As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), the ﬁrms use mixed strategies
in which the expected payoﬀ is equal to the payoﬀ of the follower (recall that the ﬁrms
are risk-neutral). It is argued there (see also Torvund, 1999) that in continuous-time
preemption games a closed-loop strategy of Firm i consists of a collection of simple
strategies (Gi (·),p i (·)). Gi (t) is the probability that Firm i has invested by time t
given that Firm j has not invested. The function pi(t) is the measure of the intensity
of atoms in the interval [t,t + dt]. It can be interpreted as the probability of playing
the ﬁrst row and the ﬁrst column (for Firm 1 and Firm 2, respectively) in the following
2×2g a m e :{{replace, replace}, {replace, don’t replace}, {don’t replace, replace}, {don’t
replace, don’t replace}}. Playing this game costs no time and the game is repeated until
at least one ﬁrm invests.3.4. EQUILIBRIA 49
In case A ∈
 
AP,A F 
, the value of pi (pj) is determined as follows. Since pi
(pj) is the probability that Firm i (j) replaces its asset, Firm i sets pi such that




L +( 1− pi)pjV
F + pipjV
J +( 1− pi)(1− pj)Vi
 
. (3.26)
Since Firm i replaces its asset with probability pi and Firm j with probability pj,t h e
probability that Firm i obtains the leader role is pi (1 − pj). Similarly, with probability
(1 − pi)pj Firm i is the follower, pipj is the joint investment probability, and with prob-
ability (1 − pi)(1− pj) nothing happens and the game is repeated. After writing down
the ﬁrst-order conditions for Firm i and Firm j, and imposing symmetric strategies,
we obtain that
p = pi = pj =
V L − V F
V L − V J . (3.27)





0i f A(t) <A P,
V L(A(t))−V F(A(t))











0i f A(t) <A P,
V L(A(t))−V J(A(t))




1i f A(t) ≥ AF
(3.29)
After substituting p = pi = pj in (3.26), the value of Firm i c a nb ee x p r e s s e da s
Vi =
p(1 − p)V L + p(1 − p)V F + p2V J
2p − p2 = V
F. (3.30)
Consequently, for A(t) ∈
 
AP,A F 
, the probability that one of the ﬁrms invests at
time t equals




while the ﬁrms invest simultaneously with probability




If A(0) <A P, the leader payoﬀ curve lies below the follower curve which implies that
it is optimal for both ﬁrms to refrain from investment. At A = AP, the leader and the
follower values are equal. This implies that (3.28) and (3.31) yield the probability of
being the leader (or follower) equal to 1
2. The probability of simultaneous investment50 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
at A = AP is therefore equal to zero. The leader invests at the moment that A = AP,
which is the smallest solution of V L (A)=V F (A), and the follower waits until AF is
reached.
If the stochastic process starts at A(0) ≥ AP,a tl e a s to n eo ft h eﬁ r m si n v e s t s
immediately. The probability of an immediate joint investment leading to the low
payoﬀ V J (A(0)) is
p(0)
2−p(0) (cf. (3.32)). In this case, according to (3.28), p(0) > 0 since
the payoﬀ of the leader exceeds the payoﬀ of the follower. This makes the probability
of investing jointly, and ending up with a low payoﬀ of V J (A(0)), become positive.
In order to be able to translate the derived mixed strategies into applicable
decision rules (since ”real-world decision makers do not ﬂip coins”), we refer to the
approach of Harsanyi (1973). He has shown that a mixed-strategy equilibrium of a
complete information game, such as the one analyzed in this paper, can be interpreted
as the limit of a pure-strategy equilibrium of a slightly perturbed game of incomplete
information (see also Tirole, 1988).12 Consequently, instead of assuming that ﬁrms play
mixed strategies in the described above 2 × 2 game, one can assume that the actual
payoﬀ resulting from becoming the leader equals V L (A(t)) + ε,a n dε is distributed
according to a density function ϕ(ε) with a bounded support [ε,ε], ε < 0 < ε.13 The
ﬁrm observes its own realization of ε but not the one of its competitor. Now, it can
be shown that a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies exists. There is a
critical value of ε = ε∗ such that the optimal strategy for Firm i is to invest if and only
if εi >ε ∗. Consequently, the ﬁrms do not have to invoke randomizing devices in the
implementation of optimal actions.
3.4.2 Simultaneous Equilibrium
The other type of outcome that can occur in the analyzed real option game is
the simultaneous replacement equilibrium. In such a case, the ﬁrms replace their
production facilities at the same point in time deﬁned by TS ≡ inf
 
t|A(t) ≥ AS 
.A
graphical illustration of the simultaneous equilibrium is depicted in Figure 3.2. From
this ﬁgure it can be concluded that no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate from this
equilibrium since the payoﬀ of this strategy exceeds all other payoﬀs.14
12For suﬃcient conditions on the payoﬀ functions and information structure when such an interpre-
tation is possible, see Milgrom and Weber (1986).
13Here, the uncertainty about the value of parameter ε is just a reduced form representation of
uncertainty about the value of (the one of) the ﬁrm-speciﬁc primitive parameters of the model.
14Of course, the payoﬀs resulting from the preemptive equilibrium in Section 3.4.1 may be lower
than those associated with the optimal joint replacement. However, the occurrence of the preemptive3.4. EQUILIBRIA 51




















Figure 3.2: The values of the leader, V L, optimal simultaneous replacement, V S,a n de a r l y
simultaneous replacement, V J, relative to the value function of the follower, V F, for a set of
parameter values resulting in the optimality of a simultaneous replacement at AS.
The occurrence of a particular type of equilibrium is determined by the relative









i.e. when for some A it is more proﬁtable to become the leader than to replace pro-
duction facilities simultaneously. Otherwise, simultaneous replacement is the Pareto-




0i fA(t) <A S,





0i fA(t) <A S,
1i fA(t) ≥ AS.
(3.35)
equilibrium, as in Section 3.4.1, is due to the fact that values of A exist that the corresponding leader
payoﬀ exceeds the value from the joint replacement strategy. It is the lack of coordination among the
ﬁrms (with possible transfer of excess value) that leads to ex post Pareto-ineﬃcient outcomes. In the
case of the simultaneous equilibrium the payoﬀ of the leader never exceeds the payoﬀ from optimal
joint replacement and therefore the preemptive equilibrium, while still existent, is Pareto-dominated
(see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985)52 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
The following proposition implies that ﬁrms replace their production facilities simul-
taneously if the investment cost is suﬃciently high.
Proposition 3.1 A unique I∗ exists such that ∀I>I ∗ simultaneous replacement is
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition constitutes an important result with respect to the compar-
ison between the real option exercise game with proﬁt uncertainty and the situation
where the ﬁrms face product market uncertainty. In the ﬁrst case the occurrence of
either of the equilibria does not depend on the irreversible cost associated with the
investment decision (see Huisman and Kort, 1999). This results from the fact that the
optimal threshold under proﬁt uncertainty is proportional to the investment cost I.
This proportionality is a consequence of the multiplicative way in which uncertainty
enters the proﬁt function. Conversely, introducing market uncertainty in a Cournot
model results in the optimal threshold being no longer proportional to I. This is the
reason why the resulting equilibrium regions depend on the sunk cost.15
3.5 Uncertainty and Asset Replacement Thresholds
Since the ﬁrms’ decisions to replace production assets are irreversible (sunk cost
I cannot be recovered) and they have the ﬂexibility in timing the replacement, they
replace their production assets later than a simple NPVrule would indicate. In a
non-strategic framework, there exists an option value of waiting for better (but never
complete) information which is taken into account before committing the corporate
resources. As uncertainty about the demand grows, the ﬁrm is going to wait with
replacement for a higher level of demand, as the classical real option theory suggests.
However, it also has to take into account the interactions in the product market, that
may substantially reduce the value of the timing ﬂexibility. Kulatilaka and Perotti
(1998) obtained in a two-period model that these interactions may in fact result in
a negative relationship between the required level of demand at which resources are
committed and uncertainty. In this section, we examine how uncertainty inﬂuences the
level of demand triggering investment in the continuous-time model.
15In general, the investment cost aﬀects the boundaries of the equilibrium regions. Therefore, the
lack of such a relationship in a proﬁt uncertainty model is rather a coincidence than a rule.3.5. UNCERTAINTY AND ASSET REPLACEMENT THRESHOLDS 53
First, we investigate the impact of volatility on the optimal asset replacement
thresholds of the follower and of optimal simultaneous replacement. In these cases the
















so that the optimal replacement thresholds of the follower and of optimal simultaneous
replacement increase in uncertainty. In the case of the follower’s decision, the competi-
tor has already replaced its asset. Hence, what is left to do for the remaining ﬁrm is
to choose the optimal replacement timing. Since the opponent has already taken its
decision, strategic interactions do not play a role here. So, as in standard real options
theory, also here the threshold goes up with uncertainty, which reﬂects the value of
waiting argument. In determining the optimal simultaneous replacement timing strate-
gic interactions do not play a role either. Therefore, analogous to the follower’s case,
the value of waiting argument also prevails here.
The impact of volatility on the production facility replacement threshold of the
leader requires an additional analysis. Let us set the marginal cost k to zero to simplify




AP is the smallest root of ξ (A)=0 . To determine the eﬀect of market uncertainty
on AP, we calculate the derivative of ξ (A) with respect to σ. The change of (3.25)




























∂(σ2) directly measures the inﬂuence of uncertainty on ξ (A), thus






∂(σ2) reﬂects the impact on
the net beneﬁt of being the leader of the fact that the follower replacement threshold
increases with uncertainty.
16An additional motivation for this simpliﬁcation is provided by the fact that for, e.g., the majority
of intangible/information products the marginal cost of a unit of good or service is negligible (cf.
Shapiro and Varian, 1998).54 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL













At ﬁrst sight, the joint impact of both eﬀects is ambiguous. (3.39) represents the simple
value of waiting argument: if uncertainty is large, it is more valuable to wait for new
information before replacing the existing production facility (cf. Dixit and Pindyck,
1996). As we have just seen, this also holds for the follower. The implication for the
leader of the follower replacing later is that the leader has a cost advantage for a longer
time. This makes an earlier replacement of the leader potentially more beneﬁcial. This
eﬀect is captured by (3.40), which can thus be interpreted as an increment in the
strategic value of becoming the leader vs. the follower resulting from the delay in the
follower’s implementation of the superior technology. Obviously, the latter eﬀect is not
present in monopolistic/perfectly competitive markets, where the impact of uncertainty
is unambiguous.
It is possible to show that the direct eﬀect captured by (3.39) dominates,
irrespective of the values of the input parameters.
Proposition 3.2 When uncertainty in the product market increases, the threshold
value of the demand at which the leader replaces its production facility increases too.
Proof. See the Appendix.
From Proposition 3.2 it can be concluded that the leader threshold responds
to volatility in a qualitatively similar way as a non-strategic threshold, i.e. it increases
with uncertainty. The reason for this result is the following. First, in our model we
introduced the possibility of postponing the replacement of the production facility. In-
creased uncertainty raises the proﬁtability of replacement (because the follower replaces
later) but the value of the option to wait rises even more. Second, uncertainty could be
beneﬁcial for earlier replacement because of the convex shape of the net gain function,
resulting in a power option-like type of payoﬀ (cf. Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998). Then,
while performing a mean preserving spread, downside losses are more than compen-
sated by upside gains. However, unlike the two-period framework of Kulatilaka and
Perotti (1998), in our continuous-time model the net gain function is always linear
in the stochastic variable A. If the leader invests, the proﬁt ﬂow π00 is replaced by
the proﬁt ﬂow π10, and it is clear from (3.3) and (3.4) that π10 − π00 is linear. The
same holds for the follower investment (π11 −π01 linear) and simultaneous investment3.6. DECISION TO START PRODUCTION 55
(linearity of π11 − π00). To see whether the convexity argument could also work here,
in Section 3.6 we consider the decision to start production. In this case the ﬁrms are
not active initially and can start up production only upon investing. Consequently, the
net gain ﬂows for the leader, and the follower, being equal to π10 and π01, respectively,
are convex in A.
3.6 Decision to Start Production
Consider two ﬁrms having the possibility to start production in a new market
where there is no incumbent. The new market assumption implies, in contrast with
Sections 3.3-3.4, that the ﬁrms can only start realizing proﬁts after incurring a sunk
cost I. It still holds that demand follows the stochastic process (3.2). With little loss
of generality the marginal cost of a unit of output after starting production is set to
k =0 .
First, we calculate the value of the demand parameter for which it is optimal











The optimal follower threshold (3.41) exists only for σ2 <r− 2α. For a relatively
high degree of uncertainty, i.e. for σ2 ≥ r − 2α (which corresponds to β1 ∈ (1,2]), the
follower will never start production since for such levels of uncertainty the value of the
option to invest always exceeds the net present value of investment. In the limiting






(3r − 4α)I (3.43)
(for a derivation see the Appendix). Equation (3.43) corresponds to the maximal value
of AFN provided that it is ﬁnite. In case information about the uncertainty level is
imperfect, the investment problem is solved by ﬁrst calculating the uncertainty implied
by the threshold AFN. Subsequently, the decision maker can decide whether the true
level of uncertainty is more likely to lie below or above the implied value. In the latter
case, he should refrain from entering the market.56 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
Now, let t to be the moment at which the leader starts producing in the new


















￿ − I if A>A FN,
(3.44)






















￿ − I if A>A FN.
(3.45)
From (3.44) and (3.45) it is obtained that indeed the leader and follower values are
convex in A. The threshold of the leader, being the preemption point, is the smallest
solution of the following equation
V


















The impact of uncertainty on the threshold of the leader is not straightforward. Similar
as in the model with the ﬁrms initially competing in the product market, there are
two eﬀects: the eﬀect of the waiting option and of the strategic option. Let us denote
V LN (A) − V FN(A)b yξ


























      
Direct uncertainty eﬀect
.
Uncertainty aﬀects the magnitude of each of the mentioned eﬀects via parameter β1,
as in Section 3.5, and via the eﬀective discount rate,  . The latter contribution results
from the convexity of the proﬁt function, i.e. its proportionality to the square of the
underlying stochastic variable A (see (3.45)).
After substituting the functional forms of V LN (A)a n dV FN(A)i n t oξ
N (A)
and calculating the derivative explicitly, the following result is obtained.
Proposition 3.5 The threshold value of the demand at which the leader starts
production increases with uncertainty.
Proof. See the Appendix.3.7. UNCERTAINTY AND REPLACEMENT TIMING 57
Analogous to the follower case, there exists a critical level of uncertainty, σ2 =
r − 2α, above which it is optimal for the leader never to invest. In the limit, where

















The conclusion is that also in the case of a new market, uncertainty raises the
threshold levels of market demand at which it is optimal for ﬁrms to invest. Moreover,
the resulting convexity of the payoﬀ functions not only raises the threshold of the ﬁrms
but also results in a subset of parameters for which no replacement is optimal.
3.7 Uncertainty and Replacement Timing
Until now we analyzed the impact of uncertainty and strategic interactions on the
optimal replacement threshold of the ﬁrm. Although threshold values and timing have
a lot to do with each other, it cannot be concluded in general that the relation between
the two is monotonic (cf. Sarkar, 2000). After having determined the dependency of
threshold values on uncertainty in Section 3.5 and 3.6, in this section we investigate the
relationship between uncertainty, expected timing of replacement and the probability
with which the threshold is reached within a time interval of a given length.









where A∗(σ2) denotes the optimal replacement threshold as a function of uncertainty.
We note that expectation (3.49) tends to inﬁnity for σ2 → 2α and does not exist for



















The expected timing of replacement increases with uncertainty due to two eﬀects. First,
for any given threshold, the associated expected ﬁrst passage time is increasing with
17Increasing σ2 beyond 2α implies that the probabilities of surviving without reaching the threshold
before a given time do not fall suﬃciently fast for longer hitting times. Since the expectation is the
sum of the product of the ﬁrst passage times and their probabilities, an insuﬃcient decay in the
survival probabilities (without reaching the threshold) results in the divergence of the expectation.58 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
uncertainty (cf. the ﬁrst component of the RHS of (3.50)). Second, for a ﬁxed level of
uncertainty, an increase in the optimal investment threshold leads to an increase in the
expected time to reach (cf. second component of RHS of (3.50)). Based on (3.50) it
can be concluded that whenever the threshold goes up due to more uncertainty, it also
holds that the expected time to replace the production facility increases.
An alternative approach to measure the impact of uncertainty on the timing
of replacement is to look at the probability with which the threshold is reached within
a time interval of a given length, say τ. Contrary to the expected ﬁrst passage time,
this approach does not impose any restrictions on the values of σ. The probabilities
of optimal asset replacement within a given interval are particularly useful when this
interval coincides with a budgeting period.18
After substituting y =l n A∗


































where T denotes the time to reach the threshold and Φ is the standard normal cu-
mulative density function. As already pointed out by Sarkar (2000), the derivative
∂P(T<τ)
∂σ does not have an unambiguous sign and it can thus be shown that, in general,
uncertainty can aﬀect the probability of reaching the threshold within a given time in
both directions.
First, we illustrate the relationship between the ﬁrst passage time, volatility
and related probabilities for the follower threshold since this threshold is unaﬀected by
strategic considerations. Subsequently, we present results of simulations related to the
threshold of the leader. In this part we use the model of Sections 3.3-3.4. The results
for the decision to start production are qualitatively similar and are not reported.19
From Figure 3.3 it can be concluded that the form of the relationship between
the uncertainty and the probability of reaching the threshold depends on the length of
the time interval. For suﬃciently long time intervals, the probability of reaching the
threshold decreases with volatility. Intuitively, this can be explained by the fact that
18For a discussion of the capital budgeting process at the corporate level see Kaplan and Atkinson
(1998), Ch. 14 and Bower (1986), Ch. 1-3.
19In this case a restriction on σ has to be imposed in order to ensure the positive sign of ￿ (cf.
(3.12)).3.7. UNCERTAINTY AND REPLACEMENT TIMING 59













Figure 3.3: The cumulative probability of reaching the optimal follower replacement
threshold as a function of demand uncertainty for a set of parameter values: A =4 ,
r =0 .05,α =0 .015,K=3 ,k=0and I =6 0 .











Figure 3.4: The cumulative probability of reaching the optimal follower replacement thresh-
old as a function of time horizon for the set of parameter values: A =4 ,r=0 .05,α=
0.015,K=3 ,k=0and I =6 0 .60 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
the probability mass of the ﬁrst passage time density function moves to the right (cf.
(3.50)) and longer times of reaching the demand level triggering replacement become
more likely. Moreover, the trigger itself is increasing with σ.
For low values of τ the probability of reaching the replacement threshold ﬁrst
increases and then decreases. For σ = 0 the probability of reaching the threshold
within a certain time interval is zero when the optimal replacement time lies outside
this interval. Increasing σ results in a spread of the probability mass, so that the
probability of reaching the demand threshold becomes positive for a strictly positive
σ. A larger spread is initially equivalent to a higher probability of hitting the optimal
replacement threshold. However, when volatility continues to rise, at a certain moment
the eﬀect of the probability mass shifting to the right starts to dominate the eﬀect of
the spread. As a consequence, the cumulative probability of reaching the threshold
becomes smaller again.
Figure 3.4 indicates that the probability of reaching the follower threshold
always increases with the time interval, which is of course trivial. The relevant obser-
vation is that this relationship is more pronounced for low levels of market uncertainty.
This results from the fact that in the absence of uncertainty the optimal investment
trigger is reached at a speciﬁed point in time with probability 1 and the corresponding
cumulative density function is a heaviside step function. Increasing volatility spreads
the probability mass around the point corresponding to the deterministic case. This
leads to an increased cumulative chance of reaching the trigger at points in time situ-
ated to the left of this speciﬁed point in time, while the reverse is true for the point
situated to the right. This inﬂuences the shape of the cumulative distribution function
whose slope decreases with uncertainty.
Figure 3.5 allows for a closer inspection of the relationship between the timing
of asset replacement and uncertainty. It can be concluded that, irrespective from the
length of the time interval, there exists a level of uncertainty beyond which a further
increase in uncertainty always reduces the probability of the optimal asset replacement.
The relationship between this level and the length of the time interval is inverse, i.e. the
longer the time interval, the lower level of uncertainty for which a further uncertainty
increase reduces the probability of the optimal replacement. For example, using the
parameters from Figure 3.5 we can conclude that for τ = 5 this critical value of
uncertainty, σ,i s0 .234, for τ = 10 it is only 0.118, whereas for τ = 20 increased
uncertainty always reduces the cumulative probability of optimal investment.
Figure 3.6 indicates that the probability of the optimal replacement increases
in uncertainty for a suﬃciently short time interval and decreases for a suﬃciently long3.7. UNCERTAINTY AND REPLACEMENT TIMING 61


















Figure 3.5: The derivative with respect to market uncertainty of the cumulative probability
of reaching the optimal follower threshold as a function of uncertainty for the set of parameter
values: A =4 ,r=0 .05,α =0 .015,K=3 ,k=0and I =6 0 .




















Figure 3.6: The derivative with respect to market uncertainty of the cumulative probability
of reaching the optimal follower threshold as a function of time horizon for the set of parameter
values: A =4 ,r=0 .05,α =0 .015,K=3 ,k=0and I =6 0 .62 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
horizon. Moreover, the derivative of the probability of reaching the optimal threshold
changes its sign only once. Finally, Figure 3.6 allows for the conclusion that the length
of time interval beyond which uncertainty negatively aﬀects the probability of optimal
replacement is, again, negatively related to the uncertainty level. For σ =0 .1t h e
interval length which separates the areas of a positive and a negative relationship
equals 11.46 years, for σ =0 .2i te q u a l s5 .87 years, while for σ =0 .3 it drops to 4.06
years.
Despite the presence of strategic eﬀects, the probability of asset replacement
of the leader within a given time interval responds to changes in uncertainty and the
length of the interval in a similar way as the corresponding probabilities of the follower.
For low σ’s the probability of investing increases more rapidly with the length of the
time interval than for high σ’s. Moreover, for high τ’s the probability of replacing the
existing asset is always decreasing with uncertainty, while for low τ’s the probability
behaves in a non-monotonic way.
The relationship between uncertainty, ﬁrst passage time and probabilities of
reaching the leader threshold is illustrated in Table 3.1 below.
σ τ =1 τ =2 τ =5 τ =1 0 τ =1 5 τ =2 0
0.05 0.06 2.39 24.11 54.32 71.17 80.97
0.10 0.61 5.93 26.79 47.94 59.70 67.24
0.20 0.62 5.14 21.00 36.47 45.10 50.72
0.30 0.46 3.97 16.50 28.66 35.31 39.55
0.40 0.39 3.30 13.57 23.22 28.29 31.39
0.50 0.36 2.93 11.55 19.23 23.02 25.21
Table 3.1: The cumulative probability (in percentages) of reaching the optimal leader replace-
ment threshold as a function of demand uncertainty for the set parameter values: A =2 ,
r =0 .05 ,α =0 .015,k=0 ,K =3and I =6 0 .
The relationship between the investment probability of the leader and uncer-
tainty is analogous to the corresponding relationship of the follower. The probability
that the leader replaces its production facility within a given time interval decreases
with uncertainty when the length of this interval is suﬃciently large. In a situation
where the relevant interval is suﬃciently short, there are two contradictory eﬀects. On
the one hand, the investment probability increases because higher volatility enhances3.7. UNCERTAINTY AND REPLACEMENT TIMING 63
the chance of reaching a particular threshold early. On the other hand, this probabil-
ity eventually declines with uncertainty because then the eﬀect of the probability mass
shifting to the right begins to dominate.
Now, we formulate the following proposition, which extends Sarkar (2000) by
deﬁning the time interval lengths separating a monotonic and non-monotonic relation-









,α > 0, (3.52)
as the point in time at which the replacement threshold A∗ is reached in the determin-
istic case. Then it holds that for τ<τ ∗ the probability of reaching the investment
threshold A∗ before τ increases with uncertainty at a relatively low level of uncertainty
and decreases for a relatively high level, whereas for τ>τ ∗ the probability of reaching
the optimal threshold before τ always decreases with uncertainty.
Proof. See the Appendix.
On the basis of Proposition 3.4 it may be concluded that the replacement hori-
zon being equal to the optimal timing of replacement in the deterministic case separates
the regions of monotonic and non-monotonic relationship between uncertainty and the
probability of replacement. In Table 3.1, the parameters are chosen in such a way that
the optimal timing of replacement in the deterministic case equals τ∗ =9 .36. Therefore
the investment-uncertainty relationship in columns 2-4 is non-monotonic, while it is
negative in columns 5-7.
In order to determine τ∗ for the leader, we need to determine its replacement
timing in the deterministic case. It holds that the optimal investment timing of the
leader in the model without uncertainty is equal to the rent equalization point in the
preemption game of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). In the case of the follower, τ∗ is equal
to the point of time at which the incremental ﬂow from operations, π11 − π01, reaches
the ﬂow associated with the replacement cost, Ir. Hence, τ∗ corresponds to the optimal
Jorgensonian trigger, which equalizes the ﬂow costs and revenues of the project. The
optimal simultaneous replacement closely resembles the case of the follower trigger.
The only diﬀerence is that now, the incremental proﬁt ﬂow equals π11 − π00.
Finally, we would like to point out that our analysis also extends to the sit-
uation where α ≤ 0. In such a case and without uncertainty the ﬁrms would face
now-or-never decisions. Therefore, it holds that τ∗ ∈{ 0,∞}, so that the relationship
between the investment probability within a given time interval and uncertainty will64 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
be either non-monotonic or decreasing for all time horizons. This implies that in ma-
ture industries (i.e. those with non-positive growth rate), the probability of launching
existing positive NPVprojects always decreases with uncertainty. As far as initially
negative NPVprojects are concerned, the probability of their optimal execution is
initially increasing with uncertainty. When uncertainty becomes suﬃciently high, the
replacement probability starts to fall.
3.8 Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the ﬁrm’s decision to replace an existing
production facility with a technologically superior one. In order to capture the eﬀect
of strategic interactions among the ﬁrms operating in an imperfectly competitive and
uncertain environment we model the product market as a Cournot duopoly with a
stochastic demand parameter. Such a formulation results in the payoﬀ functions being
convex in the stochastic demand parameter.
We determine the types of equilibria of the real option game played by the
ﬁrms. We show that it is optimal for the ﬁrms to replace their production facilities
sequentially when the associated cost is relatively low and simultaneously otherwise.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the direct eﬀect of uncertainty (related to the waiting
option) on the replacement threshold of the leader is always larger than the indirect
eﬀect (strategic option) resulting from the delay in the follower decision to replace its
production facility. Consequently, irrespective from the type of equilibrium, increasing
uncertainty always raises the level of demand triggering the optimal replacement. This
result also holds in case of the decision to start production rather than to replace the
existing asset.
Moreover, it can be concluded that the expected timing of replacement in-
creases with uncertainty. This result supports the view that uncertainty delays the
implementation of the new technology, even in the presence of strategic interactions
combined with a convex proﬁt function. Moreover, it shows that the result of Ku-
latilaka and Perotti (1998) that uncertainty can stimulate investment due to strategic
interactions does not carry over from a two period model to a continuous time setting.
We also determine the probability of replacing the production facility within a
certain time interval. Here, the point in time at which replacement is made optimally
in the deterministic case plays a crucial role. For an interval that contains this point in
time, the probability of optimal replacement within this time interval decreases with
uncertainty. However, if this time interval is that short that the optimal replacement3.9. APPENDIX 65
time in the deterministic case lies outside this interval, then the replacement probability
goes up with uncertainty when uncertainty is low while it goes down otherwise.
Finally, we would like to discuss the limitations of our approach. In order to
ensure analytical tractability and to make our results comparable to Kulatilaka and
Perotti (1998), we used a linear demand speciﬁcation and parallel shifts in demand.
Such a model speciﬁcation allowed us to show that in a continuous-time framework the
convexity of payoﬀ functions does not result in investment occurring at lower states
of demand when uncertainty is higher, as it does in a two-period model. Our setting
enabled us to show that uncertainty enhancing convex payoﬀs and therefore stimulating
investment in a two-period case does not accelerate strategic replacement when there
is ﬂexibility in timing the replacement. Of course, our predictions do not automatically
carry over to other forms of product market uncertainty. In other words, we do not
formally deﬁne the classes of demand functions for which the analysis holds. With
respect to robustness of our results, it is also important to relax other assumptions like
constant marginal costs and Cournot competition.
3.9 Appendix
Proof of existence and uniqueness of AP. The outline of the proof follows
Grenadier (1996). First, we establish the existence of a root of ξ (A) on the interval
(0,A F). Evaluating ξ (A)a tA =0g i v e s













Similarly, evaluating ξ (A)a tA = AF yields ξ
 
AF 
= 0. Finally, calculating the left




4(β1 − 1)(K − k)
3
3δ [9Ir+4 K (K − k)]
< 0. (3.54)
The signs of ξ (A) at the ends of interval (0,A F) and the sign of (3.54) implies that
ξ (A) has at least one root in the relevant interval.
The uniqueness is proved by showing strict concavity of ξ (A)o v e ri n t e r v a l66 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
























The last inequality results from the fact that the sign of the sum of the two last
components of the expression in the square brackets is positive for β1 →∞and the
sum is decreasing with β1. Consequently, the root is unique.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. First, let us deﬁne
ζ (A) ≡ V
S (A) − V
L (A). (3.56)
































for A ≤ AF. From (3.33) it follows that if on the interval [AP,A F] the minimum of ζ (A)
is smaller than zero, a preemptive equilibrium occurs. Otherwise, the ﬁrms replace their
production facilities simultaneously.21 The existence of a negative minimum of ζ (A)


























































Using the fact that
∂ζ(A)
∂A


























20The proof for general k goes along the same lines and is skipped for the sake of brevity.
21Strictly speaking, the preemptive equilibrium still exists in this case but is Pareto-dominated by
the simultaneous replacement equilibrium (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985).3.9. APPENDIX 67
Subsequently, we substitute for A in (3.61) the expression (3.58) for A∗∗. Complexity of
the resulting expression yields the necessity to use a numerical procedure. A geometric
grid search indicates that
dζ(At)
dI
   
 
A=A∗∗ is positive for β1 ∈ [1, r
α), and α ∈ (0,∞),β 1 ∈
[1,∞), and α ∈ (−∞,0], and for other parameters falling into intervals: r ∈ (α,∞),










































 β1 . (3.62)
Since the threshold of the leader is equal to AP,a n dAP i st h es m a l l e s tr o o to ft h e
concave function ξ (A), we know that
∂ξ(A)
∂A











   
A=AP
> 0 (3.64)
to conclude that the replacement threshold of the leader is increasing with uncertainty
(decreasing with β1). Moreover, upon analyzing (3.62) we know that
dξ(A)
dβ1 changes its



























   
A=AP > 0. In order to































































22The domain of I results from the fact that for this range of values of K,t h r e s h o l d sAF and AS
are decreasing in K, which constitutes the economically relevant case.68 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
An analytical proof is again not possible but numerically it can be shown that ξ (A∗)
is positive for β1 ∈ [1, r
α), and α ∈ (0,∞),β 1 ∈ [1,∞), and α ∈ (−∞,0], and for other














































Denote the smallest solution of ξ
N (A)=0b yAPN. Since APN cannot be explicitly
derived, we proceed as follows. First, we consider a particular point A>A PN. Second,
we show that
dξN(A)
d(σ2) is negative for all A ∈ (A,A), where A is a realization of A such










> 0, which would imply that A>A PN. After substituting























Since β1 > 2 (recall that for β1 ≤ 2 no ﬁrm is willing to enter), we know that 2I
β1−2 is































is positive so that A>A PN. We proceed





, where A is some realization of A such that A>A, and negative



















































> 0, and (3.75)
M =
1
4 2 > 0. (3.76)













































which implies that there exists only one extremum of
dξN(A)
d(σ2) that is diﬀerent from zero.
This result, combined with (3.77) and (3.78), implies that
dξN(A)
d(σ2) is negative at most















































is negative for β1 ∈ [1, r
α), and α ∈ (0,∞),
β1 ∈ [1,∞), and α ∈ (−∞,0], α ∈ R,r∈ (α,∞)a n dI ∈ (0,∞). Therefore the only
remaining part of the proof is to show that A <A PN for any vector of input parameters.
Since the explicit analytical forms of A and APN do not exist, we use a numerical
procedure. Using a grid search technique (for the domains of input parameters as in
the proofs of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2), we calculate the diﬀerences APN − A and it




   
A∈(A,A]





> 0, we conclude that dAPN
d(σ2) > 0, i.e. the investment threshold of the leader
increases with uncertainty.
23The result (3.77) has been derived using l’H￿ opital’s rule.70 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL
Proof of Proposition 3.4. First, we show that τ∗ is the time to reach the
replacement threshold A∗ in the deterministic case. After observing that x = αt is the








so τ∗ in (3.52) is the time to reach the threshold A∗. Now, we consider the density
function ϕ(τ;µ(σ),σ 2) being the density function of the ﬁrst passage time for a ge-
ometric Brownian motion, which has a mean µ(σ) and variance σ2. For the moment
we assume that µ = τ∗ irrespective from σ. Then, raising the variance σ2 is equivalent
to performing a mean preserving spread. Consequently, in such a case
∂
∂σ





∗) ≤ 0, (3.81)
with equality holding iﬀ τ = τ∗. The expectation of the ﬁrst passage time, E [τ],
associated with hitting the replacement threshold A∗, is increasing with σ (cf. (3.50))
and A∗ is increasing with σ,t o o . F o rτ>τ ∗, an increase in uncertainty not only
reduces the probability mass to the left of τ via the mean preserving spread but also
because of the mean itself moving to the right. Therefore the eﬀect of uncertainty on
the probability of the replacement decision is unambiguous in this region and negative.
For σ →∞the probability of investing before τ decreases to zero. The latter conclusion
is true since from (3.51) it is obtained that
lim
σ→∞



























































P (T<τ )=0 . (3.84)
We will show later that (3.84) holds for all relevant thresholds.
For τ<τ ∗, the two eﬀects work in opposite directions. As in the previous
case, the mean E [τ] is increasing with uncertainty. Without a change in the volatility,3.9. APPENDIX 71
an increase in the mean would then decrease the probability of replacing the existing
production facility. However, increasing uncertainty results in a greater probability
mass being present in the left tail of ϕ(τ). Therefore, the total eﬀect of increasing
uncertainty is ambiguous in this region. However, we are able to conclude that the
probability of investing at a given τ behaves in a certain non-monotonic way. For
σ =0 , there is no probability mass on the interval [0,τ∗), since the investment takes
place at τ<τ ∗ with probability 1. Therefore an increase in uncertainty initially leads
to an increased probability of investment. For relatively large σ the eﬀect of moving
the mean of the distribution to the right starts to dominate and the probability of asset
replacement falls. For σ →∞the probability of replacing the existing asset before a
given time τ decreases to zero.
Finally, we show that all the thresholds increase with uncertainty monotoni-
cally and unboundedly. We already know (from Sections 3.5 and 3.6) that the optimal
replacement thresholds increase with uncertainty monotonically. So now we only have
to prove that the thresholds grow in uncertainty unboundedly. For the thresholds of
the follower and in case of simultaneous replacement it is easy to observe that
β1
β1−1
tends to inﬁnity when σ →∞ .24 The replacement threshold of the leader requires
slightly more attention.25 We already know that the leader replaces its asset as soon as



















































































































24For a new market model a similar conclusion can be drawn after the substitution of parameters
in the original geometric Brownian motion.
25The unboundedness of the leader threshold in the new market entry can be proven in a similar













































the LHS of (3.87) approaches zero from above. To shorten the notation we rewrite
(3.86) into
0=M (A)A − N. (3.89)
Now, we are looking for the solution of (3.89). From (3.88) it can be seen that m(A)
is tending to zero from above ∀A ∈ R++ when uncertainty is increasing. Consequently,





P = ∞, (3.90)
which completes the proof.
Limiting value of the optimal follower threshold to start production. We
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r − 2α − σ2
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Applying l’H  opital’s rule yields
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=3 r − 4α. (3.92)
Substituting (3.92) into (3.91) yields the desired result.
Limiting value of the optimal leader threshold to start production. To
obtain the leader’s limiting threshold, we are interested in the form of function ξ
N
when σ2 tends to r − 2α. For any A ∈
 
0,A FN 
we have (cf. (3.44), (3.45) and
ξ














































































r − 2α − σ2 . (3.94)
26We do so by observing that lim
σ2→r−2α
β =2 .74 CHAPTER 3. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN A COURNOT MODEL





























r − 2α − σ2 .










































































































Consequently, after substituting (3.97) into (3.94), we obtain the formula for the lim-

















Proﬁt Uncertainty and Asymmetric
Firms
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to study the eﬀects of imperfect competition on the
optimal real option exercise strategies in a situation where the costs of exercising op-
tions diﬀer among ﬁrms. Such a framework, which relaxes the restrictive assumption
that the duopolistic rivals are identical, is motivated by the existence of many sources
of potential cost asymmetry.1 First, investment cost asymmetry is present when the
ﬁrms have diﬀerent access to the capital markets. In such a case, the cost of capital of
a liquidity-constrained ﬁrm is higher than of its counterpart having access to a credit
line or with substantial cash reserves (cf. Lensink et al., 2001). Consequently, the
investment cost of the ﬁrm facing capital market imperfections is higher.
Moreover, cost asymmetry occurs when the ﬁrms exhibit a diﬀerent degree of
organizational ﬂexibility at implementing a new production technology. This ﬂexibil-
ity, known as absorptive capacity (cf. Cohen and Levintal, 1994), measures the ﬁrm’s
ability to adopt external technologies, to assimilate to a changing economic environ-
ment, and to commercialize newly invented products. A higher absorptive capacity is
therefore equivalent to a lower cost associated with an investment project.
Diﬀering real options embedded in the existing assets of the ﬁrms due to past
decisions are another source of possible investment cost asymmetry. After the arrival
1Alternatively, we could introduce asymmetry by introducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc proﬁt functions or pa-
rameters of the stochastic process. However, we expect that other forms of asymmetry lead to similar
results (cf. also Huisman, 2001, Ch. 8, and Joaquin and Butler, 2000, who analyze diﬀerent forms of
asymmetry in a new market model).
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of a new invention it may appear that one of the existing technologies is more easily
extendable than the other. For instance, Kaplan (1986) reports that in the 1970s some
manufacturing ﬁrms invested in electronically controlled production facilities. This
investment did not bring signiﬁcant improvements to the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. However, after
the arrival of microprocessor-based technology in the 1980s, the ﬁrms that invested in
electronically controlled facilities were able to adopt the new technology more quickly
a n da tal o w e rc o s t .
Finally, the diﬀerence in investment costs is often a consequence of purely ex-
ogenous factors, resulting, among others, from the intervention of the authority. For
instance, the eﬀective investment cost of the ﬁrms is reduced after obtaining govern-
mental credit guarantees, which result in a lower cost of capital (see the evidence by
Kleimeier and Megginson, 2000).
As in Chapter 3, we consider the optimal real option exercise strategy of
duopolistic ﬁrms already competing in a product market.2 Both ﬁrms have an in-
vestment opportunity enhancing ceteris paribus the proﬁt ﬂow. If one ﬁrm invests, the
other ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is reduced.3 This is, for example, the case when the investment gives
the ﬁrm the possibility to produce more eﬃciently and thus cheaper, which leads to a
higher market share. The ﬁrms diﬀer ex ante only with respect to the required sunk
cost associated with the investment. Our framework most directly generalizes Smets
(1991) and Grenadier (1996), who restrict the analysis to a game between symmetric
ﬁrms, and Huisman (2001), Ch. 8, who considers a new market entry of asymmetric
ﬁrms. This generalization results in the presence of three diﬀerent equilibrium strate-
gies. First, when the asymmetry among ﬁrms is relatively small and so is the ﬁrst-
mover advantage, the ﬁrms invest at the same time. When the ﬁrst-mover advantage
is suﬃciently large, the lower-cost ﬁrm preempts the higher-cost ﬁrm. In the situation
where both the ﬁrst-mover advantage and asymmetry between ﬁrms are signiﬁcant,
the ﬁrms exercise their investment options sequentially and their investment timing do
not aﬀect each other directly. The two latter equilibria are also present in Perotti and
Rossetto (2000), in which the problem of cross-market entry is considered.4 The model
presented in this chapter is also closely related to Boyer et al. (2002), Section 5, in
2Contrary to Chapter 3, we do not model the structural form of the product market competition.
Instead, we impose a reduced form of proﬁt functions.
3Mason and Weeds (2003) allow for positive network externalities among the ﬁrms, which results
in a higher proﬁt of the incumbent after the investment of the entrant.
4It is never optimal for ﬁrms to invest simultaneously in the framework of Perotti and Rosetto
(2000) since the instantaneous proﬁts of ﬁrm competing in both the market segments are lower than
monopolistic proﬁts realized in the ﬁrms’ own market segments.4.2. FRAMEWORK OF THE MODEL 77
which asymmetry across ﬁrms has a form of diﬀering initial capacities.
Furthermore, we analyze the impact of uncertainty on the optimal investment
thresholds. We ﬁnd that the value of the waiting option increases with the proﬁt
volatility despite the presence of strategic interactions.
Finally, we determine the ﬁrms’ values and present welfare implications of the
strategic option exercise. We ﬁnd that, when an increase in the investment expen-
diture of the higher-cost ﬁrm results in a switch from joint investment to preemption
equilibrium, the value of both ﬁrms decrease. Moreover, in the preemption equilibrium,
an increase in the higher-cost ﬁrm’s investment expenditure results in the appreciation
of this ﬁrm’s value. After a cost increase of the competitor, the low cost ﬁrm knows
that it itself could delay the investment without bearing the risk of being preempted.
This investment delay raises the value of the higher cost ﬁrm. Using an example of a
duopoly in which after the investment the ﬁrms can oﬀer a good with a higher quality,
we derive the relationship between the type of equilibrium and the level of consumer
surplus. This analysis indicates that an equal access of competitors to a new technology
(or a new market) may not be socially optimal.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we present the model. Sec-
tion 4.3 contains the derivation of value functions and optimal investment thresholds.
The discussion of the resulting equilibrium strategies is presented in Section 4.4 and
the analysis of the impact of uncertainty on the timing of investment is included in Sec-
tion 4.5. In Section 4.6 we analyze the impact of strategic interactions on the value of
the ﬁrms whereas Section 4.7 discusses the relationship between the ﬁrms’ investment
strategies and social welfare. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Framework of the Model
In this chapter, the framework of Dixit and Pindyck (1996), Ch. 6, is adapted here,
with the diﬀerence that we consider two ﬁrms rather than one. The two risk-neutral
ﬁrms compete in the product market, and realize a non-negative stochastic proﬁt ﬂow.
The uncertainty in each of the ﬁrms’ proﬁts is introduced via a geometric Brownian
motion process:
dx(t)=αx(t)dt + σx(t)dw(t), (4.1)
where α and σ are constants corresponding to the instantaneous drift and to the in-
stantaneous standard deviation, respectively, dt i st h et i m ei n c r e m e n ta n ddw(t)i s
the Wiener increment. Let r be the deterministic instantaneous riskless interest rate.78 CHAPTER 4. PROFIT UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC FIRMS
It is assumed that the drift rate, α, exhibits a shortfall δ below the riskless rate, i.e.
α = r − δ. The uncertainty in the proﬁt function is included in a multiplicative way.
The instantaneous proﬁt of Firm i c a nb ee x p r e s s e da s
πNiNj (t)=x(t)DNiNj, (4.2)
where, for k ∈{ i,j},:
Nk =
 
0i f ﬁ r m k has not invested,
1i f ﬁ r m k has invested.





D10 >D 00 implies that the proﬁt of the ﬁrm that invests as ﬁrst exceeds ceteris paribus
the initial (symmetric) proﬁt. Moreover, this investment leads to a deterioration of the
proﬁt of the ﬁrm that did not undertake the project yet, i.e. D00 >D 01. Finally,
the ’catch-up’ investment made by the lagging ﬁrm enhances its proﬁt, so D11 >D 01,
but, at the same time, it reduces the proﬁt of the ﬁrst mover, so that D11 <D 10. The
last inequality implies that there are negative network externalities among the ﬁrms.5
Such a general formulation embraces, for instance, Cournot or Stackelberg quantity
competition.
The investment opportunity is assumed to last forever and the structure of the
associated payoﬀ can only change as a result of the competitor’s action. Therefore, the
opportunity can be modeled as a perpetual American option with a payoﬀ determined
endogenously. Consequently, we denote the investment cost of Firm i, i ∈{ 1,2} by Ii.
Without loss of generality I1 is normalized to I, which is the investment cost of the
low-cost ﬁrm, and I2 is set equal to κI, where κ ∈ [1,∞).
Finally, we assume that the initial realization of the process underlying both
ﬁrms’ proﬁts, x(0), is low enough, so that an immediate investment is not optimal.6
5Mason and Weeds (2003) allow for D11 >D 10 to reﬂect the positive network externalities on
the supply side that can arise among the competitors. In our setting (ﬁrms already compete in a
product market) such an assumption would be more diﬃcult to justify. Moreover, D10 >D 11 does
not preclude the presence of positive network externalities among the ﬁrms’ customers (for example,
the proﬁts generated by Microsoft in the oﬃce software segment are not likely to be positively aﬀected
by technological improvements made by Corel).
6Immediate investment is optimal in case of a suﬃciently high initial realization of the stochastic
process. The mixed strategies equilibria occurring then are discussed (for identical ﬁrms) in Chapter
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4.3 Value Functions and Investment Thresholds
As in Chapter 3, there are three possibilities concerning the relative timing of
ﬁrms investment. First, Firm i may become the leader. Alternatively, Firm j may
invest sooner which results in Firm i becoming the follower. Finally, ﬁrms may invest
simultaneously.
In this section we establish the payoﬀs associated with the three situations
described above. As in the standard approach used to solve dynamic games, we analyze
the problem backwards in time. First, we derive the optimal strategy of the follower,
who takes the strategy of the leader as given. Subsequently, we analyze the decision of
the leader. Finally, the case of joint investment is discussed.
4.3.1 Follower
Consider the investment decision of the follower (Firm i)a tt i m et,w h e r et is
the leader’s (Firm j’s) investment timing. Firm i will undertake the investment when
proﬁts are suﬃciently large, i.e. when x exceeds a certain threshold level denoted by
xF
i . Determining xF
i is equivalent to ﬁnding the optimal option exercise strategy. At
















































2β (β − 1) + αβ − r =0 . (4.7)
The ﬁrst integral in (4.4) corresponds to the present value of proﬁts obtained before
the investment is undertaken. The second part of (4.4) reﬂects the present value of
proﬁts after the investment is made minus the associated sunk cost.80 CHAPTER 4. PROFIT UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC FIRMS
The value of the ﬁrm as well as the optimal investment threshold can be cal-
culated explicitly by applying the standard dynamic programming methodology (see
Section 1.6). By solving the diﬀerential equation describing the dynamics of Firm i’s
value with corresponding value-matching, smooth-pasting and no-bubbles conditions,


















if x ≤ xF
i ,
xD11
δ − Ii if x>x F
i .
(4.8)
The interpretation of (4.8) is as follows. The ﬁrst row is the present value of proﬁts
when the follower does not invest immediately. The ﬁrst term is the payoﬀ in case the
follower refrains from investing forever, whereas the second term is the value of the
option to invest. The second row corresponds to the present value of enhanced cash
ﬂows resulting from immediate investment minus its cost.
4.3.2 Leader
Following a similar reasoning as in the previous subsection, we determine the
payoﬀ of Firm i when it invests ﬁrst, thus Firm i is the leader. Then the value function
















The ﬁrst two components of (4.9) correspond to the present value of the leader’s proﬁts
realized until the moment of the follower’s investment net of the leader’s sunk cost.
The second integral corresponds to the discounted perpetual stream of proﬁts obtained
after the investment of the follower.
Using the results of the follower problem, we can express the time-t value of

















if x ≤ xF
j ,
xD11
δ − Ii if x>x F
j .
(4.10)
The ﬁrst row of (4.10) is the net present value of proﬁts before the follower made
the investment minus the present value of future proﬁts lost due to the follower’s
investment. The second row corresponds to the net present value of proﬁts in a situation
where it is optimal for the follower to invest immediately.4.4. EQUILIBRIA 81
4.3.3 Simultaneous Investment
It is possible that the ﬁrms, despite the asymmetry in the investment cost, decide
to invest simultaneously. The value function of Firm i investing at its optimal threshold










































Expression (4.11) is interpreted analogously to (4.4) and (4.9). The simultaneous
investment threshold exists as long as D11 is larger than D00. Otherwise, it is optimal
for the ﬁrms to abstain from investing.7 Consequently, the time-t value of Firm i when


















if x ≤ xS
i ,
xtD11
δ − Ii if x>x S
i ,
(4.14)
The second row equals the value of Firm i when the simultaneous investment is
made immediately. In such a case, we denote the value of Firm i by V J
i (x). Hence, the
diﬀerence with V S
i (x) is that V J
i (x) represents the value of simultaneous immediate
investment, while V S
i (x) is the value of optimal simultaneous investment. From (4.13)
it can be seen that xS
i diﬀers among the ﬁrms. As it is shown in the next section, this
divergence does not preclude the simultaneous investment strategy.
4.4 Equilibria
There are three types of equilibria that can occur in the choice of strategies, namely
the preemptive, sequential and simultaneous equilibrium. In this section we discuss the
characteristics of each type of equilibrium and present the conditions under which each
of them occurs.
7The lack of the simultaneous equilibrium in Perotti and Rossetto (2000) is exactly due to the
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4.4.1 Preemptive Equilibrium
The ﬁrst type of equilibrium we consider is the preemptive equilibrium (cf. Subsec-
tion 3.4.1). It occurs in the situation in which both ﬁrms have an incentive to become
the leader, i.e. when the cost disadvantage of Firm 2 is relatively small. Therefore,
Firm 1 has to take into account the fact that Firm 2 will aim at preempting Firm 1
as soon as a certain threshold is reached. This threshold, denoted by xP
21,i st h el o w e s t
realization of the process x for which Firm 2 is indiﬀerent between being the leader
and the follower. Formally, xP
21 is the smallest solution to
ξ2 (x)=0 , (4.15)
where ξi (x) is deﬁned as
ξi(x) ≡ V
L
i (x) − V
F
i (x), (4.16)
in which V F
i and V L
i are given by (4.8) and (4.10), respectively. As a consequence,




















Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs associated with being the leader,
follower, both investing at Firm 1’s optimal simultaneous investment threshold and
both investing immediately. Firm 1 invests as soon as the process reaches the smaller
of two values: xP
21 at which Firm 2 is indiﬀerent between being the leader and the
follower, and xL
1 at which it is optimal for Firm 1 to invest given that Firm 2 does not
invest until xL
1 is reached. Figure 4.1 illustrates the case where xP
21 <x L
1. Consequently,
in the preemption equilibrium the payoﬀ of Firm 1 as a leader is higher than the payoﬀ
obtained if Firm 1 was second to invest. It can be seen in Figure 4.2 that to the left of
xP
21 the value of Firm 2 being the leader is lower than the value being the follower, while
to the right the opposite is true. Firm 1 uses the fact that Firm 2 has no incentive
to invest before xP
21 and preempts it by just an instant. For κ tending to 1, i.e. when
ﬁrms become symmetric, xP
21 gets closer to Firm 1’s preemption point, xP
1 , at which
Firm 1 itself is indiﬀerent between being the leader and the follower.
8At ﬁrst sight it may look surprising that the optimal threshold xL
1 does not depend on Firm 2’s
investment timing. This is due to the fact that Firm 2’s investment aﬀects equally the value of Firm


































































Figure 4.2: Firm 2’s value functions when the resulting equilibrium is of the preemptive
type.84 CHAPTER 4. PROFIT UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC FIRMS
Consequently, the presence of cost asymmetry implies the following corollary.





































Proof. The proof directly follows from the deﬁnition of the preemption point and









The sequential equilibrium occurs when Firm 2 has no incentive to become the
leader, i.e. when equation (4.15) does not have a solution. In this case, Firm 1 simply
maximizes the value of the investment opportunity, which always leads to investment
at the optimal threshold xL
1. In other words, Firm 1 acts as if it had exclusive rights


































Figure 4.3: Firm 1’s value functions when the resulting equilibrium is of the sequential type.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs associated with the sequential
investment equilibrium. From Figure 4.4 it can be concluded that Firm 2 is never































Figure 4.4: Firm 2’s value functions when the resulting equilibrium is of the sequential type.
does not need to take into account the possibility of being preempted by Firm 2. As a
result, Firm 1 is able to invest at its unconditional threshold, xL
1 (see Figure 4.3). At
xL
1 the value of the investment opportunity smooth-pastes to the net present value of
incremental beneﬁts from making the investment (cf. Dixit and Pindyck, 1996). As in
the previous case, Firm 2 invests at its follower threshold xF
2 .














that separates the regions of the preemptive and the sequential equilibrium. For κ<
κ∗ Firm 1 needs to take into account possible preemption by Firm 2, whereas κ ≥ κ∗
implies that ﬁrms always invest sequentially at their optimal thresholds.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, Proposition 4.1 states that there is a cut-oﬀ level for the cost dis-
advantage of Firm 2 above which Firm 1 can act as a monopolist in exercising its
investment option.86 CHAPTER 4. PROFIT UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC FIRMS
4.4.3 Simultaneous Equilibrium
Another type of equilibrium is the simultaneous (or joint investment) equilibrium
(cf. Subsection 3.4.2). In this case the ﬁrms invest at the same point in time. In
the simultaneous investment equilibrium one of the ﬁrms has to adopt a strategy that
does not optimize its payoﬀ unconditionally (note that the optimal joint investment
thresholds diﬀer). Since the optimal threshold of Firm 1 is lower than that of Firm
2, the only candidate for a simultaneous investment threshold is xS
1, deﬁned by (4.13).
For simultaneous investment to occur, the payoﬀ of Firm 1 associated with being the
leader has to be lower than the payoﬀ resulting from simultaneous investment at xS
1.
Otherwise, Firm 1 will invest either at xL
1 or at xP
2 (depending on the level of cost
asymmetry). Moreover, Firm 2’s follower threshold must be lower than xS
1. In other
words, Firm 2 has to ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to respond to Firm 1’s investment at xS
1
immediately than to wait. Otherwise, Firm 2 would invest as the follower at xF
2 . It
turns out that wherever it is optimal for Firm 1 to invest simultaneously, Firm 2 prefers
simultaneous investment to being the follower (see the proof of Proposition 4.2 below).

































































Figure 4.6: Firm 2’s value functions when the resulting equilibrium is of the simultaneous
type.
4.4.4 Conditions for Equilibria
The occurrence of a particular type of equilibrium is determined by the relationship
between the relative payoﬀs, which in turn depend on the level of cost asymmetry, ﬁrst-
mover advantage and market parameters such as volatility, the growth rate and the
interest rate. From Proposition 4.1 we already know the cut-oﬀ value of the cost
asymmetry parameter κ that separates the preemptive and the sequential equilibrium.
Now, we concentrate on determining the region in which the simultaneous equilibrium
occurs. In order to do so, let us deﬁne
ζi (x) ≡ V
S
i (x) − V
L
i (x). (4.20)
ζi (x) can be interpreted as the change in Firm i’s value associated with refraining
from an immediate investment as the leader in favor of the simultaneous investment
strategy. If the minimum of ζ1(x) on the interval [x(0),x F
1 ] is larger than zero, the
change is positive, and thus a simultaneous equilibrium occurs. In other words, the
simultaneous equilibrium requires that Firm 1 is always better oﬀ by investing jointly
at its optimal threshold xS
1 compared to becoming the leader.9 Otherwise, either the
sequential or the preemption equilibrium occurs.
9Strictly speaking, the equilibrium with sequential/preemptive investment still exists in this case
but is Pareto-dominated by the simultaneous entry equilibrium (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985).88 CHAPTER 4. PROFIT UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC FIRMS
Proposition 4.2 There exists a unique value of κ ≥ 1, denoted by κ∗∗,w h i c hi s
equal to
κ




β1 (D10 − D11)
(D10 − D00)







that determines the regions of the simultaneous and the sequential/preemptive invest-
ment equilibria. For κ<κ ∗∗ the resulting equilibrium is of the joint investment type,
whereas for κ ≥ κ∗∗ the sequential/preemptive investment equilibrium occurs.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4.2 implies that for a relatively high degree of asymmetry between
ﬁrms (for a given set of Dijsa n dβ1), simultaneous investment is not optimal and
either a sequential or preemption equilibrium occurs. Moreover, there exists a set
of parameter values for which simultaneous investment is not optimal even when the
ﬁrms are symmetric. In this case κ∗∗ is equal to 1. We present an illustration of when
the resulting equilibria occur in a two-dimensional graph. In Figure 4.7 we depict
the investment strategies as a function of the ﬁrst-mover advantage, D10/D11, and the
investment cost asymmetry, κ.
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6













Figure 4.7: Regions of sequential, preemptive and joint investment equilibria for the set of
parameter values: r =0 .05,α =0 .015,σ=0 .1,D 00 =0 .5,D 01 =0 .25, and D11 =1 .
When the investment cost asymmetry is relatively small and there is no signiﬁcant
ﬁrst-mover advantage, the ﬁrms invest jointly (a triangular area in the south-west).4.5. UNCERTAINTY AND INVESTMENT THRESHOLDS 89
When the ﬁrst-mover advantage becomes signiﬁcant, Firm 1 prefers being the leader to
investing simultaneously. This results in the preemption equilibrium (area in the south-
east). Finally, if the asymmetry between ﬁrms is signiﬁcant (for the set of parameter
values in the upper part of Figure 4.7), the ﬁrms invest sequentially and Firm 1 can
act as a sole holder of the investment opportunity.
4.5 Uncertainty and Investment Thresholds
From the real option literature it is known that in a non-strategic framework in-
creasing uncertainty leads to a higher optimal investment threshold. As we show below,
this observation also holds in strategic models as long as the ﬁrms’ investment thresh-
olds are solutions to the optimization problem. The follower’s threshold, the leader’s
threshold in the sequential equilibrium, and the critical value triggering simultaneous
investment satisfy this condition. Conversely, in the preemptive equilibrium the leader
(Firm 1) does not always invest at the threshold that solves its optimization prob-
lem, but instead, for certain parameter values it invests at the follower’s (Firm 2’s)
preemption point.










where Dafter and Dbefore are the deterministic contributions to the proﬁt function












i.e. the optimal follower threshold, optimal leader threshold and the critical value
corresponding to simultaneous investment increase with uncertainty.
The impact of volatility on Firm 2’s preemption point, xP
21, at which Firm 1
invests, requires slightly more attention. Let us recall that xP
21 is the smallest root of
ξ2(x)=0 . Consequently, we calculate the derivative of ξ2(x) with respect to the proﬁt
uncertainty. The change of (4.16), calculated for Firm 2, resulting from a marginal






















∂(σ2) measures the direct inﬂuence of uncertainty on the net beneﬁt
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of being the leader of the fact that the follower investment threshold increases with
uncertainty.















Apparently, the joint impact of both eﬀects is ambiguous. The ﬁrst eﬀect is (4.25),
which represents the simple value of waiting argument: if uncertainty is large, it is more
valuable to wait for new information before undertaking the investment. As we have
just seen, this also holds for the follower. The implication for the leader of the follower
investing later is that the leader has a cost advantage for a longer time. This makes
an earlier investment of the leader more beneﬁcial. This eﬀect is captured by (4.26),
which can thus be interpreted as an increment in the strategic value of becoming the
leader vs. the follower resulting from the delay in the follower’s investment.
However, it is possible to show that the direct eﬀect captured by (4.25) domi-
nates, irrespective of the values of the input parameters.
Proposition 4.3 When uncertainty of the product market increases, the leader
investment threshold increases as well.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In addition to the results obtained in (4.23) and Proposition 4.3, we perform
extensive numerical experiments aiming at determining the impact of uncertainty on
the boundaries of the equilibrium type regions. These simulations indicate that κ∗∗
increases and κ∗ decreases with σ, which implies that the preemption region reduces
with σ. This fact contributes to the positive impact of uncertainty on the ﬁrms’
investment thresholds. Our numerical results are thus consistent with Boyer et al.
(2002), who show an increase in uncertainty may result in a switch from preemptive
to the joint investment equilibrium.
Our conclusions concerning the relationship between the investment timing and
uncertainty are consistent with recent empirical evidence. The negative investment-
uncertainty relationship for ﬁrms operating in an imperfectly competitive environment
is documented, for example, by Guiso and Parigi (1999).4.6. COST ASYMMETRY AND VALUE OF THE FIRM 91
4.6 Cost Asymmetry and Value of the Firm
In this section we discuss the impact of the degree of investment cost asymmetry
on the value of each ﬁrm and, in particular, on the present value of the investment
opportunities. We show that, in the presence of strategic interactions, the relationship
between the magnitude of the investment cost asymmetry and the value of the ﬁrm
can be, in general, discontinuous and non-monotonic.
In the absence of strategic interactions among the ﬁrms the value-asymmetry
relationship is relatively straightforward. An increase in the investment cost of Firm
2 aﬀects its value via i) a higher present value of the investment expenditure that has
to be incurred and ii) a delay in the optimal timing of investment which results in
postponing the moment of the proﬁt ﬂow increase. Consequently, the value of Firm 2
decreases monotonically with κ. Conversely, the value of Firm 1 remains unaﬀected by
a change in κ since the ﬁrms do not interact with each other.
Introducing competition changes the way the asymmetry aﬀects the values of
both ﬁrms. In such a case, the value of Firm 2 is aﬀected not only by an increase in
its investment cost but also by the fact that Firm 1 moves along its reaction curve in
response to the changing characteristics of Firm 2. Consequently, the value of Firm 2
will also be aﬀected by the change of Firm 1’s investment timing inﬂuencing the cash
ﬂow of the former. We illustrate the impact of strategic interactions with an example
in which parameter values are chosen in such a way that for diﬀerent values of the cost
asymmetry parameter all three types of equilibria are possible (cf. Figure 4.7). The
ﬁrms’ values resulting from their optimal strategies are depicted in Figure 4.8.
The lowest degree of asymmetry between the ﬁrms corresponds to the simul-
taneous investment equilibrium. In the simultaneous equilibrium the outcome closely
resembles the case where strategic interactions are absent, in the sense that a marginal
increase in κ does not aﬀect the value of Firm 1 and has a negative impact on the value
of Firm 2.
As κ increases, sequential investment becomes more attractive for Firm 1 be-
cause of the increasing Firm 2’s follower threshold. This means that Firm 2 will invest
later so that Firm 1’s sequential investment proﬁt goes up. Consequently, for κ ex-
ceeding κ∗∗, Firm 1 would optimally invest at its leader threshold xL
1. However, Firm
2 anticipates this and, since its leader value at xL
1 is larger than its follower value,
it is willing to invest an instant before Firm 1 does. Again, Firm 1 reacts on this
and, as explained in Section 4.1, invests at Firm’s 2 preemption point xP
21 <x L
1.I n
such a situation the shift in Firm 1’s reaction curve is discontinuous and a preemption92 CHAPTER 4. PROFIT UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC FIRMS
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Figure 4.8: The value of Firm i (Vi) corresponding to the regions of the joint investment,
preemptive and sequential equilibria for the set of parameter values: r =0 .05,α=0 .015,
σ =0 .1,D 00 =0 .5,D 01 =0 .25,D 10 =1 .33,D 11 =1 ,I = 100 and x =4 .
equilibrium resulting in lower values of both ﬁrms occurs. The implication is that a
marginal increase in the investment cost of Firm 2 that changes the equilibrium from
simultaneous to preemptive, results in both ﬁrms’ payoﬀs jumping downward.
Once the ﬁrms are in the preemption region, the value of both increases with κ.
The at ﬁrst sight surprising positive relationship between Firm 2’s investment cost and
its value is caused by the fact that increasing κ makes Firm 2 a ’weaker’ competitor.
This implies that the preemption threat of Firm 2 declines in the investment cost
asymmetry, so that xP
21 increases with κ. Therefore, Firm 1 invests later, and this is
beneﬁcial for the cash ﬂow of Firm 2 since it can enjoy a higher cash ﬂow for a longer
period. In this case, the non-strategic, i.e. increasing investment cost for Firm 2, and
strategic eﬀects work in the opposite direction and the latter dominates. As far as
Firm 1 is concerned, its value increases because its investment threshold moves closer
to xL
1. Moreover, it beneﬁts from the delayed investment of Firm 2.
When the asymmetry between the ﬁrms reaches the critical level κ∗,a b o v e
which it is not optimal anymore for Firm 2 to become the leader, the sequential equi-
librium occurs. Upon the switch to the sequential equilibrium the values of both ﬁrms
move upward. In both cases this is caused by the discontinuous change, from xP
21 to
xL
1, of Firm 1’s investment threshold. By investing at xL
1 Firm 1 maximizes its value,4.6. COST ASYMMETRY AND VALUE OF THE FIRM 93
and lets Firm 2 enjoy a higher cash ﬂow for a longer period.
In the sequential equilibrium region the changes in the ﬁrms’ values result
entirely from the sunk cost asymmetry and its impact on Firm 2’s investment timing.
Firm 1 beneﬁts from the delayed investment of Firm 2 and the value of the latter
decreases for the same reason as in the non-strategic case.
In order to provide better intuition about the nature of the non-monotonic
relationship between the value of the ﬁrm, Vi, and the investment cost asymmetry,
κ,w ed e c o m p o s eVi into three components. First, we calculate the expected value of
discounted future proﬁts in case no investment is made, which reﬂects the value of assets
in place, A/Pi. Further, we derive the value of the ﬁrm’s own investment opportunity
given that the other ﬁrm does not invest, PVGOO
i . Finally, the magnitude of the
impact of the competitor’s investment on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, PVGOC
i is determined.
The sum of PVGOO
i and PVGOC
i can be interpreted as the strategic NPVof the
investment opportunity of Firm i.
Table 4.1 presents the decomposition of Firm 1’s value for diﬀerent levels of
the cost-asymmetry.
κ 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.33 1.5
A/P1 57.14 57.14 57.14 57.14 57.14 57.14
PVGOO
1 14.19 15.14 17.16 18.15 18.15 18.15
PVGOC
1 −8.58 −12.17 −11.51 −10.91 −10.05 −8.57
V1 62.75 60.12 62.80 64.39 65.24 66.72
κ∗ =1 .222 κ∗∗ =1 .124
Table 4.1: Decomposition of Firm 1’s value into the expected present value of the perpetual
cash ﬂow from assets in place, A/P1, the option to invest, PVGOO
1 , short the competitor’s
option to invest, and the value reduction due to the competitor’s investment, PVGOC
1 ,f o rt h e
set of parameter values r =0 .05,α=0 .015,σ=0 .1,D 00 =0 .5,D 01 =0 .25,D 10 =1 .33,
D11 =1 , and I = 100. The value of the ﬁrm, V1, equals A/P1 + PVGOO
1 + PVGOC
1 .
From Table 4.1 a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, we notice that the
value attributed to assets in place does not change with the investment cost asymmetry.
This is understandable since the existing production assets of the ﬁrms are identical.
Second, the value of Firm 1’s investment opportunity rises with κ. This reﬂects the fact
that the growing competitive advantage allows Firm 1 to keep its investment strategy
closer to the unconditional optimum, xL
1 (at which the value of PVGOO
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equals 18.15). Consequently, the only source of non-monotonicity is the interaction of
Firm 2’s investment decision with Firm 1’s proﬁt (see PVGOC
1 in Table 4.1). When
the cost-asymmetry becomes larger, i.e. when κ ≥ κ∗∗ =1 .124, then Firm 1 has no
longer an incentive to wait until the optimal simultaneous threshold is reached and
is aiming at preempting Firm 2. As discussed above, the resulting preemption game
deteriorates both ﬁrm’s payoﬀs and, as a direct consequence, their values.
Table 4.2 contains an analogous decomposition of the value of Firm 2.
κ 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.33 1.5
A/P2 57.14 57.14 57.14 57.14 57.14 57.14
PVGOO
2 13.45 11.94 11.29 10.70 9.80 7.88
PVGOC
2 −8.58 −18.25 −15.85 −12.67 −12.67 −12.67
V2 62.01 50.83 52.59 55.18 54.61 52.36
κ∗ =1 .222 κ∗∗ =1 .124
Table 4.2: Decomposition of Firm 2’s value into the expected present value of the perpetual
cash ﬂow from assets in place, A/P2, the option to invest, PVGOO
2 , short the competitor’s
option to invest and recapture the part of the market share, PVGOC
2 , for the set of parameter
values r =0 .05,α=0 .015,σ=0 .1,D 00 =0 .5,D 01 =0 .25,D 10 =1 .33,D 11 =1 , and
I = 100. The value of the ﬁrm, V2, equals A/P2 + PVGOO
2 + PVGOC
2 .
Upon analyzing Table 4.2 it can be concluded that increasing investment cost
asymmetry has two eﬀects on the value of Firm 2. First, it results in the reduction of
the value of Firm 2’s investment opportunity, PVGOO
2 . This relationship is monotonic
irrespective from the type of the prevailing equilibrium and results from the increase
in the investment expenditure that has to be incurred. Second, it inﬂuences the way
the competitor’s option to invest, PVGOC
2 , aﬀects the value of the ﬁrm. In the region
of the preemptive equilibrium, i.e. for κ ∈ [1.124,1.222], the value of Firm 2 lost
due to the exercise of the investment opportunity by Firm 1, PVGOC
2 , is inversely
related to the investment cost asymmetry. In other words, when Firm 2’s cost becomes
higher, the investment of its competitor has a smaller negative impact on its value
since the competitor invests later. This is the strategic eﬀect of the marginal increase
in investment cost (Firm 2 becomes a ”weaker competitor”), which dominates the
direct eﬀect of the increase in κ on the net present value of the project, PVGOO
2 .10
10Using a static framework, Gelman and Salop (1983) show that the proﬁt of a smaller entrant may
be positively related to its competitive disadvantage interpreted as a capacity constraint.4.7. WELFARE ANALYSIS 95
So far, we considered the impact of a diﬀerence in the investment cost on the
value of the ﬁrms. We have shown that there exists a non-monotonic and discontinu-
ous relationship between the cost asymmetry and the ﬁrms’ values resulting from the
switches among the diﬀerent types of equilibrium strategies. In the next section we
d i s c u s st h ei m p a c to fκ on social welfare by showing how particular types of strategies
aﬀect the consumer surplus.
4.7 Welfare Analysis
In order to assess the desirability of policies inﬂuencing the ﬁrms’ access to new
market segments and technologies, we investigate how investment cost asymmetry af-
fects social welfare. The investment cost that has to be incurred by the ﬁrm can be
inﬂuenced by the regulator, for instance, via ﬁscal measures and governmental guar-
antees resulting in a lower cost of capital. Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) provide
empirical evidence that the presence of a third party guarantee lowers the cost of cap-
ital. Moreover, the ﬁrms’ access to new markets and technologies can be equalized
via knowledge spillovers. Stoneman and Diederen (1994) analyze the actual diﬀusion
policies of the governments and their implications for the ﬁrms’ behavior.
The desirability of a policy can be measured by the way it aﬀects social welfare,
which is the sum of the consumer surplus and the ﬁrms’ values.11 Since in the previous
sections we already established the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs, here we begin the analysis with
deriving the consumer surplus. Subsequently, we discuss how this surplus is inﬂuenced
by the ﬁrms investment strategies. After having done this, we are ready to present the
relationship between the investment strategies and social welfare. Finally, we provide
some conclusions.
In order to derive the consumer surplus, we specify the way investment is
beneﬁcial to the consumers. To do so, we introduce a simple setting in which after the
investment Firm i is oﬀering a product of quality b1 >b 0, where b0 denotes the initial
quality of the product. As long as the ﬁrms oﬀer the same quality bk, k ∈{ 0,1}, they
compete ` a la Cournot, whereas after making the investment ﬁrst, Firm 1 achieves a
Stackelberg advantage in the diﬀerentiated product market. The Cournot outcome is
restored after Firm 2 has invested. Then both ﬁrms compete in the market with a
higher quality.
The market we consider has a continuum of consumers with an instantaneous
11Tirole (1988), Ch. 5-8, provides an extensive introduction to oligopoly theory.96 CHAPTER 4. PROFIT UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC FIRMS
utility function
Ui(t)=θib − p(t), (4.27)
where θi is a consumer-speciﬁc parameter that is uniformly distributed over the interval
[0,A(t)],bis the quality of the product and p(t) is its price at time t. The parameter















where α,σ and dw(t) are the same as in (4.1). It is useful to observe (by applying Itˆ o’s
lemma) that A2 can be replaced by x since it exactly follows process (4.1).
If both ﬁrms oﬀer the same quality, the instantaneous demand function corre-
sponding to utility function (4.27) can be expressed as
p(t)=( A − q1(t) − q2(t))b, (4.29)
where qi (t) denotes the quantity oﬀered by Firm i at time t.
Let us now derive the expressions for the instantaneous consumer surplus,
denoted by cskl (t), where k and l relate to the quality oﬀered by the ﬁrms. In order to
analyze the complete structure of the game, we consider three cases. In the ﬁrst case
only quality b0 is provided. In the second case one ﬁrm provides quality b0 and the
other b1(>b 0) and, ﬁnally, both ﬁrms oﬀer b1. In the ﬁrst and third case, maximizing
the ﬁrm’s instantaneous proﬁts, calculating social welfare, and the residual surplus





The formulation of cs10 (the second mentioned case) is slightly more involved
and it corresponds to a Stackelberg equilibrium with second degree price discrimination.
Consequently, cs10 consists of two components: the surplus of consumers purchasing
the good of quality b1 and the surplus of those who choose b0. Solving the Stackelberg





To ﬁnd out in what way the consumer surplus is related to the ﬁrms’ investment
strategies, we analyze the changes in the consumer surplus across the equilibria. If the












, (4.32)4.7. WELFARE ANALYSIS 97
where T S
1 is given by (4.12). When the resulting equilibrium is of the preemption type,














































2 is deﬁned by (4.5). The consumer surplus in the sequential equilibrium is the






is replaced by TL
1 .
After taking into account that the ﬁrms invest later in the simultaneous equi-
librium, a comparison of (4.32) and (4.33) enables us to formulate the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 4.4 Under the preemptive/sequential equilibrium the consumer sur-
plus is always larger than in the joint investment equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Consequently, from the consumers’ viewpoint, the situation in which the ﬁrms
invest simultaneously is undesirable. This is easy to understand since in this case the
ﬁrms invest later so that during a longer period of time the product with a higher
quality is not available.
Now, let us investigate social welfare, which equals, as mentioned earlier, the
consumer surplus plus the value of the ﬁrms. In order to relate the latter to the
analyzed market, we can make the following substitution, where the expressions at














For a particular example, the consumer surplus and the ﬁrms’ values are de-
picted as functions of the asymmetry in the investment cost in Figure 4.9. From this
ﬁgure it can be concluded that low asymmetry in the investment costs results in a98 CHAPTER 4. PROFIT UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC FIRMS
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Figure 4.9: Value of Firm i (Vi) and consumer surplus (CS) corresponding to the regions
of the joint investment, preemptive and sequential equilibria for the set of parameter values:
r =0 .05,α =0 .015,σ=0 .1,b 0 =5 ,b 1 =7 ,I= 100, and x =7 .
relatively low consumer surplus and higher values of the ﬁrms. Increasing the asym-
metry among the ﬁrms, such that the simultaneous equilibrium is superseded by the
preemption equilibrium, leads to a downward jump in the ﬁrms’ values and, at the
same time, to an upward jump in the consumer surplus. As seen before, the decline in
the ﬁrms’ values mainly results from the need to incur the investment expenditure, I,
earlier. The increase in the consumer surplus is the consequence of an earlier provision
of the higher quality product. When the investment cost is large compared to the
increase in the consumer surplus associated with higher quality, it is optimal from a
welfare perspective to postpone the investment. Therefore, in such a case an increase
in κ leading to a switch from simultaneous to preemption equilibrium has a detrimen-
tal eﬀect on welfare. Conversely, when the required sunk cost is relatively small, the
resulting preemption equilibrium is socially desirable.
The impact of increasing κ on social welfare is summarized in the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.2 There exists a critical level of investment expenditure below which
social welfare is always larger in the preemptive/sequential equilibrium than in the joint
investment equilibrium.4.7. WELFARE ANALYSIS 99
Consequently, if the investment expenditure is small relative to the consumer
surplus, social welfare is highest under the preemption equilibrium. In this case, the
loss in the ﬁrms’ values resulting from the preemption game is outweighed by the eﬀect
on the consumer surplus of an earlier provision of the high quality product. This implies
that in the case of a relatively low investment expenditure, a relative cost disadvantage
of one of the competitors results in strategies yielding a socially preferred outcome.
Conversely, a relatively high investment expenditure implies the social optimal-
ity of the simultaneous equilibrium. This results from the fact that the simultaneous
equilibrium is associated with the investment outlay occurring later. Since the in-
crease in consumer surplus resulting from providing a higher quality product earlier is
not suﬃcient to fully compensate for the higher present value of an early investment,
postponing the investment is socially desirable. Therefore, in the presence of a high
sunk cost of the project, investment strategies resulting in the simultaneous equilib-
rium maximize social welfare. This, in turn, implies that the cost asymmetry is not
desirable. Corollary 4.3 summarizes these ﬁndings.
Corollary 4.3 A socially desirable outcome is more likely to occur when investment
that requires a high sunk cost is associated with a low asymmetry across ﬁrms and when
a low sunk cost investment is to be made by highly asymmetric ﬁrms.
Corollaries 4.2 and 4.3 are closely associated with the impact of uncertainty on
the social welfare in equilibrium. Other things equal, higher proﬁt volatility discourages
investment and may result in a switch from the preemptive to the joint investment
equilibrium. Therefore, if entering a new market segment is associated with a signiﬁcant
investment cost, it is possible that higher uncertainty in this segment can positively
inﬂuence social welfare. Conversely, if the investment cost is relatively low, so the
preemptive equilibrium is socially optimal, uncertainty will be negatively related to
the social welfare.
We conclude that an equal access of two ﬁrms to a new market segment does not
maximize consumer surplus. Moreover, after taking into account the values of the ﬁrms,
it is not always socially desirable. If the ﬁrms’ investment costs are not excessively high,
the presence of asymmetry among them yields a socially more desirable outcome.
However, it is important to notice that these conclusions do not carry over to
the case where the ﬁrst-mover advantage is large, which would occur when the product
quality diﬀerence is higher. Then, as illustrated in Figure 4.7 the preemption equilib-
rium prevails even if ﬁrms are symmetric. Consequently, from a welfare perspective,
asymmetry is not desirable even if the investment is associated with a relatively low100 CHAPTER 4. PROFIT UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC FIRMS
sunk cost.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, the impact on the ﬁrms’ optimal investment strategies of a diﬀer-
ence in the costs associated with their proﬁt-enhancing investments is analyzed. Since
the ﬁrms operate in an imperfectly competitive duopolistic market, the proﬁtability of
each ﬁrm’s project is aﬀected by the other ﬁrm’s decision to invest. We show that when
the asymmetry among ﬁrms is relatively small and so is the ﬁrst-mover advantage, the
ﬁrms invest jointly. When the ﬁrst-mover advantage is signiﬁcant, the lower-cost ﬁrm
preempts the higher-cost ﬁrm. In the situation where the asymmetry between ﬁrms
becomes suﬃciently large, the ﬁrms exercise their investment options sequentially and
their mutual decisions do not aﬀect each other directly.
Subsequently, we analyze the impact of uncertainty on optimal investment
timing. Despite the presence of strategic interactions, increasing uncertainty always
results in a higher investment threshold. This holds not only for the optimal investment
thresholds but also for the case when the lower-cost ﬁrm faces the threat of being
preempted by its higher-cost opponent.
Furthermore, the eﬀects of investment cost asymmetry on the values the two
ﬁrms are explored. It is shown that the relationship between the ﬁrm’s value and the
cost asymmetry is non-monotonic and discontinuous. We obtain a number of counter-
intuitive results. For reasonable parameter values, deepening the ﬁrm’s competitive
disadvantage due to a marginal rise in its irreversible cost may reduce the value of
its competitor. This situation results when a switch from simultaneous to preemptive
equilibrium occurs upon the marginal change in the cost asymmetry. Another interest-
ing eﬀect of strategic interactions is present when the ﬁrms are engaged in a preemption
game. Then increasing the extent to which the ﬁrms is set at cost-disadvantage leads
to an appreciation of its value due to the strategic eﬀect on the competitor’s investment
timing.
Finally, we discuss the welfare eﬀects of strategic interactions between the
ﬁrms. In an example where the investment increases product quality, we show that
the relationship between cost asymmetry and social welfare depends on the cost of
investment. If it is relatively high and the ﬁrst-mover advantage is not too large, social
welfare is maximized when none of the ﬁrms suﬀers from competitive disadvantage.
However, if the investment cost is low, an increase of the consumer surplus resulting
from the early investment in the preemption equilibrium exceeds the loss of the ﬁrms’4.9. APPENDIX 101
joint value associated with such an investment. Therefore, the preemption equilibrium,
occurring when the suﬃciently costs diﬀer, is in this case desirable. This observation
allows for the conclusion that an equal access of competitors to a new technology or
market segment may not be socially optimal.
4.9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The sequential equilibrium occurs when Firm 2 has no
incentive to invest as the leader. Formally, this requires that ξ2(x)i sn e g a t i v ef o ra l l
x ∈ [x(0),x F
2 ). Therefore, in order to determine the domain of κ-values where the
sequential equilibrium prevails, we are interested in ﬁnding a pair (x∗;κ∗) that satisﬁes








   
x=x∗ =0 .
(4.36)
In other words, we are interested in a point (x∗;κ∗) at which Firm 2’s leader function
is tangent to the follower function. After substituting (4.8) and (4.10) into (4.16), all
deﬁned for Firm 2 for x ≤ xF










































After multiplying both sides of the second equation in (4.37) by x∗
β1, subtracting it from
































Rearranging (4.39) leads to the expression (4.19).
In the remaining part of the proof, we demonstrate that κ∗ > 1. It holds that
κ
∗ > 1 ⇐⇒
(D10 − D01)
β1 − (D11 − D01)
β1
β1(D10 − D11)
− (D11 − D01)
β1−1 > 0, (4.40)102 CHAPTER 4. PROFIT UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC FIRMS
which can be rewritten into
(D10 − D01)
β1 − (D11 − D01)
β1
β1(D10 − D11)




β1 − (D11 − D01)





a = D11 − D01, (4.42)
b = D10 − D01, (4.43)
and rearranging, we conclude that (4.41) is equivalent to
aβ1











After observing that b>aand aβ1
β1(b−a) > 0, we have to prove that the second factor of
(4.44) is positive. Let us denote w = b
a and g(w)=wβ1 −1−β1w+β1. Consequently,
we have




β1−1 − β1 > 0, ∀β1,w>1. (4.46)
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Firm 1 prefers simultaneous investment unless
for some x its leader payoﬀ, V L
1 (x), exceeds the optimal joint investment payoﬀ,
V S







. Therefore, in order to determine the domain of κ-values for which
the simultaneous equilibrium prevails, we are interested in ﬁnding a pair (x∗∗;κ∗∗) that












In other words, we are interested in a point (x∗∗;κ∗∗) in which Firm 1’s simultaneous
investment function is tangent to its leader function. After substituting (4.10) and
(4.14) into (4.20), all deﬁned for Firm 1 for x ≤ xS










































After multiplying the second equation in (4.48) by x∗∗
β1 , subtracting it from the ﬁrst































Given that we only consider the case that κ∗∗ ≥ 1, rearranging (4.50) leads to the
expression (4.21).
In the remaining part of the proof we show that the optimality of the simultane-
ous investment for Firm 1 implies that Firm 2 is better oﬀ by investing simultaneously
as well. Consequently, we prove that as long as it is optimal for Firm 1 to invest si-
multaneously, Firm 2’s follower threshold is always smaller than Firm 1’s optimal joint
investment threshold (since if this is true, then it is always optimal for Firm 2 to invest
immediately when Firm 1 invests). First, we determine   κ which solves
x
F
2 (  κ)=x
S
1 (  κ). (4.51)
For κ<  κ it holds that xF
2 (  κ) <x S
1 (  κ). After substituting (4.6) for Firm 2 and (4.13)
for Firm 1 into (4.51), and rearranging, we obtain




Now, we show that   κ>κ ∗∗, i.e. that
D11 − D01
D11 − D00










c = D11 − D00,
d = D10 − D00,
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Let us denote z = d
c and h(z)=zβ1 − 1 − β1(z − 1). Consequently, we have




β1−1 − β1 > 0, (4.56)
since z>1a n dβ1 > 1. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. The diﬀerence of Firm 2’s payoﬀs as the leader and
t h ef o l l o w e rf o rx ≤ xF






















We are interested in the direction in which uncertainty aﬀects xP
21, i.e. the smallest


































It is straightforward to observe that for suﬃciently small x (4.58) is positive. This can

















Since (in general) it is not possible to obtain an analytical formula for xP
21, we evaluate
the sign of the derivative (4.58) at such a realization of x for which the corresponding
sign is the same as at xP
21. Consequently, we are interested in the realization of x that
satisﬁes the following two properties
ξ2(x
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satisﬁes (4.60) and (4.61). Property (4.60) can be veriﬁed by examining the deﬁnition




Property (4.61) follows directly. Subsequently, we determine the sign of the derivative













































+D11 − D10 +
D11 − D01
κβ1−1 lnκ.
Positive ϕ(κ)f o r∀κ ∈ [1,κ ∗], where κ∗ is deﬁned by (4.19), would imply the positive
relationship between uncertainty and the leader threshold. First, we show that ϕ(κ∗)
is positive. Subsequently, we prove that
ϕ(κ
∗) > 0= ⇒ ϕ(κ) > 0 ∀κ ∈ [1,κ
∗]. (4.66)
The proof that ϕ(κ∗) > 0 consists of three steps. First, we change the variables and
factorize the function ϕ(κ∗), which yields the product of two factors: one with negative
and one with unknown sign. Second, we show that the factor with the unknown sign
is increasing with the relevant variable. Finally, we show that the value of the factor
with a priori unknown sign approaches zero when the underlying variable approaches106 CHAPTER 4. PROFIT UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC FIRMS
the upper limit of its domain. The last two steps imply that the sign of the analyzed
factor is negative, which is equivalent to ϕ(κ∗) having a positive sign.
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Now, we change the variables in order to simplify the expression for ϕ(κ∗). Sub-





















β1(a − b)+a − b.






















β1(p − 1) + p − 1.

























Since it always holds that
−
(1 − p)
(β1 − 1)(1 − pβ1)
< 0, (4.72)4.9. APPENDIX 107
we are interested in the sign of the second factor of (4.71). Therefore, we deﬁne































































The ﬁrst factor of (4.75) is always negative. After the following substitution
z = β1
pβ1−1(1 − p)
1 − pβ1 , (4.76)














I nt h el a s ts t e pw es h o wt h a tl i m
p↑1
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Substitution of (4.80) and (4.81) into (4.79) yields
lim
p↑1
  ϕ(p,β1)=0 . (4.83)
(4.83) together with (4.78) imply that (4.73) is negative and, as a consequence, (4.67)
is positive.
Having proven the positive sign of ϕ(κ∗), now we show that (4.66) holds. Diﬀeren-















  (β1 − 1)a




where a and b are deﬁned by (4.42) and (4.43). Deﬁning




and substitution of (4.69) result in









κβ1 < 0. (4.86)
This completes the proof.
Derivation of the consumer surplus and proﬁt functions. When both ﬁrms
oﬀer a product of the same quality, the resulting equilibrium is symmetric. The prices





























After Firm 1 achieves a Stackelberg advantage by investing, the prices and quanti-





















Figure 4.10: Firm’s proﬁts, πkk, and the instantaneous consumer surplus, cskk,i nam a r k e t











Figure 4.11: Firm’s proﬁts, π10 and π01, and the instantaneous consumer surplus, cs10,i n
a market where ﬁrms compete with product qualities, respectively, b1 and b0.110 CHAPTER 4. PROFIT UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC FIRMS






































The observation that A2 = x allows for an immediate calculation of the consumer
surplus in terms of (6.1) and for an identiﬁcation of the deterministic contributions of
the proﬁt functions.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Since TP
21 <T F
2 <T S
1 for each ω ∈ Ω (see Section
1.6), subtracting the value of consumer surplus in the joint investment equilibrium















−r(s−t)(cs11 (s) − cs00 (s))ds
 
> 0.
An identical reasoning can be applied while comparing the simultaneous equilibrium
with the sequential exercise strategy.Chapter 5
Entry and Strategic Quality Choice
5.1 Introduction
An uncertain economic environment results in ﬁrms managing their investment
opportunities not only by choosing the timing of market entry but also by selecting
product characteristics, such as quality. Higher quality is associated with higher costs
but allows for capturing the beneﬁts of good states of demand. On the contrary, bad
states of demand can lead to lower quality since the cost of possible quality improve-
ment outweighs beneﬁts from a moderate increase of the consumers’ interest in the
product. For example, the options available to the subscribers of a Japanese operator
NTT DoCoMo via the i-mode and related third generation (3G) services have been
scaled down comparing to the initial plans since demand, in relation to the associated
costs, turned out to be lower than expected. Consequently, at the time of launching
the new product, the subscribers did not have the possibility of videoconferencing or
receiving video clips, and what remains in the package oﬀered to them is accessing
e-mail, downloading news and weather reports, and calling up location-speciﬁc infor-
mation. Adding new services was planned to be considered if the future demand was
suﬃciently high.1 The case of the Japanese operator illustrates that ﬁrms face a trade-
oﬀ between the costs of quality and foregone revenues resulting from oﬀering limited
functionality of the product. In this chapter we analyze the impact of demand uncer-
tainty and competition on the optimal choice of the ﬁrm’s strategic variables, such as
investment timing and the product quality, as well as on its valuation.
We apply the real options approach which allows to determine the value of ﬂex-
ibility concerning the investment timing and the quality of the oﬀered product/service.
1See The Economist, October 13-19, 2001, The Mobile Internet: A Survey.
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The implementation of option-based techniques requires taking into consideration two
major diﬀerences between ﬁnancial and real options. First, in most cases real options
are not exclusive, i.e. exercising a given option by one party results in the termination
of corresponding options held by other parties (cf. the analysis of Chapters 3 and 4).
For example, an option to lay down a ﬁber-optic cable between an internet backbone
and a residential area is alive only until a competitive ﬁrm does so. Second, the ﬁrm
can inﬂuence both the value of the underlying asset as well as the exercise price of the
corresponding option. In many situations there exists a positive relationship between
the amount of the sunk cost and the revenue of the project (i.e. via the level of autom-
atization of the production process or via the product quality). Consequently, the ﬁrm
is often faced with a menu of mutually exclusive real options with diﬀerent exercise
prices and payoﬀ structures.
Both these aspects of real options have been incorporated into this chapter
and are applied to investigate the investment decision in a market with stochastic
demand, positive network externalities and competitive entry threat. We develop a
strategic model in which a ﬁrm chooses the timing of irreversible investment and the
quality of the product. Competitive entry occurs as a result of the optimal investment
decision of a second ﬁrm. We compare the cases of ﬁxed and ﬂexible quality in order to
determine the additional value of ﬂexibility in quality choice. Flexible quality, which
can be adjusted over time, requires suﬃcient know-how within the ﬁrm, the use of a
more advanced technology or contractual ﬂexibility (e.g. via a ﬂexible agreement with
content providers in the case of a 3G mobile operator). Fixed and ﬂexible quality can
also be interpreted as resulting from a licensed and internally developed technology,
respectively. In the ﬁxed quality case, once chosen quality cannot be changed. For
instance, it may not be possible for an internet infrastructure provider to save on quality
reduction (equivalent to narrowing bandwidth capacity) since ﬁber-optic cable cannot
be easily resold or hired to another party during market downturn. Adding capacity
when the demand is high can also be prohibitively costly, especially if the high state
of demand results from its high volatility. In case of ﬂexible quality, the ﬁrm is able to
change it at a low cost in response to demand ﬂuctuations and/or competitive entry.
In practice, ﬂexible quality is often associated with higher up-front costs. We show
that these higher costs are especially justiﬁed in competitive environments with large
demand uncertainty where the value of ﬂexible quality more than doubles compared
to the monopoly case.
Consequently, we aim at unifying two streams of literature: strategic real op-5.1. INTRODUCTION 113
tions and industrial organization-based endogenous quality choice.2 As far as the real
option framework is concerned, our model builds up upon such contributions as Smets
(1991), Grenadier (1996), Perotti and Rossetto (2000), Huisman (2001), Nielsen (2002),
Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), and Mason and Weeds (2003), which all have in com-
mon that they analyze the eﬀects of both competition and uncertainty on investment
timing.
Introducing quality choice as a strategic variable results in the extension of
the existing continuous-time strategic real options framework to a class of models in
which ﬁrms are equipped with two control variables. Besides choosing the timing of
investment, the ﬁrms now also have to decide about the optimal quality of the product
they are going to oﬀer. The implication is that some of the classic real options results
cease to hold. For example, in the ﬁxed quality case, the optimal investment timing
of the second ﬁrm is no longer irrelevant for the investment decision of the leader in
the open-loop strategies (cf. Huisman, 2001). This is due to the fact that the entry
decision of the follower interacts with the second control variable of the leader (quality),
which, in turn, inﬂuences the leader’s optimal investment timing. With ﬂexible quality
the follower’s investment decision becomes again irrelevant since the leader can change
quality instantaneously. As a consequence, until the follower’s entry it can act as a
monopolist, thus without being inﬂuenced by the entry threat.
In this chapter it is shown that, due to strategic interaction between the leader
and follower, the value of the investment option of the former can decrease with un-
certainty if the ﬁxed-quality technology is used. Moreover, the value of the leader is
lower than the one of the follower. This latter result is due to the strategic disad-
vantage of the ﬁrst mover in a Stackelberg game in which ﬁrms compete in strategic
complements. Once the leader has invested it cannot change its quality. Hence, the
follower is in the comfortable position where it can optimally adjust its quality level
to the leader’s choice. The situation reverses under the ﬂexible-quality technology of
the leader. Now, the value of the follower, which still has a ﬁxed quality choice, can
decrease with uncertainty since its project’s value becomes concave in the realizations
of random demand. This is caused by the fact that now the leader can change its
quality level after the follower has made its choice.
Furthermore, we show that in the ﬂexible-quality case the leader can drive its
competitor out of the market in high states of the demand. This is caused by the
fact that the leader can aﬀord investing in high quality when demand is high. This
2In a recent paper, Pennings (2002) analyzes the optimal quality choice in a real options framework
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reduces the demand for the product oﬀered by the follower to zero for states of demand
exceeding a certain trigger. Flexible quality can thus serve as an entry deterrent control.
In this case the quality level need not be set higher than monopoly level since the
leader’s ability to raise quality instantly after a potential entry is suﬃcient to prevent
such an entry from occurring.
We also discuss the impact of network externalities on the optimal investment
timing, quality choice and ﬁrms’ valuations. Since, from the point of view of a con-
sumer, an increase of the degree of network externalities can compensate the decrease
in quality, the optimal quality choice of ﬁrms is inversely related to network external-
ities. Moreover, ﬁrms invest sooner and their valuations are higher when the product
market exhibits strong network externalities.
As far as the literature on strategic quality choice is concerned, our model is
related to the contributions by Motta (1993), Aoki and Prusa (1996), Foros and Hansen
(2001), Dubey and Wu (2002), Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001) and Banker et al.
(1998). In general, it can be remarked that we generalize this stream of research by
analyzing a dynamic, continuous-time framework while taking into account economic
uncertainty.
Motta (1993) considers a two-stage duopoly model with either ﬁxed or variable
costs of quality (i.e. independent from or proportional to the scale of improvement).
Fixed costs can be associated with R&D or advertising activities. Variable costs,
that correspond to our framework, reﬂect more skilled labor and more expensive raw
materials and inputs. The result of the paper is that ﬁrms diﬀerentiate qualities, which
is possible due to setting diﬀerent prices. In a similar framework Aoki and Prusa (1996)
analyze optimal sequential and simultaneous quality choice. Again, due to the fact that
the authors assume only vertical product diﬀerentiation and price competition, there
exists a ﬁrst-mover advantage in the quality choice game. In our case, products are
diﬀerentiated also horizontally, so the ﬁrms set diﬀerent qualities even if the cost of the
good to consumer is equal. As a consequence, qualities become strategic complements,
reaction curves are continuous, and the proﬁt of the second mover is higher.
Foros and Hansen (2001) apply a two-stage model extended to allow for hor-
izontal diﬀerentiation and network externalities to the market of Internet Service
Providers. They ﬁnd that the optimal choice of quality is positively related to network
externalities. Their result diﬀers from ours due to the fact that in Foros and Hansen
(2001) the substitution eﬀect between quality and network externalities is dominated
by the impact of lower competitive pressure resulting from higher network externalities.
Dubey and Wu (2002) investigate ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in product inno-5.2. NON-STRATEGIC MODEL WITH FIXED QUALITY 115
vation, which ultimately leads to a quality increase. They show that the relationship
between the number of ﬁrms and the propensity to innovate is bell-shaped. In other
words, if the number of ﬁrms is ”too large” or ”too small” the innovation process does
not occur. The results of Dubey and Wu (2002) are consistent with our model that
predicts that the possibility of entry increases the quality provided by the otherwise
monopolistic ﬁrm. Using a diﬀerent analytical framework Banker et al. (1998) con-
clude that in the absence of synergies among the ﬁrms in the quality cost, an increasing
number of ﬁrms leads to decreasing quality. This ﬁnding coincides with the argument
of Dubey and Wu (2002) for a ”too large” number of ﬁrms and is caused by the fact
that improving quality is assumed to be suﬃciently costly.
An alternative dynamic model of strategic quality choice is developed by Hoppe
and Lehmann-Grube (2001). In their framework, the ﬁrms chose the optimal timing of
entry, given that the available quality is a deterministic function of time. Prior to the
investment, ﬁrms are assumed to pay R&D costs which are proportional to time until
investing. The authors show that, depending on the cost of R&D, there can be either
rent equalization (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985) or a second-mover advantage in
the quality choice game. The assumption made by Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001)
that the costs of higher quality are incurred prior to investment diﬀers from ours in
which the costs of quality occur after the investment is made (similar to the notion
of variable quality costs in Motta, 1993). As a consequence, contrary to Hoppe and
Lehmann-Grube (2001), we do not observe the ﬁrst-mover advantage (corresponding
to payoﬀ equalization without exogenous ﬁrms’ roles) in the ﬁxed-quality case in our
model.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we present the model of
a monopolistic ﬁrm with a ﬁxed-quality technology. Section 5.3 extends the model to
a duopolistic environment. The discussion of the monopolistic model with a ﬂexible
quality choice is presented in Section 5.4 and the analysis of its duopolistic extension
is included in Section 5.5. In Section 5.6 we compare the impact of ﬁxed and ﬂexible
quality on the value of the ﬁrm. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Non-Strategic Model with Fixed Quality
Consider a situation in which a risk-neutral ﬁrm has an investment opportunity
to launch a product/service in an uncertain market. It chooses the optimal investment
timing and quality of the product. In this section we assume that once chosen quality
cannot be changed. The idea of the ﬁxed quality choice is therefore similar to Ueng116 CHAPTER 5. ENTRY AND STRATEGIC QUALITY CHOICE
(1997), who considers an inﬁnitely repeated oligopoly game in which the qualities are
chosen before the ﬁrst period. It is realistic to assume that the revenue per customer
is not constant but evolves stochastically over time.3 The instantaneous revenue per
customer at time t is equal to x(t), where x follows the geometric Brownian motion
dx(t)=αx(t)dt + σx(t)dw(t). (5.1)
Here α denotes the deterministic drift rate and σ is the instantaneous volatility of
the process. In the analysis we assume that the initial realization of (5.1), x(0), is
suﬃciently low, so that in all possible cases the market is too small for immediate
investment to be optimal.
There is a continuum of heterogenous consumers with valuations ωi distributed
uniformly over the interval [0,1]. A consumer derives utility not only from the stand-
alone good but also from the number of other consumers using it. A utility function
satisfying these characteristics is4
Ui = ωiq + an − k, (5.2)
where q ∈ R+ is the quality of the good, k ∈ R+ is the cost the consumer has to bear
to acquire the good, and a ∈ R+ is a parameter that measures the intensity of the
network externalities.5 Consequently, ωi can be interpreted as the marginal rate of
substitution between income and quality, so that a higher ωi reﬂects a lower marginal
utility of income and, as a consequence, a higher income (see also Tirole, 1988, p. 98).
Large a implies that the consumer’s utility grows fast with the number of other users.
In the opposite case, when a tends to zero, the number of users of the same good does
not aﬀect the utility of the consumer.6 The size of the network, n ∈ [0,1], is interpreted
as the fraction of the total market that has bought a given product. Without loss of
generality, we normalize the absolute size of the total market to 1.
3For instance, the revenue per customer of a mobile telephone network depends on the intensity
of voice traﬃc, competitive pressure, and arrival of new services that can be oﬀered to the customer
against an additional fee. It is natural to assume that the evolution of these economic variables over
time contains an unpredictable component.
4Heterogeneity of consumers with respect to the value attached to the quality of the stand-alone
good and their homogeneity with respect to the degree of network externalities is a common assump-
tion in the economics of network literature (cf. Mason, 2000, and references therein).
5Parameter k should not be associated with a price that the consumer has to pay for the product.
It can be interpreted as a non-monetary cost associated with the eﬀort and time used for searching
the good with suitable characteristics.
6Of course, there are examples of negative a as well. For instance, the utility from havinga
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Network externalities are thus present if the number of other consumers using
the same product inﬂuences the utility of a given consumer. Positive (negative) net-
work externalities imply that the utility of the consumer increases (decreases) with the
number of other users. An example of a good a demand for which exhibits positive
network externalities is an access to the web via a given Internet Service Provider,
a computer operating system, an audio recorder using a particular standard (DCC,
MD, or CD-R), or a mobile phone (GSM vs. CDMA). We analyze a good for which
the consumer’s utility depends both on the network size and the quality (MacOS vs.
Windows). The purchase decision is determined mainly by these two parameters, so
that we do not incorporate a pricing strategy. This choice of modeling approach follows
recent empirical evidence. In an analysis of the on-line book retail market Latcovich
and Smith (2001) claim that ”consumers do not respond much to signiﬁcant price dif-
ferences between sellers [...]. But they [...] care about vertical characteristics such as
reliability, security, and ease of use”. This supports the idea of the quality-oriented
market analyzed in our paper. Also Shapiro and Varian (1998) point out that the price
is an insigniﬁcant determinant of the purchase decision for many network goods, such
as software. Referring to the market for spreadsheets they claim that ”the purchase
price of the software is minor in comparison with the cost of deployment, training and
support. Corporate purchasers, and even individual customers, were much more wor-
ried about picking the winner of the spreadsheet wars than they were about whether
their spreadsheet costs $49.95 or $99.95” (Shapiro and Varian, 1998, p. 288).
On the basis of the consumers’ utility function, we can determine the size of
the network as a function of the quality chosen by the ﬁrm. Deﬁne the consumer of
type ω to be indiﬀerent between acquiring the good or not. Consequently, it holds that
ωq + an − k =0 . (5.3)
By setting a<k<q , which is to ensure an interior solution for the size of the network
(we waive these restrictions later), and observing that the size of the network, n,e q u a l s





We further assume a constant value per customer, constant economies of scale
on the supply side, and that the unit cost of operation, c(q), satisﬁes c￿ (q) > 0a n d
c￿￿ (q) ≥ 0. The ﬁrm chooses quality q so as to maximize the value of the investment
opportunity. In order to determine the value of the investment opportunity, we begin
with calculating the value of the project after the investment decision is made. The118 CHAPTER 5. ENTRY AND STRATEGIC QUALITY CHOICE
value of the project is found by integrating over time the discounted diﬀerence between
the instantaneous value of the installed base of consumers, xn(q), and the operating
costs c(q)n(q).7 Therefore, if we denote the project value at time t by V (t), it holds
that
V (t)=E












≡ R(q)x − C (q) (5.6)
where r is the risk-free rate and δ,d e ﬁ n e da s
δ ≡ r − α, (5.7)
is the return shortfall of the demand process x. The ﬁrm has to incur a sunk invest-
ment cost, I ∈ R++. Although I does not depend on the choice of quality, the cost
associated with pursuing the project increases with quality due to a higher present
value of operating costs.8 The decision of the ﬁrm is to choose the optimal quality, q,
and timing of entry, x∗, in order to maximize the value of the investment opportunity.
To ﬁnd the optimal investment threshold and product quality we proceed in
two steps. First, we solve the optimal stopping problem for an arbitrary level of q.
As an intermediate result we obtain the optimal investment threshold and the value of
the investment opportunity as a function of q. Second, we maximize the value of the
investment opportunity with respect to q.
























σ2 > 1. (5.9)









(I + C (q))
β1−1. (5.10)
7The instantaneous value of the installed base of consumers can be obtained by integrating the utili-
ties of participatingconsumers over their types,
￿ 1
ω (ωq + an − k)dω. This equals 0.5n2a+0.5(q − k)n
which is convex in n. However, here we assume that the ﬁrm does not price discriminate so that it
does not extract the whole consumer surplus. Instead, we impose linearity in n of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
8An alternative interpretation of the cost structure is that the initial investment outlay equals
I + c(q)n(q)/r, and the marginal production cost is zero for all levels of q.5.2. NON-STRATEGIC MODEL WITH FIXED QUALITY 119
The derivation of (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10) follows directly from Section 1.6. Subsequently,
we maximize the value of the investment opportunity with respect to q, given the
optimal investment rule, x∗(q). In order to ensure that our solution is a maximum, we
introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 5.1 Let q∗ be the solution to ∂F(q,x ∗)/∂q =0 . Then it holds that9
(β1(C + I)Rqq + CqRq − (β1 − 1)CqqR)|q=q∗ < 0. (5.11)
The solution to the problem of quality choice is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1 Under Assumption 5.1 the optimal quality of the product, q∗,i s
implicitly given by the following equation
Cq = x
∗Rq. (5.12)
Proof. See the Appendix.
From Proposition 5.1 it is obtained that the value of the investment opportunity
is maximized if at the optimal investment threshold the marginal cost of increasing the
quality is equal to the expected marginal beneﬁt. (5.12) implies that in the optimum
the ratio of elasticities of functions C (q)+I and R(q) equals the wedge occurring in














In order to provide more insight into the obtained result, we analyze the rela-
tionship between market uncertainty, intensity of the network externalities, size of the
network and the optimal quality. Proposition 5.2 provides part of the results.
Proposition 5.2 The quality of the product increases with revenue uncertainty and







Proof. See the Appendix.
9When it does not yield ambiguity, subscripts denote partial derivatives.120 CHAPTER 5. ENTRY AND STRATEGIC QUALITY CHOICE
The fact that higher uncertainty concerning the demand side of the market
inﬂuences the quality choice of the ﬁrm positively results from the option-like structure
of the project value and upside potential from higher quality investment. Furthermore,
a higher growth rate of the market also implies a higher quality choice since the ﬁrm
prefers to incur additional cost to increase quality when revenue is expected to grow
faster.10
Furthermore, numerical simulations indicate that the impact of network exter-
nalities on the optimal quality choice is negative. The latter relationship results from
the fact that the level of quality and the degree of network externalities act as substi-
tutes in the marginal consumer’s utility function. Since a higher quality is equivalent
to a larger consumer base (cf. (5.4)), the size of the network in optimum, n∗, also rises
with σ and α.
Market uncertainty and intensity of network externalities also have an impact
on the optimal investment threshold. Since both factors aﬀect the optimal investment
threshold directly and indirectly (via the change of the optimal quality), the total












In the Appendix we prove the following proposition:




Hence, the relationship between uncertainty and the optimal investment thresh-
old is positive. Therefore we conclude that the ﬂexibility in the quality choice does not
change the classical result of real option theory (cf. Dixit and Pindyck, 1996).
Extensive numerical simulations show that the optimal investment threshold
decreases with a magnitude of network externalities. This is associated with the fact
that a higher magnitude of network externalities makes the product market more valu-
able for the ﬁrm. This results in a higher value of the investment project (other things
equal) and, thus, a lower value of x suﬃces to achieve the required proﬁtability ratio,
β1/(β1 − 1), of the project at the time of investing.
10The positive sign of the derivative with respect to α is equivalent to the negative derivative with
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5.3 Strategic Model with Fixed Quality
Here we introduce the possibility of competitive entry by a second ﬁrm (Firm
2). In order to focus on the incumbent-entrant problem, we impose that Firm 2 can
only enter after Firm 1 has already done so (i.e. ﬁrms play the timing game in the
open-loop strategies as in Reinganum, 1981). After entering the market, Firm 2 starts
oﬀering the good having a quality q2. In general, q2 will diﬀer from q1, i.e. from the
quality choice made by Firm 1. The fact that the ﬁrms do not compete in prices
implies that for the consumers the cost of accessing each network is equal across the
networks. Consequently, if the products were perfect substitutes, consumers would
always choose the product with a higher quality and the resulting market outcome
would always be a monopoly.11 In case of imperfect substitution this does not hold
any longer. Denote the degree of substitution by ρ ∈ (0,1). For ρ close to unity, the
goods are close substitutes, whereas a very small ρ implies that the ﬁrms operate in
virtually separated markets.
In order to analyze the impact of entry on the valuation of the ﬁrst ﬁrm in
the market (Firm 1), we adopt a simple structure for the market with diﬀerentiated
goods (as in, e.g., Spence, 1976) and allow for the presence of network externalities as
in Section 5.2. The system of inverse demand functions is given by
 
k =( 1− n1)q1 − ρn2q2 + a(n1 + ρn2) for Firm 1’s network, while
k =( 1− n2)q2 − ρn1q1 + a(n2 + ρn1) for Firm 2’s network,
(5.18)
and ni,n∈{ 1,2}, is the size of Firm i’s network. Each of the inverse demand functions
can be interpreted as follows. The LHS represents the instantaneous cost (utility loss)
of accessing the network. The RHS corresponds to the linear demand schedule that
decreases with the oﬀered quantities, ni and nj, while its negative slope is reduced
by the presence of a component a(n1 + ρn2) which reﬂects network externalities. The
impact of the quantity oﬀered by Firm j on Firm i’s demand, and the network external-
ities among its consumers is scaled down by factor ρ reﬂecting imperfect substitution
among the goods. It can be easily noticed that for nj equal to zero, (5.18) reduces to
the monopolistic demand function of Section 5.2 (cf. equation (5.4)).
The size of the network of Firm i obtained by solving (5.18), subject to ni ∈























i = k(1 − ρ)+ρmax[k,qj], (5.20)
qi =
max[k,qj] − k(1 − ρ)
ρ
, (5.21)
and i,j ∈{ 1,2},i = j. Depending on the quality oﬀered, Firm i competes with Firm
j for moderate values of qi, it is a monopolist for high qi, or has no customer base
if qi is low. Both qualities q
i and qi depend positively on quality qj oﬀered by the
competitor. Moreover, higher substitutability of the goods, captured by ρ, results in
shrinking the range of qualities in which ﬁrms compete. This is intuitive since the
closer substitutes the goods are, the less they can diﬀer in qualities for both ﬁrms to
be present in the product market. Since the once chosen qualities remain ﬁxed and
neither q






i ∈{ 1,2}. Otherwise, one of the ﬁrms would be better oﬀ by not entering.
For analytical convenience, we impose the following linear speciﬁcation of the
cost function:
c(qi)=c0(qi − a),c 0 ∈ R++,q i ∈ [a,∞), (5.22)
where c0 can be interpreted as an eﬃciency parameter. Consequently, higher values
of c0 correspond to industries that are less eﬃcient in R&D. Setting a quality equal
to a(<k ) is equivalent to the ﬁrm producing no output and incurring no cost (since
ni (a)=c(a) = 0 in this case). The instantaneous proﬁt function corresponding to
(5.22) is
πi =( x − c0(qi − a))ni. (5.23)
We solve the problem backwards in time. First, the optimal investment thresh-
old and quality choice of Firm 2 is determined. The value of Firm 2’s investment

















where T2 denotes the random stopping time associated with x reaching Firm 2’s optimal
investment threshold. A well-known procedure (cf. Section 1.6) allows for deriving5.3. STRATEGIC MODEL WITH FIXED QUALITY 123
Firm 2’s optimal threshold, x∗














(q2 − a)δ, (5.25)
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Upon analyzing (5.27) it can be concluded that the qualities chosen by the ﬁrms are
strategic complements. Since q
2 is an increasing function of q1 (see (5.20)) and q∗
2 rises
with q
2, the quality chosen by Firm 2 is positively related to the quality choice made
by Firm 1.
This relationship, in combination with a closer inspection of (5.25), leads to
the following proposition.
Proposition 5.4 Firm 2 responds optimally to an increased quality of Firm 1 not










Proof. See the Appendix.
Consequently, it can be concluded from Proposition 5.4 that the choice of
higher q1 is equivalent to entry-deterrent behavior of Firm 1.
Having calculated the optimal investment threshold of Firm 2, we are in po-
sition to analyze the investment decision of Firm 1. First, we note that the value of
Firm 1’s investment project at the time of investing, t,i sg i v e nb y
V1(t)=E
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Value lost due to the competitive entry
.
Again, an application of the well-known procedure yields the optimal threshold, x∗
1,
and the value of investment opportunity, F∗









































It is worthwhile noticing that the optimal investment timing of Firm 1 does not ex-
plicitly depend on the action taken by Firm 2. This outcome results from the fact
that the roles of the ﬁrms (leader vs. follower) are exogenously determined. However,
this result still diﬀers from the classical result from the real options theory (see, e.g.,
Huisman, 2001, p. 170) concerning the irrelevance of the follower’s investment timing
for the decision of the leader. The reason is that Firm 1’s timing decision is aﬀected
by the choice of quality, q1, and, according to (5.31), q1 depends on Firm 2’s threshold
x∗
2 and on the threshold quality q
1, which is a function of q2 (cf. (5.20)).
The resulting dependence of Firm 1’s investment threshold on the behavior
of Firm 2 is caused by the fact that in our model ﬁrms have two control variables
(investment timing and quality) as opposite to a single variable in classic real option
models. It still holds that introducing the competitor does not change the optimal
ceteris paribus choice of the timing variable. However, competitive entry changes the
optimal choice of quality (the second control variable). This makes the monopolistic
choice of timing no longer optimal and, as a consequence, it holds that x∗
1  = x∗.
As far as the value of the investment opportunity is concerned, it can be de-
termined by maximizing the argument of the RHS of (5.31). The derivative of F∗
1 with
respect to q1 can be computed since x∗
1,x ∗
2 and q2 are known functions of q1.D u et o
complexity of the resulting relationship, the unique (in the relevant interval) root of
the derivative has to be determined numerically.5.3. STRATEGIC MODEL WITH FIXED QUALITY 125
5.3.1 Comparative Statics: Valuation of Firms
We are interested in the sensitivity of the value of the ﬁrms with respect to changes
of market parameters. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 depict the relationship between the market
volatility and the value of the investment opportunity of Firm 1 and Firm 2, respec-
tively, for diﬀerent magnitudes of network externalities. On the basis of both ﬁgures
two observations can be made. First, the value of Firm 1’s investment opportunity is
lower than the one of Firm 2. The ﬁrst phenomenon results from the strategic disadvan-
tage of the ﬁrst mover in a game in which the ﬁrms compete in strategic complements.
As it can be shown in a simple Stackelberg setting, the follower’s payoﬀ is higher than
the payoﬀ of the leader if the control variables are strategic complements (cf. Tirole,
1988, p. 331, footnote 53). Despite the fact that Firm 1 enjoys proﬁt from investment















Figure 5.1: The value of the investment opportunity of Firm 1 for the parameter values
ρ =0 .5,k=5 ,c 0 =1 ,r=0 .05,α=0 .015,x 0 =4 , and I =1 0 .
Second, the sign of the relationship between the value of Firm 1’s project and
uncertainty crucially depends on the magnitude of network externalities, a. The stan-
dard option argument indicates that the sign of this relationship is positive. However,
under higher uncertainty Firm 2 sets its quality more ”aggressively” (cf. (5.14)), which
negatively inﬂuences the value of Firm 1. The sign of the joint eﬀect is ambiguous and















Figure 5.2: The value of the investment opportunity of Firm 2 for the parameter values
ρ =0 .5,k=5 ,c 0 =1 ,r=0 .05,α=0 .015,x 0 =4 , and I =1 0 .
strong network externalities ampliﬁes the latter (strategic) eﬀect.
Finally, it can be seen that the presence of the network externalities signif-
icantly enhances the value of the investment opportunities of both ﬁrms. The rate
of increase is most dramatic when the degree of network externalities approaches the
cost of joining the network (i.e. when the marginal consumer’s valuation of the stand
alone-good is equal to zero). Therefore, for the set of parameters as in Figures 5.1
and 5.2, the change in the value of the ﬁrms’ investment opportunities following an
increase in a f r o m3t o4( k = 5) is higher than the analogous change associated with
an increase in a from 0 to 3.
5.3.2 Comparative Statics: Firm 1’s Strategic Choice of Vari-
ables
Finally, we compare the non-strategic and strategic case with respect to Firm
1’s optimal choice of strategic variables. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the optimal
investment threshold, whereas Figures 5.5 and 5.6 depict the optimal quality choice.
From Figures 5.3 and 5.4 it follows that the optimal investment threshold is higher if
a subsequent competitive entry threat exists. This contradicts the result known from
the strategic real option literature that the optimal investment threshold of the market5.3. STRATEGIC MODEL WITH FIXED QUALITY 127
leader is not inﬂuenced by the entry threat if the roles of the ﬁrms are predetermined.
As we already concluded from (5.30), Firm 1’s investment threshold depends on the














Figure 5.3: The optimal investment threshold of Firm 1 in the non-strategic case for the
parameter values ρ =0 .5,k=5 ,c 0 =1 ,r=0 .05,α=0 .015, and I =1 0 .
On the basis of Figures 5.5 and 5.6 we conclude that the presence of a (poten-
tial) competitor increases the quality provision of Firm 1. Higher quality (as shown in
Section 5.2), as well as the fact that, from the timing of the second ﬁrm onwards, the
market must be shared with the competitor, results in the optimality of a higher - than
in the non-strategic case - investment threshold which, in turn, leads to the outcome
depicted in Figure 5.4.
This result and the one concerning the project’s value contradict the ﬁndings of
Foros and Hansen (2001), who analyze a duopoly model of Internet Service Providers.
In a modiﬁed Hotelling framework they show that proﬁts decrease and the oﬀered qual-
ity increases with the degree of network externalities. The reason why this diﬀers from
our results is the following. Here, in a non-strategic framework, network externalities
can act as a substitute of quality in a consumer’s utility function. Consequently, a
ﬁrm can have less incentive to invest in (costly) quality when network externalities are
present. This eﬀect also takes place in a strategic framework if the increase of quality
occurs for a single product. In case of Foros and Hansen (2001), the increase of inter-















Figure 5.4: The optimal investment threshold of Firm 1 in the strategic case for the param-













Figure 5.5: The optimal quality choice of Firm 1 in the non-strategic case for the parameter














Figure 5.6: The optimal quality choice of Firm 1 in the strategic case for the parameter
values ρ =0 .5,k=5 ,c 0 =1 ,r=0 .05,α=0 .015, and I =1 0 .
by lower competitive pressure resulting from higher network externalities.
5.4 Non-strategic Model with Flexible Quality
Here, it is assumed that within the ﬁrm suﬃcient know-how is present for adjusting
quality, which can be valuable in case of changing demand characteristics. The fact
that the ﬁrm can change quality could be caused for instance by the fact that its
technology is the result of its own R&D process. Such an interpretation implies that in
the previous section quality was ﬁxed because the production technology was provided
by an external vendor.
Once the entry threshold, x∗∗, is reached, production commences. The marginal
cost, c(q (x)), is a function of the instantaneously chosen product/service quality. This
quality is chosen in such a way that the value of the ﬁrm is maximized. In this section
we assume that no competitive entry threat exists.130 CHAPTER 5. ENTRY AND STRATEGIC QUALITY CHOICE
Consequently, at each point in time the ﬁrm chooses quality q (t) such that12
q
∗∗ (x) = argmax
q
[(x − c0(q − a))n(q)]. (5.32)
From this the present value of the ﬁrm’s expected cash ﬂow at time t can be determined
V (t)=E
   ∞
t
(x(s) − c0(q




















η = c0(k − a)
and 1B is an indicator function. (5.35) implies that for low states of demand (i.e. for
x<η ) the optimal choice of quality is a (<k ), which corresponds to the situation
in which the market is not served and the ﬁrm incurs no cost (see (5.22)). As soon
as x hits η from below, quality jumps to k and, subsequently, adjusts continuously to
changes in x. When x hits η from above, the quality drops to a and the ﬁrm again
becomes idle without incurring variable costs.
Deﬁne the instantaneous proﬁt function, π, to be equal to the expression under













￿ + π = rV (5.37)
12Our formulation diﬀers from the optimal control models of quality as, e.g., presented by El
Ouardighi and Tapiero (1998, see also references therein) since these authors consider a determin-
istic setting in which they include elements absent here such as pricing strategy and learning eﬀects.
13T h ev a l u eo ft h eﬁ r m ,V , (cf. (5.33)) still satisﬁes the diﬀerential equation (5.37) since q is an
F-previsible process. Consequently,
dV = Vxdx +0 .5Vxx (dx)
2 + Vqdq = Vxdx +0 .5Vxx (dx)
2 ,
which, after the substitution of (5.1), yields the LHS of (5.37).5.4. NON-STRATEGIC MODEL WITH FLEXIBLE QUALITY 131
for appropriate value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions yields:
V =
 
BM2xβ1 for x<η ,
BM1xβ2 + C0 + C1x0.5 + C2x for x>η ,
(5.38)
where constants BM1, BM2, C0, C1,a n dC2 are given by equations (5.76)-(5.80) in the















σ2 < 0. (5.39)
The value functions in the two regimes of the stopping region are the solutions of the
standard ODE (5.37) with the non-homogeneity term deﬁned by (5.36). Under the
regime x<ηdemand is too low and no service/product is oﬀered. Consequently, the
value of the ﬁrm consists entirely of the option value to relaunch the activities should
the market turn out to be favorable. For x>ηthe ﬁrm oﬀers the service and makes
positive proﬁt. Now, the value of the ﬁrm consists of two parts: the perpetuity value of
the current instantaneous proﬁt and the option-like component reﬂecting the possibility
of ceasing the operations if x falls below η. The perpetuity value of the instantaneous
proﬁt has the structure of a portfolio of continuously paid dividends proportional to
various powers of the GBM (5.1).
The optimal investment threshold and the value of the investment opportunity
are found by applying the standard procedure for the optimal exercise of an American
option when the value of the investment project in the stopping region is described by
(5.38). It should just be noticed that it is never optimal to exercise the investment
option for x<ηsince by waiting an increment dt the present value of investment cost
diminishes by Irdt, whereas the expected present value of the cash ﬂow remains un-
changed. The value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions regarding the expression
for V when x>ηin (5.38) are
AMx
β1 = BM1x
β2 + C0 + C1x




−0.5 + C2. (5.41)
From (5.40) and (5.41) the following implicit equation for the optimal investment
threshold, x∗∗, can be obtained
(β1 − β2)BM1(x
∗∗)
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The value of the investment opportunity equals







where V (x∗∗) is given by the ﬁrst row in (5.38).
Here, we would like to make an additional remark concerning the implications
of the ﬂexible quality choice on the cost structure. Compared with the ﬁxed-quality
case, the eﬀective sunk cost in the current case equals I, as opposed to I + C in the
former. Consequently, the choice of ﬂexible quality not only allows for optimizing the
product parameter when demand changes but also for avoiding commitment to ﬁxed
production costs in the future.
5.5 Strategic Model with Flexible Quality
In this section we introduce the possibility of entry of a second ﬁrm (Firm 2). As
in the ﬁxed quality case, such an entry threat is going to inﬂuence both the optimal
investment timing and the value of the investment opportunity of Firm 1. We proceed
as follows. First, we discuss possible market outcomes dependent on the realization
of the stochastic variable, x. Subsequently, we determine the value of Firm 1 in the
situation where both ﬁrms have already invested. Then, we move backwards and
calculate the value of Firm 1 after it entered the market but before Firm 2 invested.
Finally, we determine the value of Firm 1’s investment opportunity and its optimal
investment threshold, and provide some comparative statics.
As in Section 5.3, Firm 2 is assumed to have the ﬁxed-quality technology.
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c0 , when Firm 1 is a monopolist.
(5.44)
The ﬁrst (idle) and the third (monopoly) case have already been derived in Section
5.4. The result for the duopoly case can be obtained by maximizing the proﬁt function
(5.23) with respect to qi, i = 1, and using the observation that n1 is in this case deﬁned
by the second equation in (5.19). Before we derive Firm 1’s proﬁt as a function of x,
we formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 5.5 There are three regimes of the product market structure when the
quality of Firm 1’s product is ﬂexible. For low realizations of x the market is served5.5. STRATEGIC MODEL WITH FLEXIBLE QUALITY 133
only by the entrant (Firm 1 stays idle), intermediate realizations of x correspond to
the duopoly outcome, whereas under high realizations of x Firm 1 is a monopolist. The

















where ψ ≡ ρ(q1 − a), and q
1 and q1 are given by (5.20) and (5.21).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The existence of three regimes of quality choice result from the fact that now
Firm 1 is able to adjust its quality, q1,a sx evolves. Since from (5.20) and (5.21) we
learn that q
2 and q2 explicitly depend on q1, it follows that q
2 and q2 become functions
of x. Consequently, for low realizations of x (lower than ϕ) Firm 1 remains idle (in
order to avoid operating loss), whereas for intermediate values of x it competes against
Firm 2. If x becomes large (larger than κ), Firm 1 can aﬀord to choose quality that
is high enough to prevent Firm 2 (with a ﬁxed quality q2) from serving the market.
Consequently, the quality choice (5.44) reﬂects the optimal response in the state of
inaction, duopoly and monopoly, respectively. This relationship is illustrated in Figure
5.7.
We denote the value of Firm 1, provided that Firm 2 has already entered the
market, by V d
1 . V d





























 2 for x>κ.
(5.48)
For x<ϕFirm 1 is idle, for x>κ it earns monopoly proﬁt, whereas for x ∈ (ϕ,κ)


















Firm 2 Firm 1 + Firm 2 Firm 1
Figure 5.7: Trigger qualities q
2 (short-dotted line), q2 (long-dotted line) as a function of x,
f o rt h ep a r a m e t e rv a l u e sρ =0 .5,k=5 ,a=2 ,c 0 =1 , and q2 =7 .5 (solid line). For low
realizations of x (below ϕ) only Firm 2 is active in the market whereas for high realizations
(above κ) Firm 1 becomes a monopolist - the quality of Firm 2 is too low. For intermediate
values of x both ﬁrms serve the market since q2 remains within the bounds determined by
q
2 and q2.
cases of (5.19) and (5.44) into (5.23). Solving (5.47) with the value matching and







(D2 + D4)xβ1 for x<ϕ ,
D1xβ2 + D2xβ1 + E0 + E1x0.5 + E2x for ϕ<x<κ,
(D1 + D3)xβ2 + C0 + C1x0.5 + C2x for x>κ,
(5.49)
where (see the Appendix) C0, C1,a n dC2 are deﬁned by (5.78)-(5.80), whereas coeﬃ-
cients D1, D2, D3, D4, E0, E1,a n dE2 are deﬁned by (5.81)-(5.87). Again, it can be
seen that the value of Firm 1 consists of the present value of the expected cash ﬂow and
the option-like components reﬂecting possible switches across regimes. Parameters Ek
and Ck, k ∈{ 1,2,3}, correspond to the duopolistic and monopolistic proﬁt function,
respectively. Components of the form Dlxβ2, l ∈{ 1,2,3,4}, reﬂect the possibility of
switching to the regime corresponding to lower than current realizations of x, whereas
the opposite is true for components Dlxβ1.
Equipped with the valuation formula for Firm 1 when both ﬁrms are already5.5. STRATEGIC MODEL WITH FLEXIBLE QUALITY 135
present in the market, we are ready to derive the value of Firm 1, V m




















where V is deﬁned by (5.38) and x∗∗
2 denotes Firm 2’s entry threshold (derived in the
Appendix). V m
1 equals the monopolistic value of Firm 1 (as deﬁned by (5.38)) adjusted
for the component reﬂecting competitive entry. The latter component equals the value
loss from switching from monopoly to duopoly multiplied by the probability-weighted
discount factor corresponding to the random time of Firm 2’s entry.
In the last step, we determine the value of Firm 1’s investment opportunity. We
already know that the valuation formulae for V diﬀer across the two regimes (cf. (5.38))
and that it is never optimal for Firm 1 to invest in the ﬁrst regime. Consequently, when
applying the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions to (5.50), we substitute for
V the expression corresponding to the second row in (5.38). A simple manipulation
of the value-matching and smooth pasting conditions (cf. (5.40) and (5.41)) yields the











1 =0 . (5.51)
A comparison of (5.51) with (5.42) leads to the observation that x∗∗
1 = x∗∗. This is in
line with the classic strategic real option models in which the roles of the ﬁrms (leader
vs. follower) are determined exogenously and where the ﬁrms have a single control
variable (investment timing). This ﬁnding can be explained by the fact that in our
case the decision problem of the Firm 1 with one discrete control variable (timing) and
with one continuous control variable (quality) can be transformed into the problem
of a single discrete variable whereas the relevant payoﬀ functions are at each moment
optimized with respect to the continuous variable. Consequently, the value of Firm 1
is no longer a function of quality since this is chosen optimally given the realization of
xt and the choice of exogenous parameters.





























It can immediately be noticed that F1 <F(cf. (5.43)) because of the present value of136 CHAPTER 5. ENTRY AND STRATEGIC QUALITY CHOICE

















As soon as competitive entry becomes very remote, i.e. when x∗∗
2 →∞ , it holds that
the problem reduces to the valuation of a monopolistic ﬁrm and F1 = F.
5.5.1 Comparative Statics: Valuation of Firms
Analogous to Section 5.3, we are interested in the sensitivity of the ﬁrms’ value with
respect to changes of market parameters. Figures 5.8 and 5.9 depict the relationship
between the market volatility and the value of the investment opportunities of both
ﬁrms for diﬀerent magnitudes of network externalities. Inspection of both the ﬁgures
leads to two main conclusions First, contrary to the ﬁxed quality case, the value of
Firm 1’s investment opportunity is higher than the one of Firm 2. Second, the value
of Firm 2’s project is non-monotonic in uncertainty (like the value of Firm 1 in the
previous case). The ﬁrst result is implied by the fact that Firm 1 is a leader in the
investment game but, thanks to its ﬂexibility with regard to quality choice, acts as a
follower in the Stackelberg quality game. Consequently, Firm 1 not only receives cash
ﬂow from the project over a longer period but also is able to adjust its quality optimally
to the ﬁxed the quality choice of Firm 2, q2, and the realization of the demand, x.
The non-monotonicity of Firm 2’s value in uncertainty results from the fact
that Firm 1 can exploit to a (relatively) larger extent the changes in the demand by
changing its quality when uncertainty is high. Therefore, higher uncertainty aﬀects
the eﬀective discount rates of the components of Firm 2’s value that are concave in x
(see (5.90)). Consequently, the presence of such concavities leads to a lower valuation
in a more uncertain environment. A positive relationship between Firm 2’s value and
uncertainty at the low levels of uncertainty can be explained by the traditional option
argument that, in this case, dominates the strategic eﬀects.
As far as the relationship between the degree of network externalities and
the value of the ﬁrms is concerned, it resembles the picture of the ﬁxed quality case.
Again, the presence of the network externalities leads to an increase in the value of
the investment opportunities of both ﬁrms and the rate of this increase is high when
















Figure 5.8: The value of the investment opportunity of Firm 1 for the parameter values
















Figure 5.9: The value of the investment opportunity of Firm 2 for the parameter values
ρ =0 .5,k=5 ,c 0 =1 ,r=0 .05,α=0 .015,x 0 =4 , and I =1 0 .138 CHAPTER 5. ENTRY AND STRATEGIC QUALITY CHOICE
5.5.2 Comparative Statics: Firm 1’s Strategic Choice of Vari-
ables
In the case in which quality is ﬂexible, the following observations can be made.
First, the optimal investment threshold in the presence of entry threat is identical to
the level of x triggering the investment of the monopolist. This is due to the well-
known fact that if the roles of the ﬁrms are predetermined and the only choice variable
of the leader is the investment timing, future entry of the follower does not impact the
investment timing of the leader (cf. Huisman, 2001). Second, upon examining (5.44),
we can conclude that the quality chosen by Firm 1 does not change in a continuous





The optimal quality choice, q∗∗
1 , piecewise (weakly) increases with the state of the
market, x.A t ϕ and κ the quality exhibits discontinuities. Calculating the relevant


























Realizations ϕ and κ are reversible switch points in which the functional form of the
optimal quality changes. As pointed out by Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), the
function describing the optimal choice of a control variable is in general discontinuous
in the switch points (see also Dumas, 1991). Continuity is implied if the switch points
are chosen optimally so as to maximize the value of the ﬁrm. Here, the switch points are
not chosen optimally by Firm 1 but, instead, they result from the change of the product
market structure. From (5.44) it can be seen that for low x Firm 1 ceases operations
as the revenues do not cover the operating costs. When x reaches ϕ from below,
Firm 1 resumes operations and the resulting outcome is duopolistic. Finally, when x
reaches κ Firm 1 covers the entire market and the monopoly prevails. Consequently,
the discontinuity of q∗∗
1 (x) occurs at both ϕ and κ.
The positive sign of (5.53) results from the fact that the quality of the idle ﬁrm
equals a (cf. (5.44)), whereas resuming the operations requires the quality exceeding
k(>a ). The negative sign of (5.54) can be explained as follows. At the moment x
equals κ (cf. Figure 5.4), quality chosen by Firm 1 is that high that Firm 1 captures5.6. VALUATION EFFECTS OF FLEXIBLE VS. FIXED QUALITY 139
all customers. Hence, Firm 2 leaves the market after which Firm 1 reduces quality. It
can do so since Firm 2 will not re-enter (unless x falls below κ). Firm 2 knows that
if it re-entered, Firm 1 would immediately raise quality to the optimal duopoly level.
We conclude that ﬂexible quality serves as an entry deterrent control here, while still
it can be set at the optimal monopoly level.
5.6 Valuation Eﬀects of Flexible vs. Fixed Quality
In this section we analyze the eﬀects on the valuation of the ﬂexible vs. ﬁxed
technology choice made by Firm 1. We address the following two related questions:
i) what is the relationship between the loss in value due to the expected competitive
entry (in comparison with monopoly) and the ﬁxed or ﬂexible quality choice, and ii)
















Figure 5.10: The relationship between the ratio of Firm 1’s duopolistic to monopolistic value
and uncertainty under ﬁxed quality choice for ρ =0 .5,k=5 ,c 0 =1 ,r=0 .05,α=0 .015,
and I =1 0 .
Figures 5.10-5.13 contain a comparison of the ratio of Firm 1’s value in the
monopoly vs. duopoly case for ﬂexible and ﬁxed quality choice. On the basis of Figures
5.10 and 5.11 it can be concluded that the value lost due to competitive entry is much
















Figure 5.11: The relationship between the ratio of Firm 1’s duopolistic to monopolistic
value and uncertainty under ﬂexible quality choice for ρ =0 .5,k=5 ,c 0 =1 ,r=0 .05,













Figure 5.12: The relationship between the ratio of Firm 1’s ﬂexible to ﬁxed technology
non-strategic value and uncertainty for ρ =0 .5,k=5 ,c 0 =1 ,r=0 .05,α=0 .015, and













Figure 5.13: The relationship between the ratio of Firm 1’s ﬂexible to ﬁxed technology
strategic value and uncertainty for ρ =0 .5,k=5 ,c 0 =1 ,r=0 .05,α=0 .015, and
I =1 0 .
that the ﬂexible quality choice is associated with Firm 1’s follower’s role in the quality
game played by the ﬁrms at each instant. The second-mover advantage in setting the
quality by the incumbent is stronger when the demand uncertainty is higher. Therefore,
when uncertainty is high, the gap between the monopolistic and the strategic value of
Firm 1 is almost closing (cf. Figure 5.11). Finally, we can observe that the degree of
network externalities have little eﬀect on the ﬁrms’ relative valuation until they become
very high in the ﬁxed quality case. Then the fraction of Firm 1’s value lost due to the
competitive entry as compared to monopoly is even higher (cf. Figure 5.10).
Moreover, we analyze the impact of ﬂexible quality choice on the ﬁrms’ valua-
tion from a slightly diﬀerent angle. Instead of looking at the value lost due to competi-
tive entry, we investigate the value impact of a switch from the ﬁxed- to ﬂexible-quality
technology. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 illustrate this eﬀect as a function of demand uncer-
tainty for diﬀerent magnitudes of network externalities. The following conclusions can
be drawn. First, the incremental value of the ﬂexible technology over the ﬁxed-quality
technology is higher in a strategic than in a monopolistic framework. Moreover, the
strategic impact of ﬂexibility is increasing with demand uncertainty (cf. Figure 5.13).
Whereas in the monopolistic framework the value gain occurring due to the ﬂexible
technology is moderate and does not increase sharply in σ, both the value gain and142 CHAPTER 5. ENTRY AND STRATEGIC QUALITY CHOICE
its sensitivity towards growing uncertainty are much more dramatic. Like previously,
the value impact of network externalities is relatively small and aﬀects the advantage
of the ﬂexible technology adversely.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we determine advantages of ﬂexibility in quality choice of a ﬁrm
considering an uncertain product market sector exhibiting network externalities. The
ﬁrm is able to adjust quality over time when it, for instance, possesses suﬃcient know-
how, invented the technology itself, or adopted a more advanced technology. In general,
this requires larger sunk costs and the aim of this paper is to determine in which cases
it is particularly justiﬁed to incur these larger costs.
First, we derive the optimal investment threshold and the quality choice of
the ﬁrm using the ﬁxed-quality technology in both the monopolistic and duopolistic
framework. Second, we repeat the analysis for the ﬂexible technology choice. Finally,
we perform a comparison of outcomes resulting from applying the two alternative
technologies.
We show that the qualities chosen by the ﬁrms in the ﬁxed-quality framework
are strategic complements. This implies that a higher quality chosen by the market
leader is associated with a higher quality provided by the second ﬁrm to enter. More-
over, the market leader uses the quality as a means to deter entry since its level of
quality chosen under competitive entry threat is higher than in an isolated monopolis-
tic market. Finally, since the ﬁrms play a version of a Stackelberg game in strategic
complements, the value of the second ﬁrm to enter exceeds the one of the leader.
We also extend general results of strategic real options theory. From this theory
it is known that if the roles of the ﬁrms are exogenous or when they suﬃciently diﬀer
in characteristics, the follower’s investment timing is irrelevant for the decision of the
leader. However, due to the addition of a second control in the form of quality choice,
the investment timing of the ﬁrst investor is inﬂuenced by the decision of the other
ﬁrm.
If the market leader is able to adjust quality over time, its optimal investment
strategy is identical to the monopolistic case. This observation results from the fact
that the loss due to the competitive entry equally aﬀects the value of its investment
opportunity before investing and the value of the project once the sunk cost is incurred.
Moreover, the ﬂexible quality choice of the leader implies three diﬀerent market struc-
tures as functions of the underlying demand. When demand is low, only the second5.8. APPENDIX 143
ﬁrm is active, moderate demand is associated with both ﬁrms serving the market,
whereas high demand implies that the entire market is served by the leader.
A comparison of ﬁrms’ values under two alternative technologies leads to fur-
ther conclusions. It appears that the relative value of the ﬂexible (as opposed to ﬁxed)
technology is much higher in the duopolistic case than in an isolated monopoly. A
related observation is that the value loss from a competitive entry is much lower when
the quality is ﬂexible. Second, the value of ﬂexible quality choice increases with un-
certainty since an immediate quality adjustment to the changes in stochastic demand
is possible. Moreover, the case of ﬂexibility also allows for achieving the second-mover
advantage in the Stackelberg game after the competitive entry. The latter result is
ampliﬁed if the market uncertainty is high.
5.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5.1. The optimal quality level is calculated by maximizing
(5.10) with respect to q. The corresponding ﬁrst-order condition is (dependence on q













β1−1Rq − (β1 − 1)R




from which it follows that
β1(C + I)Rq − (β1 − 1)RCq =0 . (5.56)




x∗R = 1 yields the desired result.
The corresponding second-order condition is
(β1(C + I)Rqq + CqRq − (β1 − 1)CqqR)|q=q∗ < 0. (5.57)
This is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the relevant functions which ensures that
q∗ corresponds to a local maximum. This is formulated as Assumption 5.1. If (5.56)
has multiple solutions satisfying (5.57), then the one corresponding to the highest value
of (5.10) is chosen.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. We begin by deﬁning (cf. (5.56))
H (q)=β1(C (q)+I)Rq (q) − (β1 − 1)Cq (q)R(q). (5.58)144 CHAPTER 5. ENTRY AND STRATEGIC QUALITY CHOICE
For q∗ it holds that H (q∗;·) = 0. Therefore, the impact of a change in θ ∈{ a,σ} can
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< 0. (5.60)
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R2 . (5.65)
















(β1 − 1)CqR − β1(C + I)Rq
R2
=0 . (5.66)
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This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5.4. The sign of derivative dq∗
2/dq∗
1 immediately follows
from (5.27) and the argument thereafter. In order to determine the sign of dx∗
2/dq∗
1,
we ﬁrst express x∗
















Since we already know that q
2 is an increasing function of q1 (cf. (5.20)), the desired
result is obtained if we can show that the two last factors of (5.69) increase with q
2.
We ﬁrst derive expressions for q2 − q








































By inspecting (5.70) we immediately conclude that the second factor of (5.69) is in-
creasing with q
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2 − a + K.
and K =4 β1Ir(β1 − 1)(1 − ρ2)c
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> 0.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5.5. The proposition can be proven by analyzing the proﬁt
functions of the ﬁrms in a duopoly and two cases of a monopoly. Proﬁt maximization
based on the system of demands (5.18) with the optimal quality schedule of Firm 1





























κ = c0(q2 − a). (5.75)
Here, ϕ,ψ and κ are functions of q2, which is chosen at the beginning of the game (the
quality chosen by Firm 2 is ﬁxed at the moment of undertaking investment). Since π2
is concave and decreasing for suﬃciently large x (but smaller than κ), we get that for
x>κ it holds that π2 = n2 = 0 (since Firm 2 will cease the production in the region
x ∈ (κ,∞), where the attainable proﬁt is negative). In the same fashion in can be
shown that π1 =0f o rx<ϕ .What remains to be proved is that ϕ<κ.I t c a n b e
seen upon manipulating (5.45) and (5.46) that










  > 0 ⇔ q1 − q
1 > 0.
The latter inequality is proven directly by observing that
qi − q







< 0.5.8. APPENDIX 147
This completes the proof.
Value function coeﬃcients with ﬂexible quality: non-strategic case. The
following coeﬃcients are derived on the basis of Bellman equation (5.37) with value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions applied to V for x = η and with no-bubble
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By either solving the Bellman equation of type (5.37) with a non-homogeneity term
being proportional to the n-th power of x, or by calculating the drift coeﬃcient in the
GBM for y ≡ xn using Itˆ o’s lemma, it can be shown that the eﬀective discount rate
corresponding to the n-th power has a form r − nα − 0.5n(n − 1)σ2 (cf. Dixit, 1993,
p. 13). Of course, this puts a restriction on the pairs (α,σ2) if ﬁnite valuations are to
be obtained.
Value function coeﬃcients with ﬂexible quality: strategic case. The
following coeﬃcients are derived on the basis of Bellman equation (5.47) with value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions applied to V d
1 for x = ϕ and x = κ, and with
no-bubble conditions for x → 0a n dx →∞ :
D1 ≡ E2
ϕ1−β2 (β1 − 1)
β2 − β1
+ E1







κ1−β1 (β2 − 1)ρ2
β2 − β1
− E1
κ0.5−β1 (β2 − 0.5)
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κ1−β2 (β1 − 1)ρ2
β2 − β1
− E1
κ0.5−β2 (β1 − 0.5)
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ϕ1−β1 (β2 − 1)
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Derivation of Firm 2’s optimal investment threshold. First, we derive the
value of the Firm 2. Denote the value of the Firm 2 after entering the market by V2.





























0f o r x>κ.
(5.89)
In (5.89) the value of π2 for x>κ is zero since for high demand, Firm 1 captures the
entire market share (cf. Lemma 5). For ϕ<x<κ the result corresponds to (5.74),
whereas for x<ϕFirm 2 achieves monopoly proﬁt (cf. (5.23)) since Firm 1 remains
idle. Solving (5.88) with the value matching and smooth pasting conditions satisﬁed





(B2 + B4)xβ1 + CM
0 + CM
2 x for x<ϕ ,
B1xβ2 + B2xβ1 + CD
0 + CD
1 x0.5 + CD
2 x + CD
3 x1.5 for ϕ<x<κ,












































































































































r − 1.5α − 0.375σ2. (5.100)
Despite the fact that the expressions for the value of Firm 2 diﬀer across the regimes,
calculating the option value of the investment opportunity of Firm 2 represents no
additional diﬃculty comparing to the traditional analysis. It can be shown that the
value is negative under the ﬁrst regime (x<ϕ ), reaches a peak under the second
regime (ϕ<x<κ), and tends asymptotically to zero under the third regime (x>κ).
Therefore, it cannot be optimal for Firm 2 to invest under regimes one and three.
Consequently, the value of Firm 2’s option to invest can be calculated on the basis of



























From this it is obtained that the optimal investment threshold of Firm 2, x∗∗
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Investment and Debt Renegotiation
6.1 Introduction
One of the consequences of debt ﬁnancing is its inﬂuence on the ﬁrm’s investment
policy. As it is known from Myers (1977), the presence of a risky debt in the company’s
books leads to underinvestment, i.e. a situation in which some positive NPVprojects
are foregone. Although the impact of the agency costs of debt on the ﬁrm’s investment
policy has been widely discussed in the literature in qualitative terms, relatively little
has been done to analyze the magnitude of these costs. Moreover, the existing con-
tributions yield diﬀering predictions concerning the inﬂuence of the renegotiability of
debt on the investment policy (cf. Mella-Barral and Perraudin, 1997, and Mauer and
Ott, 2000). This chapter uses the contingent claims approach to examine the ﬁrm’s
optimal investment and liquidation policy in the presence of debt ﬁnancing and the
equityholders’ option to default and renegotiate the original debt contract.
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the impact of the renego-
tiation option, the distribution of bargaining power, and indirect bankruptcy costs on
the optimal investment and liquidation policy of the ﬁrm. In particular, we are inter-
ested in the impact of those debt characteristics on the magnitude of underinvestment
problem. Furthermore, the impact of a growth opportunity on the optimal bankruptcy
and renegotiation timing is analyzed. In this way it can be investigated whether ﬁrms
operating in sectors with signiﬁcant growth opportunities are less likely to ﬁle for debt
restructuring than their counterparts in more mature industries.
The motivation for this chapter arises also from the ongoing debate on the dif-
ferences in bankruptcy codes between the European Union and the United States, and
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the implications of the EU countries bankruptcy law for the ﬁrms’ operating decisions.1
Under Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy law, ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms suspend their
coupon payments and a reorganization plan including writing new debt contracts is
implemented. The operations of a ﬁrm entering Chapter 11 reorganization usually re-
main unaﬀected by the negotiations process, which makes it relatively easy to remain
in business if the ﬁnancial restructuring is successful. In Europe, however, a distressed
ﬁrm most likely goes under court administration, and its operations are suspended.
As a result, the reputation of the ﬁrm deteriorates and there is a high chance that
liquidation occurs.
In our model debt renegotiation constitutes a good approximation of a private
work-out. Under the work-out the initial debt contract is changed so that the equi-
tyholders, as the ﬁrst-best users of assets, are better oﬀ running the company than
declaring bankruptcy. Moreover, the creditors beneﬁt from the fact that the modiﬁed
debt contract reduces the probability of bankruptcy. The case of bankruptcy better
resembles the European system. A ﬁrm that defaults on its debt obligations goes
bankrupt and its assets are foreclosed by the creditors. Such foreclosure leads in many
cases to ineﬃciently early liquidation since the value of the assets to the creditors is
lower than their value to the original owners. US Chapter 11 remains between these
two cases as far as the time allowed for renegotiation is concerned, but it is more
shareholder-friendly from the point of view of coupon suspension.
Our analysis also provides insight into the diﬀerences between the impact of
a bank credit and diﬀusely held debt on the ﬁrm’s operating policy. Bank credit is
mostly associated with the possibility of debt renegotiation upon ﬁnancial distress,
whereas diﬀusely held debt makes renegotiation less likely (cf. Bolton and Scharfstein,
1996). The outcome of renegotiating the bank debt depends on the bargaining power
of the equityholders vis-` a-vis the bank and on both parties’ outside options. Usually,
the bargaining power of the bank is large, in particular when the ﬁrm is relatively small
and uses a portfolio of its services. Consequently, the share of the renegotiation surplus
received by the bank may be substantial (cf. Hackbarth et al., 2002). When corporate
debt is held by dispersed bondholders, the bargaining power of the creditors is usually
small and such is the surplus from renegotiation that accrues to the creditors (cf. Hege
and Mella-Barral, 2002).
The model is based on the following assumptions. The ﬁrm has an investment
opportunity to scale up its activities upon incurring an irreversible cost. The cash ﬂow
1See, e.g. The Economist, 23rd March 2002, ’Up from the ashes’, and 7th September 2002, The
ﬁrms that can’t stop falling: Bankruptcy in America.6.1. INTRODUCTION 153
of the ﬁrm follows a random process and the ﬁrm has to pay an instantaneous coupon
on its debt. Failure to pay the coupon triggers bankruptcy. Following Mella-Barral
and Perraudin (1997) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000), we assume that the coupon
payment can be renegotiated so that bankruptcy is avoided and the surplus is split
among the equityholders and creditors.
A number of other models known from the literature can be nested in our
framework. Setting the coupon level equal to zero leads to the basic model of Dixit
and Pindyck (1996) with the ﬁrm scaling up its activities. Excluding the renegotiation
possibility reduces our model to Mauer and Ott (2000). By setting the investment
cost to inﬁnity and liquidation value to zero, we arrive at Fan and Sundaresan (2000),
whereas imposing prohibitively high investment cost in combination with take-it or
leave-it oﬀers and no taxes reduces our model to Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997).
Consequently, this chapter builds upon Mauer and Ott (2000), who analyze
the interaction between the leverage and investment option when renegotiation is not
allowed for, and both Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), and Fan and Sundaresan
(2000), who focus on strategic debt service.2 Bankruptcy and renegotiation concepts
used in our paper coincide with two polar cases analyzed by Morellec and Francois
(2001), who model US Chapter 11 as costly reorganization with a limited duration.
The extreme cases in which the renegotiation is not allowed for (duration equal to
zero) and can last inﬁnitely long, are analyzed by Leland (1994) and Mella-Barral and
Perraudin (1997), respectively.
In this chapter it is shown that the presence of the renegotiation option exac-
erbates the underinvestment problem. This is due to the fact that the wealth transfer
to the debtholders, which occurs upon investment, is higher if the shareholders can
default strategically on their original debt contract. The additional underinvestment
does not occur if all the bargaining power is given to the creditors. Another implica-
tion of the renegotiability of the debt contract is that the problem of ineﬃcient early
liquidation can be reduced. This results from the fact that ﬁrm remains in the hands
of the original shareholders, who can run it most eﬃciently. However, it cannot be
avoided fully, due to the impact of the suboptimal investment policy on the choice of
2A far from complete list of references includes Vercammen (2000), analyzing how bankruptcy,
triggered by the assets value falling below the face value of the debt, inﬂuences investment, Leland and
Toft (1996), considering a ﬁnite maturity debt with a stationary structure, Anderson and Sundaresan
(1996), Mella-Barral (1999), Acharya et al. (2002), and Hackbarth et al. (2002), analyzing debt
renegotiation. Related workis presented by Mauer and Triantis (1994), Fischer et al. (1989), and
Dangl and Zechner (2001), who focus on the optimal recapitalization policy.154 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
liquidation trigger.3
The ﬁrm’s operating decisions partially inﬂuence its optimal debt restructuring
policy. The presence of a positive NPVproject, in combination with a high debtors’
bargaining power, may result in an earlier timing of debt reorganization. However, the
ﬁrm’s liquidation policy determined, among others, by the magnitude of its tangible
collateral, does not aﬀect its optimal debt reorganization policy. This ﬁnding may be
to some extent counterintuitive since the magnitude of collateral inﬂuences both the
creditors’ outside option and the value of the ﬁrm. It appears that these two eﬀects
cancel out when the debt renegotiation decision is made.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 the basic model of the ﬁrm is
described, whereas in Section 6.3 debt renegotiation is introduced. Comparative statics
and some empirical implications are presented in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 The Basic Model
As a starting point, consider a ﬁrm that generates a random cash ﬂow x(t), where
x(t) is the time-t realization of a stochastic process. The ﬁrm has an option to make
an irreversible investment, I, after which it will be entitled to a cash ﬂow, θx(t), where
θ>1. Randomness of the cash ﬂow is incorporated in our model by letting x follow
the stochastic diﬀerential equation
dx(t)=αx(t)dt + σx(t)dw(t), (6.1)
where α and σ are constants corresponding to the instantaneous growth rate and the
volatility of the project’s cash ﬂow, respectively, and w(t) denotes a standard Brownian
motion.4 Let r be the deterministic instantaneous riskless interest rate. It is assumed
that all the agents are risk neutral and the drift rate of the cash ﬂow, α, exhibits a
shortfall δ below the riskless rate, i.e. α = r − δ.
We begin the analysis with the simple case of an all-equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm. In
Subsection 6.2.1 the optimal liquidation and investment decisions of the unlevered ﬁrm
are investigated. Subsequently, we introduce a mixed capital structure. The presence
3These results show the limitations of the two-period model of Myers (1977). In his case, the
investment and the liquidation decisions are made simultaneously so that the possibility of renegoti-
ation enhances investment and reduces liquidation. In the continuous-time frameworkof the present
model, renegotiation reduces ineﬃcient liquidation in bad states of nature but (anticipated by the
shareholders in good states of nature) also impairs the investment activity.
4We do not impose a constant positive marginal cost to avoid the need of tackling the issue of
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of debt results in a positive probability of bankruptcy and the shareholders’ option
to default. The optimal bankruptcy trigger and the impact of bankruptcy on the
investment decision are analyzed in Subsection 6.2.2.
6.2.1 All-Equity Financing
The cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm is subject to taxation and the corporate tax rate is τ.N o
other taxes are assumed. The ﬁrm may always decide to sell its assets and liquidate.
Deﬁne an indicator i ∈{ 0,1} to be equal to 0 if the investment has not yet been made,
and 1 in the opposite case. Liquidation entails receiving a lump sum payment, γi,i n
return for the present value of the ﬁrm’s expected future cash ﬂow.
The standard no-arbitrage argument (cf. Dixit and Pindyck, 1996) implies
that any claim, F, contingent on the process x and having an instantaneous payoﬀ
Bx+ C, where B,C ∈ R, satisﬁes the ordinary diﬀerential equation









∂x2 + Bx+ C. (6.2)
For the value of the unlevered ﬁrm, Vi, parameters B and C are θ
i (1 − τ) and zero,














2β (β − 1) + (r − δ)β − r =0 , (6.4)
and M1 and M2 are constants determined from boundary conditions speciﬁc to the
type of the contingent claim.
Let us ﬁrst consider the value of the ﬁrm after the investment has been made.
The only decision that is to be made by the shareholders at each instant is whether to
























1 is the optimal liquidation threshold. The value of the ﬁrm prior to liquida-
tion equals the present value of earnings in perpetuity and the value of the option to
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Before the investment, the strategy space of the ﬁrm consists of the three
following elements
{continue,liquidate,invest}.
Liquidation occurs when earnings fall below a certain trigger, whereas investment takes
place when earnings are suﬃciently high. This results in a double-barrier problem
where the optimal investment threshold and liquidation trigger before the investment
have to be found simultaneously. The optimal investment and liquidation policies are
found by solving ODE (6.2) for V0 subject to
V0(x
∗)=V1(x


































0 denotes the before-investment liquidation trigger and x∗ is the optimal in-
vestment threshold.
6.2.2 Debt and Equity Financing
Now, let us assume that the ﬁrm is partially ﬁnanced with debt. The debt contract
is associated with a perpetual coupon stream b, which is tax deductible. The par value
of debt is assumed to equal b/r. Because of the limited liability of equityholders, in
some states of nature it is optimal for them to default on debt obligations. A failure
to pay the contracted coupon results in bankruptcy upon which creditors take over the
ﬁrm. We impose the absolute priority rule (APR) so the equityholders receive nothing
in the event of bankruptcy as long as the claim of debtholders is not fully satisﬁed.5
Since we are interested in the optimal debt restructuring policy, we assume
an endogenous bankruptcy procedure. Such a procedure stipulates that equityholders
declare bankruptcy so to maximize the value of equity. In such a case it is possible that
for low cash ﬂow realizations, the equityholders may actually inject cash to the ﬁrm.
This modeling approach is consistent with, for instance, Leland (1994), Mella-Barral
5Evidence presented by Franks and Torous (1989) indicates signiﬁcant departures from the absolute
priority rule in many bankruptcy settlements. Our assumption has been introduced for simplicity.
Waiving this assumption would result in bankruptcy occuring for higher realizations of cash ﬂow than
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and Perraudin (1997), and Acharya and Carpenter (2002). It diﬀers from the models of
exogenous bankruptcy, which is triggered by the asset value falling below a prespeciﬁed
level. For instance, in Merton (1974) bankruptcy occurs when the terminal value of
assets is lower than the debt principal, whereas in Black and Cox (1976) it is triggered
when the level of assets hits a deterministic barrier.6 Yet another approach is taken by
Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), who assume that bankruptcy is triggered
by illiquidity, i.e. when net proﬁts fall negative.
The value of the ﬁrm operated by the creditors after bankruptcy is a func-
tion of the cash ﬂow from output, denoted by Ri(x). Following Fan and Sundaresan
(2000), we abstain from analyzing the issue of dynamic recapitalization. As a con-
sequence, the ﬁrm run by the creditors remains all-equity ﬁnanced for ever, and the
tax shield is irreversibly lost upon bankruptcy. Moreover, if bankruptcy occurs prior
to the investment, the growth option expires unexercised. Finally, as in Mella-Barral
and Perraudin (1997), it is assumed that the debtholders will run the ﬁrm less eﬃ-
ciently, so that the cash ﬂow generated by the ﬁrm in the hands of the creditors equals
ρθ
i (1 − τ)x, where ρ ∈ (0,1).7 The latter assumption reﬂects, among others, superior
ability of existing management to run the ﬁrm and distraction of management upon
bankruptcy, combined with impaired ability to contract and suboptimal investment in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital (see Hackbarth et al., 2002).
Since the value of the ﬁrm, Vi,i t se q u i t y ,Ei,d e b t ,Di, and creditors’ reservation
value, Ri, are securities contingent on the earnings process, x, they all satisfy ODE
(6.2). The values of constants B and C deﬁning their instantaneous payoﬀs are depicted
in Table 6.1.
Vi Ei Di Ri
B θ
i (1 − τ) θ
i(1 − τ) − ρθ
i (1 − τ)
C bτ −b(1 − τ) b −
Table 6.1: Instantaneous payoﬀs associated with the value of the ﬁrm, Vi,e q u i t y ,Ei,d e b t ,
Di, and the creditors’ outside option, Ri.
First, we determine the value of the ﬁrm run by the creditors, Ri. It is obtained
by solving (6.2) with value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions reﬂecting the fact
6See Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002) for a detailed reference list concerning related safety covenants.
7Hege and Mella-Barral (2000) develop a model in which the ﬁrm in the hands of new owners
has exactly the same set options concerning new debt issues and subsequent reorganizations as under
the management of incumbents. The assumption about proportional reduction of cash ﬂow upon
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that the only option available to the ﬁrm run by the creditors is to liquidate. It holds






























i (1 − τ)
(6.12)
is the optimal liquidation trigger of the creditors running the ﬁrm.
We determine the value of the ﬁrm and the optimal investment threshold by
ﬁrst considering the case in which the ﬁrm has already invested. We solve (6.2) for
the ﬁrm’s equity, E1, and debt, D1 with value-matching conditions at the bankruptcy
trigger that correspond to the absolute priority rule. The value of the ﬁrm’s equity,






















































The optimal equityholders’ bankruptcy trigger is determined using the smooth-pasting









The value of the ﬁrm equals





























Figure 6.1 depicts the value of the ﬁrm and the claims written on it after the
investment is made. The value of the ﬁrm approaches the present value of earnings
increased by the tax shield for a high earnings level. For lower realizations of the
earnings process, the concavity of the ﬁrm’s value increases, which reﬂects the value of
the equityholders’ option to default. At the bankruptcy trigger, xB
1 , the ﬁrm’s value6.2. THE BASIC MODEL 159
function exhibits a kink which reﬂects the fact that bankruptcy is neither optimal
nor reversible as seen from the perspective of the ﬁrm value maximization.8 The
value of equity approaches the present value of earnings minus the after-tax coupon
payment. For lower realizations of earnings, its convexity increases due to the limited
liability eﬀect. At the equityholders’ optimal bankruptcy trigger, the value of equity
smooth-pastes to zero. Finally, the value of debt tends to its riskless valuation for
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Figure 6.1: Valuation of the ﬁrm, V1, its debt, D1,a n de q u i t y ,E1, with bankruptcy occurring
upon default.
Equipped with the value of the ﬁrm after the investment has been made, we
are ready to determine the optimal exercise policy of the investment option. We cal-
culate both the ﬁrm value-maximizing and the equity value-maximizing investment
thresholds. Here, we use the framework of Mauer and Ott (2000) and correct two of
their boundary conditions9. We start by observing that the value of the ﬁrm as well as
8If bankruptcy was optimal then the value function would be diﬀerentiable at xB
1 as a result of the
smooth-pasting condition. Reversibility would imply the continuity of the ﬁrst derivative of the value
function at xB
1 due to the no-arbitrage condition (for details see Dumas, 1991).
9First, we replace the investment bankruptcy trigger in condition (9.20a) on p. 159 of Mauer and
Ott (2000) that ignores the impact of the investment opportunity, by the one determined optimally.
Second, we add a smooth-pasting condition necessary for calculating the optimal trigger in the presence
of the investment opportunity.160 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
its equity and debt before the investment, V0, E0, and, D0, respectively, satisfy ODE



















D0 = V0 − E0. (6.19)
The component K0xβ1 is the value of the growth option and B0xβ2 reﬂects the value
lost due to the potential future bankruptcy. A01xβ1 is the fraction of the value of the
investment option that accrues to the equityholders and A01xβ2 is the equityholders’
option to default. The constants K0, B0, A01, A02, the optimal bankruptcy trigger xB
0
and the ﬁrm value-maximizing investment threshold, x∗, are uniquely determined by
the system of equations
V0(x
∗)=V1(x
∗) − I, (6.20)
E0(x
∗)=E1(x














































Equations (6.20) and (6.21) are the value-matching conditions ensuring the
continuity of the value of the ﬁrm as well as of its equity and debt (by D0 = V0 − E0)
at the optimal investment threshold. (6.22) is the smooth-pasting condition associated
with the ﬁrm value-maximizing property of the investment threshold. (6.23) and (6.24)
are the value matching and smooth-pasting conditions for the equityholders at the
bankruptcy trigger. (6.24) ensures that the bankruptcy trigger is chosen such that
the value of equity is maximized. (6.25) is the value-matching condition for the ﬁrm
at the bankruptcy trigger. Its RHS implies that the investment option expires upon
bankruptcy.
It holds that xB
1 is lower than xB
0 . This is due to the fact that the cash
ﬂow is higher after the investment has been undertaken and the present value of the
incremental cash ﬂow from investment is worth more than the option to acquire it.
The debtholders beneﬁt from undertaking the investment project in two ways.
First, the probability of bankruptcy decreases so that the present value of the expected6.3. DEBT RENEGOTIATION 161
coupon stream is higher. Second, the outside option of the debtholders becomes more
valuable. After bankruptcy is declared, the debtholders will run a ﬁrm that generates
a higher cash ﬂow than prior to the investment.
Since in most cases it is impossible to implement an investment schedule that
maximizes the value of the ﬁrm, we compare the ﬁrst-best solution with the second-
best that maximizes the value of the equity.10 The investment decision associated with












   
x=x∗
(6.26)
Constants K0, B0, A01, A02, and triggers xB
0 and x∗ are completely described by the
system of equations (6.20)-(6.25) with (6.22) replaced by (6.26). The optimal invest-
ment threshold is in this case higher since the wealth transfer to debtholders occurring
upon investment causes that the equityholders invest later than the ﬁrst-best solu-
tion would indicate. Furthermore, the optimal bankruptcy trigger is lower under the
second-best investment rule than under the ﬁrst-best policy. The reason for such a
relationship is that under the second-best investment rule the value of the investment
opportunity for the equityholders is higher than under the ﬁrst-best policy. Therefore,
at any x the continuation value is higher under the second-best that under ﬁrst-best.
As a consequence, the continuation value under the second-best smooth-pastes to the
stopping value (equal to zero) at a lower x than under the ﬁrst-best.11
6.3 Debt Renegotiation
The divergence between the optimal liquidation trigger of the ﬁrm and the equity-
holders’ endogenous bankruptcy trigger implies that there is a scope for debt renegoti-
ation. The scope for renegotiation stems from the fact that upon bankruptcy the three
following components of the ﬁrm’s value are irreversibly lost. First, the investment
opportunity ceases to exist when the creditors take over the company. Second, upon
bankruptcy the ﬁrm forgoes the present value of the tax shield. Finally, creditors run
10In general, it is not in the interest of shareholders to align perfectly the incentives of the managers
with their own in the presence of debt (cf. Brander and Poitevin, 1992, and John and John, 1993). The
optimal compensation scheme should be constructed in such a way that the combined agency costs of
equity and debt are minimized. However, in this paper’s framework with a single owner-manager the
ﬁrst-best solution is not achievable.
11Mauer and Ott (2000) fail to incorporate this relationship in their model.162 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
the ﬁrm less eﬃciently so the instantaneous earnings of the ﬁrm are reduced by fraction
(1 − ρ) of the current cash ﬂow.
In this section we analyze the impact of debt renegotiation on the investment
policy and the value of the ﬁrm. We assume that the renegotiation process has a form
of Nash bargaining in which the bargaining power is split between the two types of
the ﬁrm’s stakeholders (cf. Perraudin and Psillaki, 1999, and Fan and Sundaresan,
2000). The distribution of the bargaining power is given exogenously and is described
by parameter η ∈ [0,1], where a high η is associated with high bargaining power of
the shareholders. The take-it or leave-it oﬀers made either by the shareholders or by
the creditors (as in Mella-Barral and Perraudin, 1997) are limiting cases of the Nash
bargaining solution. Consequently, they correspond to the cases where η =1a n d
η = 0, respectively. The former situation can be related to large corporations that
are likely to be aggressive in negotiations, whereas the latter corresponds to small and
young ﬁrms that use a portfolio of the bank’s services.
The remainder of this section consists of two parts. In Subsection 6.3.1, we
calculate the value of the ﬁrm as a function of the equityholders’ renegotiation trigger
and determine the optimal sharing rule. In Subsection 6.3.2 we simultaneously derive
the values of debt and equity, and determine the optimal equityholders’ renegotiation
and investment policies and the ﬁrm’s optimal liquidation rule.
6.3.1 Nash Bargaining Solution
Debt renegotiation has a form of a strategic debt service, i.e. it is associated with
a lower than contractual coupon payment. The new coupon payment schedule has
to satisfy both the shareholders’ and debtholders’ participation constraints associated
with the renegotiation process. We follow Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Fan
and Sundaresan (2000) in assuming that the coupon is a function of the current cash
ﬂow. Such an approach allows for avoiding path-dependency, which leads to analytical
intractability.12 Repeated renegotiation is possible and occurs in equilibrium with
positive probability.
It is assumed that bargaining power is distributed among the shareholders and
the creditors which results in the surplus from renegotiation being distributed with
a certain proportion among the two groups. Moreover, we impose the assumption
made by Fan and Sundaresan (2000) that during the renegotiation process the tax
shield is temporarily suspended. As soon as the cash ﬂow from operation recovers and
12Hege and Mella-Barral (2000) assume that a once reduced coupon cannot be increased.6.3. DEBT RENEGOTIATION 163
debtholders are receiving coupon b again, the tax shield is restored.13,14 Finally, it is




ρ(1 − τ). (6.27)
Condition (6.27) implies that the liquidation value is small enough so that it will not
be optimal for the creditors to liquidate the ﬁrm immediately after the original debt
contract is infringed.15
First, we determine the value of the ﬁrm, V NB
i , as a function of the optimal
renegotiation trigger. Since the present value of the tax shield depends on the moment
of commencing the debt renegotiation, the value of the ﬁrm as a whole depends on the
renegotiation trigger. V NB
i can be expressed as the sum of the present value of cash







+ TS i +( 1− i)K0x
β1 + Lix
β2. (6.28)
In the Appendix we show that for a given choice of the renegotiation trigger, xNB
i ,t h e































The expressions on the right-hand side have an immediate interpretation. They are
the products of the present value of the perpetual tax shield, bτ
r , a stochastic discount




 β2, and a fraction
β1
β1−β2 that reﬂects the fact that the tax shield operates only in the renegotiation region.
The constants K0 and L0 will be determined later, i.e. at the time of solving























 −β2 , (6.30)
13According to Fan and Sundaresan (2000), p. 1072, the fact of temporary tax shield suspension
in the renegotiation region ”may be interpreted as debtholders agree to forgive some debt and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) suspends tax beneﬁts until contractual payments are resumed.” An
alternative approach is proposed by Hege and Mella-Barral (2000), and Hackbarth et al. (2002), who
assume that the magnitude of the tax shield corresponds to the prevailing coupon payment.
14Fan and Sundaresan (2000) claim (footnote 12, p. 1073) that the optimal renegotiation trigger is
lower when the tax beneﬁts accrue during the strategic debt service. In fact, the optimal renegotiation
trigger is higher when the tax shield is not suspended since the value of starting renegotiation is higher
in such a situation. Therefore, our main results would be even stronger if we did not impose suspension
of the tax shield. See also footnote 17.
15Since ρ(1 − τ) < 1, condition (6.27) also implies that the debt is risky.164 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
where xLN
















(for derivation of (6.30) and (6.31) see the Appendix). It can be directly seen that
in the absence of taxes, (6.31) reduces to (6.6) with τ = 0. Upon comparing (6.31)
with (6.6) it can be concluded that xLN
1 is lower than xL
1 as long as xNB
1 is ﬁnite.
Consequently, in the presence of taxes the liquidation option is exercised later when
the ﬁrm is partially ﬁnanced with debt and renegotiation is possible.
Having determined the value of the ﬁrm, we are ready to calculate the solution
to the bargaining game. Let ϕ∗
i be the outcome of the Nash bargaining process being
equal to the fraction of the ﬁrm received by the shareholders. Given that the value of
the ﬁrm is described by (6.28), the shareholders receive ϕ∗
1V NB
i and the debtholders get
(1 − ϕ∗
i)V NB
i . The outside options (the oﬀ-renegotiation payoﬀs) of equityholders and
debtholders are zero and Ri, respectively. Consequently, the solution to the bargaining
game can be written as follows:16
ϕ
∗

















From (6.32) it can be concluded that the fraction of the ﬁrm received by the equity-
holders in the renegotiation process critically depends on the creditors’ outside option,
Ri. If the creditors’ outside option equals zero (i.e. if γi = ρ = 0), shareholders receive
the fraction of the ﬁrm equal to their bargaining power coeﬃcient. In the opposite
case, i.e. when creditors outside option equals the value of the ﬁrm (ρ =1 ,τ=0 ,
and i = 1), shareholders receive nothing in the renegotiation process. Moreover, the
optimal sharing rule again depends on the amount of the current cash ﬂow, x.
6.3.2 Equity Valuation and Optimal Renegotiation Policy
Having calculated the value of the ﬁrm and the optimal sharing rule given the
shareholders’ renegotiation trigger, we now derive the optimal renegotiation policy.
16In the formulation of bargaining problem we follow Perraudin and Psillaki (1999), and Fan and
Sundaresan (2000), (where for η =0 .5 the game is the one of Rubinstein, 1982, with ∆t → 0) who
impose this multiplicative form of the objective function. The drawback of an alternative, additive
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We begin by deriving the formulae for the securities values. Subsequently, we simulta-
neously determine the optimal renegotiation and investment policy by maximizing the
value of the equity and the optimal liquidation policy by maximizing the value of the
ﬁrm.
Given the value of the ﬁrm as a function of the underlying cash ﬂow, we are
ready to determine the after-investment value of equity, ENB
1 , and to ﬁnd the optimal
renegotiation trigger. The value of equity is determined by solving ODE (6.2) with an
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Applying the smooth-pasting condition allows for ﬁnding the optimal renegotiation
trigger, xNB






b(1 − τ + ητ)δ
(1 − η (1 − ρ))θ(1 − τ)r
, (6.34)
It is straightforward to notice that the trigger xNB
1 increases with taxes. This
is because the eﬀect of taxes on the cash ﬂow that accrues to the ﬁrm’s shareholders
dominates the eﬀect of a temporarily suspended tax shield. Therefore, despite the fact
that the tax shield is suspended under renegotiation, the shareholders prefer an earlier
debt reorganization.17
From (6.34) it can be seen that the renegotiation trigger is independent from
taxes only if η is equal to zero. This is equivalent with the creditors holding the
entire bargaining power. In such a case the optimal renegotiation trigger equals the
optimal bankruptcy trigger and the latter has already been shown to be independent of
taxes (cf. (6.15)). Moreover, the optimal renegotiation trigger does not depend on the
liquidation value γ1. This results from the fact that the change of the instantaneous
17The impact of taxes on cash ﬂow is not taken into account while analyzing the optimal bankuptcy
trigger in Leland (1994) (see footnote 22 therein concerning the ceteris paribus assumption) and the
renegotiation trigger in Fan and Sundaresan (2000) (see Assumption (6), p. 1061 therein). Conse-
quently, the optimal renegotiation trigger in Fan and Sundaresan (2000) is reported to decrease in
taxes since only the eﬀect of the increasing tax shield is taken into account. Moreover, contrary to the
result of Fan and Sundaresan (2000) obtained without the liquidation option, introducing taxes does
not always imply that shareholders receive a higher fraction of the ﬁrm in the renegotiation process.166 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
payoﬀ when the renegotiation commences is not inﬂuenced by the collateral.18
The after-investment value of the ﬁrm, V NB
1 , can be determined now by sub-
stituting (6.29) and (6.30) into (6.28). Having also calculated the value of equity, ENB
1 ,
and knowing the value of R1 (see (6.11)), we are able to provide the value of its debt,
DNB
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Figure 6.2 depicts the value of the ﬁrm and the claims written on it after the
investment is made and there exists a possibility of renegotiation. The value of the
ﬁrm remains within the band bounded from below by the present value of the cash ﬂow
and from above by the present value of the cash ﬂow and of the perpetual tax shield.
The value of the equity behaves as in the case without renegotiation with the only
diﬀerence being that the option to default is replaced by a more highly valued option
to renegotiate. The value of debt tends to its riskless valuation for high levels of cash
ﬂow as in the previous case, and it equals a fraction of the ﬁrm value, (1 − ϕ∗)V NB
1 ,
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Figure 6.2: Valuation of the ﬁrm, V1, its debt, D1, and equity, E1, with the shareholder’s
option to renegotiate the debt.





= γ1, then the renegotiation trigger would depend on γ1.
However, this is ruled out by assumption (6.27).6.3. DEBT RENEGOTIATION 167
At the optimal equityholders’ renegotiation trigger, the value of all the claims
remain diﬀerentiable. For the equity it is the result of the smooth-pasting condition
that guarantees optimality of the trigger. For the value of the ﬁrm and its debt it is a no-
arbitrage condition. Since the renegotiation process is reversible, i.e. the equityholders
will restore the original coupon ﬂow, b, as soon as the earnings process again exceeds
the critical threshold xNB
1 , the ﬁrst-order derivative of the value of all the claims must
be continuous. As a consequence, the value of the ﬁrm and of its debt does not exhibit
kinks at the renegotiation trigger, xNB
1 .
In order to determine the optimal investment, renegotiation and liquidation
triggers and the value of the corporate securities, we ﬁrst observe that the value of
equity before investment, ENB












A01xβ1 and A02xβ2 are the components of the value of equity associated with the
investment and debt renegotiation option, respectively. Using equation (6.36) for ENB
0 ,
(6.33) for ENB
1 , (6.28) with i =0a n di =1f o rV NB
0 and V NB
1 , respectively, and (6.11)





































































































Equations (6.37) and (6.38) are the value-matching conditions required for the value
of the ﬁrm and equity to be continuous at the optimal investment threshold, x∗.T h e
smooth-pasting condition (6.39) guarantees the optimality of the investment threshold,
x∗. Conditions (6.40) and (6.41) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
associated with the optimal renegotiation trigger chosen by the equityholders, respec-168 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
tively. The RHS of (6.40) is the share of the value of the ﬁrm received by the share-
holders upon renegotiation. (6.42) is the value matching condition reﬂecting the value
of the ﬁrm at the liquidation trigger. Finally, (6.43) is the smooth-pasting condition
for the value of the ﬁrm at the closure point.
Now, we are ready to state the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1 The optimal investment threshold, x∗, renegotiation trigger, xNB
0 ,
and liquidation trigger, xLN
0 , can be obtained by simultaneously solving the following
equations







































































The constants K0, L0, A01,a n dA02 are deﬁned by equations (6.65) and (6.66) in the
Appendix.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Unfortunately, an analytical solution to the above system of equations cannot
be obtained. Therefore, we rely on numerical methods. Figure 6.3 depicts the values
of the ﬁrm, its debt and its equity, in the presence of the investment and renegotiation
options.
The boundary conditions for the equity value-maximizing investment policy



















replaces (6.39). This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6.2 The shareholders’ value-maximizing investment threshold is ob-
tained by solving simultaneously equations (6.45), (6.46), and
(θ − 1)(1 − τ)
δ
+ β2(A12 − A02)(x
∗)
β2−1 − β1A01 (x
∗)
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Figure 6.3: Valuation of the ﬁrm, V0,i t se q u i t y ,E0, and debt, D0, with the shareholder’s
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Figure 6.4: Valuation of the ﬁrm, V0,i t se q u i t y ,E0, and debt, D0, with the shareholder’s op-
tion to renegotiate the debt and the option to invest exercised at the equity value-maximizing
level of earnings.170 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
Constants A01, A02 and A12 are deﬁned by equations (6.66) and (6.67) in the Appendix.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 6.4 depicts the value of the ﬁrm, and its debt and equity in the presence
of the investment and renegotiation options when the second-best investment policy is
implemented. Now, it is the value of equity that is diﬀerentiable at x∗ (cf. (6.47)).
Finally, we are able to present the optimal debt service prior to and after
exercising the growth option. The coupon stream resulting from renegotiating the
original debt contract, cNB















(1 − η(1 − ρ))xθ







bx > x NB
i .
(6.49)
The ﬁrst regime in the strategic debt service corresponds to earnings remaining between
the ﬁrm’s optimal liquidation trigger, xLN
i , and the level triggering liquidation if the
ﬁrm was run by the creditors, xLR
i . In this case the creditors receive a weighted average
of cash ﬂow from holding the collateral, rγi, and operating the ﬁrm as the ﬁrst-best
users, xθ
i (1 − τ). These streams are weighted with the shareholders’ bargaining power
coeﬃcient, η. For the earnings level above xLR
i , but still in the renegotiation region,
the creditors receive a weighted average of the cash ﬂow from operating the company
as the second-best , xρθ
i(1 − τ), and as the ﬁrst-best users, xθ
i (1 − τ). Outside the
renegotiation region, the contractual coupon b is paid.
Note that for τ =0a n dη ∈{ 0,1} the coupon schedule corresponds to the
outcome of the take-it or leave-it oﬀers in Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), whereas
setting γi to zero reduces the solution to the payment scheme of Fan and Sundaresan
(2000).
On the basis of (6.49) it can be concluded that the presence of the growth
opportunity does not change the coupon ﬂow to the creditors within given regimes.
This results from the following fact. In the bargaining process both groups of stake-
holders receive the following portfolio: a fraction of the ﬁrm’s value, V NB
i , and the
fraction of the creditors’ outside option, Ri. Strategic debt service reﬂects cash ﬂows
to which these portfolios of securities are entitled. Since the investment opportunity
that constitutes a part of the ﬁrm’s value is not associated with any payment stream,
the strategic debt service within a given regime is not inﬂuenced by its presence.
Although the growth option does not inﬂuence cash ﬂows from the ﬁrm’s se-
curities, it aﬀects, via its impact on optimal triggers, the regimes determining the6.3. DEBT RENEGOTIATION 171




















The ﬁrst inequality is implied by the positive value of the growth option. Without the
growth option, the liquidation trigger xLN
0 would be equal to θγ0xLN
1 /γ1.H o w e v e r ,
the presence of growth option raises the opportunity cost of liquidating the ﬁrm. As a
consequence, the ﬁrm is liquidated optimally at a cash ﬂow level lower than θγ0xLN
1 /γ1.
The equality in the middle follows from the solution to the creditors’ liquidation prob-
lem when the value of the ﬁrm run by the creditors is given by (6.11). The remaining
relationship reﬂects an ambiguous sign of the impact of the growth opportunity on the
renegotiation policy.
All the above relationships directly translate into the changes in the strategic
debt service resulting from the presence of the growth option. First, the inequality on
the left reﬂects the eﬀect of the investment opportunity on the liquidation trigger. It
implies that in the presence of the growth option, the debt will be strategically serviced
for a longer period before the ultimate decision to abandon the ﬁrm. Furthermore,
the boundary between the regimes delineated by the trigger xLR
1 is unaﬀected by the
presence of the investment opportunity. After all, the creditors running the company
after the bankruptcy do not hold the growth option anymore. Finally, the impact
of the investment opportunity on the cash ﬂow level that triggers the renegotiation
is ambiguous. On the one hand, since the value of equity contains an additional
component reﬂecting the value of the option to invest, the equityholders’ value of
the outside option increases, which makes renegotiation ceteris paribus less attractive.
However, the value of the ﬁrm is also higher when the investment opportunity exists.
Therefore, the value of renegotiation increases as well. Since these two eﬀects work
in the opposite directions, the presence of the investment opportunity can, in general,
either raise or reduce the renegotiation trigger.
Proposition 6.3 The optimal renegotiation threshold in the presence of the invest-
ment opportunity can either be lower or higher than the corresponding threshold in a
situation where there is no such opportunity. The condition
ηK0 >A 01 (6.51)
determines the range of η in which the presence of investment opportunity results in
earlier renegotiation.
Proof. See the Appendix.172 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
From Proposition 6.3 we conclude that it is possible to determine the crit-
ical level of the shareholders’ bargaining power, η, that demarcates the two cases.
It holds that under both the ﬁrst-best and second-best solution, the optimal rene-
gotiation trigger exceeds the one without the investment opportunity if and only if
K0 − A01 >
1−η
η A01. This condition describes the case where the present value of the
wealth transfer to the creditors occurring upon investment exceeds the value of the
option to invest that accrues to the shareholders by more than a factor
1−η
η . This
means that if the bargaining power of the shareholders is high enough, it is optimal
for them to begin the renegotiation process earlier in the presence of an investment
opportunity. By doing so, the shareholders forgo the component of the value of equity
associated with the investment option A01xβ1, but they are more than compensated
by receiving a fraction (dependent on η) of the ﬁrm’s value including the ﬁrm’s growth
option K0xβ1.
Introducing the option to renegotiate the debt may adversely aﬀect the value
of the debt itself. This happens in a situation where the renegotiation trigger is close,
but the bankruptcy trigger (in the absence of renegotiation) lies much below the rene-
gotiation trigger, i.e. when the shareholders’ bargaining power, η, is suﬃciently high
and the eﬃciency of creditors as the would-be managers, ρ, is low. Naturally, for x
close enough to the bankruptcy trigger, allowing for renegotiation increases the debt
value since the creditors’ renegotiation payoﬀ is higher than the one received after the
bankruptcy.
6.4 Numerical Results and Testable Implications
This section presents comparative statics concerning the ﬁrm’s optimal investment,
liquidation, and debt restructuring policies, the ﬁrst passage time probabilities and
securities’ values. Moreover, it presents some testable implications of the model. The
input parameters used for graphical illustrations as follows: risk-free rate r =0 .05,
drift rate of the earnings process α =0 .015, volatility of earnings σ =0 .2, eﬀective tax
rate τ =0 .05, instantaneous coupon b =0 .66, eﬃciency of the creditors as the second-
best users of the ﬁrm’s assets ρ =0 .5, bargaining power of the shareholders η =0 .5,
liquidation value before investment γ0 = 1, investment cost I = 10, earnings multiplier
resulting from exercising the growth option θ = 2, liquidation value after investment
γ1 = 2. In Subsection 6.4.1 we analyze the optimal policies, whereas in Subsection 6.4.2
we look at the ﬁrst passage time probabilities. Subsection 6.4.3 discusses securities’
valuation and Subsection 6.4.4 provides empirical implications.6.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS 173
6.4.1 Optimal Policies
The comparative statics for optimal investment, debt restructuring, and liquidation
triggers are depicted in Table 6.2 below.
σ α,δ r,δ r,α b ρ η I,θ
−1 τγ 0 γ1
x∗ + − +( i)( ii)( iii)( iv)++ ( v)( v)
xNB
0 −− + − + − ++ + − +
xB
0 −− +( i)+( vi)0 ++ ( vi)( vi)
xLN
0 −− +++− ++ + + −
Table 6.2: Comparative statics concerning the optimal investment, x∗, renegotiation, xNB
0 ,
bankruptcy, xB
0 , and liquidation, xLN
0 ,t h r e s h o l d s .” +”( ” −”) denotes a positive (negative)
derivative with respect to a given parameter. The numbers in brackets refer to the explanatory
notes in the text.
The signs of ﬁrst derivatives for both the ﬁrst-best and second-best policy are
included in Table 6.2. Below, we provide a discussion of those results that diﬀer from
the well-known results from the real options and corporate ﬁnance literature.
(i) From real options theory it is known that under all-equity ﬁnancing the relation-
ship between the optimal investment threshold and the risk-free interest rate,
r, given constant return shortfall, δ, is increasing.19 Such a relationship holds
because the wedge between the Marshallian and optimal investment threshold
increases with r, whereas the present value of the project does not change. Debt
ﬁnancing introduces another eﬀect, which works in the opposite direction. Given
that the coupon b is ﬁxed, a higher r is associated with a lower debt value, and
thus with a lower magnitude of the underinvestment problem. Consequently,
a higher r can stimulate earlier investment since it is associated with a lower
wealth transfer from shareholders to debtholders. The latter eﬀect dominates if
cash ﬂow uncertainty is low. For low levels of uncertainty the optimal invest-
ment threshold is low, and this implies a relatively high leverage at the moment
of undertaking the project. In such a case the impact of the change in r on
the value of wealth transfer to debtholders is high and the wealth transfer eﬀect
dominates the waiting option eﬀect. As a result, for low cash ﬂow uncertainty the
relationship between interest rate and optimal investment threshold is U-shaped
(cf. Figure 6.5).20174 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION














Figure 6.5: Equity value maximizing investment threshold in the presence of renegotiation
option, x∗ (NB,·), and without renegotiation, x∗(B,·),f o rσl =0 .1,σ h =0 .2 and varying

















Figure 6.6: First-best, x∗ (NB,F), and second-best, x∗(NB,S), investment thresholds
in the presence of renegotiation option compared to ﬁrst-best, x∗(B,F), and second-best,
x∗(NB,F), thresholds without renegotiation, and with the all-equity threshold, x∗(E),f o r

















Figure 6.7: First-best, x∗ (NB,F), and second-best, x∗(NB,S), investment thresholds
in the presence of renegotiation option compared to ﬁrst-best, x∗(B,F), and second-best,
x∗(B,S), thresholds without renegotiation, and with the all-equity threshold, x∗(E),f o r
varying magnitude of the creditors outside option, ρ.
(ii) The impact of leverage, b, on the optimal investment threshold for the ﬁrst-best
and second-best solutions diﬀers (see Figure 6.6). If the investment is made so
as to maximize the value of the ﬁrm, the optimal investment threshold decreases
with leverage. The latter relationship results from a higher increase in the present
value of the tax shield upon completing the investment. The opposite is true
in the situation where the investment threshold is chosen so to maximize the
value of equity. In this case the optimal investment threshold increases with
leverage. This can be explained by the wealth transfer from the equityholders to
the debtholders, positively related to the level of leverage. The wealth transfer
occurs since after undertaking the project the renegotiation trigger is lower than
before the investment has been made.
(iii) The outside option of the debtholders, ρ, inﬂuences the optimal investment
threshold either by delaying investment, if the threshold is chosen so that the
value of the ﬁrm is maximized, or by accelerating it, if the shareholders choose
19See Dixit and Pindyck (1996), Ch. 6.
20When the ﬁrst-best solution is applied, the wealth transfer to the debtholders does not directly
















Figure 6.8: First-best, x∗ (NB,F), and second-best, x∗(NB,S), investment thresholds
in the presence of renegotiation option compared to ﬁrst-best, x∗(B,F), and second-best,
x∗(NB,F), thresholds without renegotiation, and with the all-equity threshold, x∗(E),f o r
varying distribution of bargaining power, η.
the investment timing (cf. Figure 6.7). The reason for which the ﬁrst-best invest-
ment threshold increases with ρ is that the optimal renegotiation trigger decreases
with ρ. Consequently, since a lower renegotiation trigger is equivalent to a lower
increase of the PVof the tax shield, the value of the project decreases with ρ
and the investment is undertaken later. In the special case of τ = 0, the tax
shield argument is no longer present and the threshold is equal to the 100% eq-
uity one. Conversely, if the value of equity is maximized, a lower wealth transfer
associated with high ρ (thus low xNB
0 ) moves the investment threshold closer to
the all-equity case. When the second-best solution is applied, the wealth transfer
from debtors to creditors always occurs upon investment so that even in case of
τ = 0 the equity value-maximizing investment rule diﬀers from the one given by
the optimal all-equity threshold.
(iv) The shareholders’ bargaining power, η, aﬀects the optimal investment threshold
in an opposite way than ρ (cf. Figure 6.8). If the timing of investment is chosen
optimally so as to maximize the value of the ﬁrm, the optimal investment thresh-
old decreases with η. This results from the fact that the value of the investment6.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS 177















Figure 6.9: First-best, x∗ (NB,F), and second-best, x∗(NB,S), investment thresholds
in the presence of renegotiation option compared to ﬁrst-best, x∗(B,F), and second-best,
x∗(NB,F), thresholds without renegotiation, and with the all-equity threshold, x∗(E),f o r
diﬀerent liquidation values, γ0.
opportunity to the ﬁrm increases with η, since the present value of the additional
tax shield (due to investment) increases. For an analogous reason as in (iii),
the ﬁrst-best investment threshold is insensitive to changes in η in the absence of
taxes. However, if the timing of investment is chosen by the equityholders so that
the value of equity is maximized, the optimal investment threshold increases with
η. This is due to the fact that the renegotiation trigger is positively related to
η. Since the renegotiation trigger decreases upon investment, debtholders beneﬁt
most from investment when the initial trigger is high. A higher wealth transfer
that accrues to the debtholders upon undertaking the project results in a later
investment.
(v) The impact of the liquidation value of the ﬁrm on the optimal investment policy
depends on the presence of the renegotiation option and on the fact whether the
ﬁrst-best solution can be implemented (cf. Figure 6.9). When the investment
threshold is chosen as to maximize the value of the ﬁrm, the investment is always
undertaken later (thus closer to the all-equity trigger) when the liquidation value
γ0 (γ1) is higher (lower). This results from the fact that investment becomes less178 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
attractive if it is associated with a lower increase in the liquidation value. This
eﬀect is reversed if in the presence of the renegotiation option the choice of the
investment trigger maximizes the equity value. Since a higher initial liquidation
value negatively inﬂuences the probability of strategic default, the wealth transfer
to the debtholders, which occurs at the moment of investment, is lower. This
results in an earlier investment. The same argument can be applied to analyze
t h ei m p a c to fγ1. Finally, when renegotiation is not allowed for and the second-
best solution is implemented, the investment trigger does not depend on the
ﬁrm’s liquidation value.
(vi) The bankruptcy trigger, xB
0 , is inﬂuenced neither by the ﬁrm’s liquidation value
nor by the eﬃciency of the creditors as the second-best users of the ﬁrm’s as-
sets as long as the investment threshold is chosen as to maximize the equity
value. In a situation where the ﬁrst-best solution can be implemented, the op-
timal bankruptcy threshold is positively related to the liquidation value γ1 and
negatively related to the creditor’s eﬃciency and liquidation value γ0.A p o s i -
tive change in a liquidation value and low creditor’s eﬃciency make investment
particularly attractive since it lowers the present value of the economic cost of
bankruptcy. Consequently, investment occurs too early comparing with the case
when the eﬀect of the change of economic costs of bankruptcy is absent. This
results in a lower value of the ﬁrm’s claims as a going-concern and lower oppor-
tunity cost of bankruptcy.
6.4.2 First Passage Time Probabilities
Interactions between the options to scale up the operations and to reorganize debt
can already be observed by analyzing the relevant optimal triggers. However, since
equityholders face a double-barrier control problem, there is no one to one correspon-
dence between the optimal triggers and the ﬁrst passage time probabilities. Therefore,
we extend the analysis and calculate the ﬁrst passage time probabilities associated with
the optimal renegotiation trigger and with the optimal investment threshold.
In order to evaluate the inﬂuence of a given option, or parameter, on the
relevant decision trigger, we calculate the probabilities of reaching the trigger within a
time interval of length T. For example, the probability of strategic debt restructuring
is equivalent to the probability of the cash ﬂow process hitting, either the renegotiation
trigger, xNB
0 , or, ﬁrst, the investment threshold x∗ and then the renegotiation trigger,
xNB
1 . Conversely, the probability of investment equals the probability of hitting the6.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS 179
investment threshold, x∗, conditionally on not hitting the liquidation trigger, xLN
0 .T h e
derivation of the relevant probabilities, based on solving a partial diﬀerential equation
(PDE), is presented in the Appendix.
In Table 6.3 we present the comparative statics concerning the ﬁrst passage
time probabilities. The presented results have been obtained by numerical calculation
of the relevant probabilities for an extensive range of input parameters.
σ α,δ r,δ r,α b ρ η I,θ
−1 τT γ 0 γ1
p∗ (vii)+ − (viii)( ii)( iv)( iv) −− +( v)( v)
pNB (vii) − + −∗ + − ++ + + −∗ +∗
pB (vii) − + −∗ +( vi)0 + + + ( vi)( vi)
Table 6.3: Comparative statics concerning the ﬁrst passage time probabilities associated with
investment, p∗, debt renegotiation, pNB, and bankruptcy, pB.∗ relationship can be reversed
when x∗ − x is very small. The numbers in brackets refer to the explanatory notes in the
text.
(vii) Non-monotonicity of the investment-uncertainty relationship has been already
pointed out by Sarkar (2000) and analyzed further in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
It crucially depends on the relationship between the horizon T and the time to
reach the deterministic Jorgensonian threshold. From Chapter 3 it is obtained
that if the horizon T is relatively short, the investment-uncertainty relationship
is humped, while for high T it is negative. Another factor that inﬂuences the
probability of investment in this double-barrier problem of the ﬁrm is the prob-
ability of bankruptcy (or of liquidation when renegotiation is possible) which is
also sensitive to the changes in uncertainty. On the basis of Figure 6.10 one
can conclude that higher uncertainty results in a lower probability of investment
when cash ﬂow is high. However, for lower levels of cash ﬂow, uncertainty raises
the probability of investment since bankruptcy becomes less likely. The latter
holds since the bankruptcy threshold decreases with σ.
The presence of renegotiation option aﬀects the probability of investment
twofold. First, it raises the optimal investment threshold. Second, it allows to pre-
serve the investment opportunity for the levels of cash ﬂow lower than the bankruptcy
trigger. The smaller than one ratios of the probabilities with and without renegotia-
tion illustrate that the eﬀect of an increased investment threshold in the presence of180 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION














Figure 6.10: The probability of investment when the renegotiation is not possible for xl =
0.6,x m =0 .7,a n dxh =0 .8, as a function of cash ﬂow volatility, σ.
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Figure 6.11: The ratio of probabilities of investment when the renegotiation is and is not
possible for xl =0 .6,x m =0 .7,a n dxh =0 .8, as a function of cash ﬂow volatility, σ.6.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS 181















Figure 6.12: The probability of renegotiation for xl =1 .0,x m =1 .1,a n dxh =1 .25,a sa
function of shareholders’ bargaining power, η.
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Figure 6.13: The ratio of probabilities of debt renegotiation with, pNB(·,GO), and without,
pNB(·,NGO), the growth option for xl =1 .0,x m =1 .1,a n dxh =1 .25, as a function of
shareholders’ bargaining power, η.182 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
renegotiation more than oﬀsets the impact of losing the investment opportunity upon
bankruptcy (see Figure 6.11).
(viii) An increase in the interest rate, r, when the return shortfall, δ, is kept constant,
can change the probability of investment in both directions. If the investment
threshold decreases with r (see (i)), then the probability of investment always
increases with r. However, when the investment threshold is positively related to
r (also see (i)), the sign of the investment-interest rate relationship is ambiguous.
This results from the fact that such increase in the investment threshold is coun-
terbalanced by the increase in the cash ﬂow drift rate as well as by a decrease in
the bankruptcy trigger (see (6.15)). The sign of the joint eﬀect depends on the
speciﬁc choice of model parameters.
What remains to be considered is the relationship between the presence of the
growth option and the probability of strategic debt restructuring. Renegotiation is
more likely when the debtors are given more bargaining power (cf. Figure 6.12). How-
ever, the magnitude of the inﬂuence of bargaining power on the renegotiation proba-
bility highly depends on whether the ﬁrm holds positive NPVgrowth opportunities.
Such a comparison is illustrated in Figure 6.13. It appears that in the presence of a
positive NPVproject, the probability of debt renegotiation can be higher than without
the investment option. Such a situation occurs when the actual renegotiation trigger
xNB
0 exceeds the renegotiation trigger without the investment opportunity (equal to
xNB
1 θ), and the current cash ﬂow is not excessively high.21 This situation occurs when
the shareholders’ bargaining power, η, is large (cf. Proposition 6.3). This eﬀect is
magniﬁed for moderate levels of uncertainty (high uncertainty relatively increases the
shareholders’ value of the investment option which makes renegotiation less likely).
6.4.3 Valuation of Securities
In this section the comparative statics concerning the valuation of the ﬁrm’s secu-
rities are presented. Since the signs of the relevant relationships does not depend on the
presence of the renegotiation option, the existence of such an option is assumed here.
Table 6.4 depicts the direction of the impact of model parameters on the valuation of
equity, debt and the entire ﬁrm.
21In the absence of the renegotiation option the bankruptcy triggers are the relevant ones. Since it
holds that xB
0 is always lower than xB
1 θ, the presence of the investment opportunity always reduces
the default probability when there is no option to renegotiate.6.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS 183
σ α,δ r,δ r,α b ρ η I,θ
−1 τγ 0 γ1
ENB
0 ++− + −+ − + −− − −
DNB
0 (ix)+ − (xi)+ − + −−− ++
V NB
0 (x)+− (xii)+ − + −−− ++
Table 6.4: Comparative statics concerning the valuation of the ﬁrm, its debt and equity. ”+”
(”−”) denotes a positive (negative) derivative with respect to a given parameter, and ”+−”
(”−+”) indicates a humped (U-shaped) relationship. The numbers in brackets refer to the
explanatory notes in the text.
Since changes in the valuation of the claims resulting from the changes in input
parameters are mostly consistent with those reported in the dynamic capital structure
literature (e.g. Leland, 1994), we mainly discuss the results that are directly inﬂuenced
by the interactions between the option to invest and to restructure the debt.
(ix) The relationship between the cash ﬂow volatility, σ, and the value of debt, DNB
0 ,
depends on the current level of the earnings process, x. When this level is high,
the value of the debt decreases with volatility since higher volatility makes renego-
tiation, other things equal, more likely. However, for realizations of x suﬃciently
close to xNB
0 , two other eﬀects result in a positive relationship between the value
of the debt and uncertainty. First, for low x, the impact of xNB
0 decreasing with
σ is stronger than the impact of a higher probability of hitting any ﬁxed trigger
lower than x.22 Second, the renegotiation value of debt rises with σ. The latter
relationship results from the fact that the value of the ﬁrm rises with σ,b e c a u s e
of the included investment opportunity component.
(x) The relationship between the cash ﬂow volatility, σ, and the value of the ﬁrm,
V NB
0 , results from the impact of the volatility on the value of debt and equity.
For a given σ and varying x, the value function is ﬁrst convex (which mainly
reﬂects the option value of the tax shield after the contractual debt service is
restored), then it becomes concave (as a result of a short option on the tax shield
once contractual service is restored), becomes once again convex (when the option
component associated with the investment opportunity starts to dominate) and,
eventually, becomes and remains concave (when it value-matches to V NB
1 −I,s e e
(6.37)). Consequently, the eﬀect of changes in σ is only unambiguous when the
ﬁrm either is ﬁnancially distressed (positive relationship) or close to the optimal
exercise of its growth option (negative relationship).
22Using a similar reasoning Leland (1994) explains the behavior of junk bonds.184 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
(xi) The sign of the relationship between the value of debt and the risk-free interest
rate, r, given constant return shortfall, δ, is in general ambiguous. The relation-
ship is hump-shaped for low uncertainty combined with a high convenience yield,
and decreasing otherwise. If the ﬁrm’s debt was riskless, its value would always
decrease with r, irrespective of the drift rate, α, and return shortfall, δ. Here,
the positive probability of renegotiation makes it risky. A very low interest rate,
in combination with a positive return shortfall, is associated with a negative drift
rate. If the uncertainty is small, the stochastic discount factor associated with
renegotiation is high. Therefore, for low levels of uncertainty the value of the
debt may beneﬁt from an increasing interest rate if the latter is suﬃciently low.
(xii) The relationship between the value of the ﬁrm and the risk-free interest rate, r,
given constant return shortfall reﬂects the impact of r on the value of equity,
ENB
0 , and debt, DNB
0 . Since the value of equity increases monotonically with r,
the impact of the interest rate on the value of the ﬁrm depends on the relative
slope of the debt value function comparing to equity. Since the former can both
increase and decrease with r (see (xi)), the value of the ﬁrm is in general hump-
shaped or increasing with r. For a very high r, the value of the ﬁrm levels oﬀ
since the impact of changes in leverage becomes negligible (as b/r → 0).
The comparative statics results from the last two columns of Table 6.4 coincide
with the ﬁndings in the recent dynamic capital structure literature (cf. Flor, 2002, and
references therein). It appears that ex post (i.e. when the capital structure is already
ﬁxed) the value of the ﬁrm’s equity decreases with the asset resale value, γi. This
results from the fact that the asset resale value increases the bargaining position of
the creditors (who can always seize the assets upon the violation of the original debt
contract by the equityholders), who are granted bigger concessions in the renegotiation
process.
6.4.4 Empirical Implications
Testing empirical predictions of our model requires identifying proxy variables that
can capture the eﬀects of diﬀerent costs of renegotiation (in the model we consider
only two polar cases: zero costs and costs oﬀsetting entire beneﬁts from renegotiation),
equityholders’ bargaining power η, and creditors’ outside option, ρ. The costs of rene-
gotiation (cf. Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996) are expected to be low when the ﬁrm is
ﬁnanced with a bank debt or, in general, when the number of its creditors is small.6.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS 185
The distribution of bargaining power (cf. Hackbarth et al., 2002) crucially depends
on the ﬁrm’s size, age, and degree of diversiﬁcation. Moreover, it is also inﬂuenced by
the country’s legal system (US Bankruptcy Code of 1978 is more shareholder-friendly
than the codes in most continental European countries). Finally, creditors’ eﬃciency
as managers of the ﬁrm is expected to be higher when the brand recognition is low (cf.
Mella-Barral, 1999) and in the sectors with low intensity of R&D.
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze the sensitivity of investment to the ﬁrm’s cash
ﬂow. Subsequently the stock price behavior and credit spreads are discussed. Finally,
some social welfare results are presented.
Investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity. The set-up of this paper’s model stipu-
lates that investment is triggered by a suﬃciently high level of cash ﬂow from opera-
tions. This implies that a higher magnitude of Myers’ (1977) underinvestment makes
the investment ceteris paribus less likely to be triggered by an incremental cash ﬂow
increase. As a consequence, the presence of the renegotiation option and high share-
holders’ bargaining power, which both result in higher underinvestment, is likely to
decrease the sensitivity of investment to the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. Therefore, our model pro-
vides an alternative explanation of the empirical evidence that small and young ﬁrms
exhibit relatively higher investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity (cf. Lensink et al., 2001, Ch.
3, and references therein). Since small ﬁrms usually have a limited bargaining power
in the debt renegotiation with banks, the magnitude of the additional underinvestment
resulting from the renegotiation option will be in the most cases insigniﬁcant. This
relatively lower magnitude of underinvestment implies that their investment-cash ﬂow
sensitivity is likely to remain high. The same argument can be used to claim that the
capital investment of big and mature ﬁrms with dispersed bond market debt will be
on average more sensitive to cash ﬂow than investment of similar ﬁrms with a mixture
of bank and bond market debt and with bank debt only (cf. Moyen, 2002).
Stock price behavior. Asymmetric returns are inherent to the equity of ﬁrms
that hold a substantial portfolio of real options. As Bernardo and Chowdhry (2002)
point out (cf. also Berk et al., 1997, and Pope and Stark, 1997), positive earnings
surprises have a stronger eﬀect on the prices of equity than negative ones. This is
because the presence of a real option makes the payoﬀ to equityholders convex in the
stochastic variable that underlies the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. In the current model, the equity
value function consists of two convex components, options to invest and to restructure
the debt/declare bankruptcy, and one linear, present value of cash ﬂow. Therefore, it
is itself convex. As a consequence, the stock price returns exhibit right-skewness.186 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
The presence of an investment and a renegotiation option has also implications
for the responsiveness of the stock price to the earnings surprises. Upon introducing the
renegotiation option alone, one can observe that the stock price becomes less responsive
to the earnings surprises. This is associated with a decrease of the ﬁrst derivative of
the equity value function with respect to the process x. The reason for that is that
the renegotiation option has a relatively higher value in the adverse states of nature
(i.e. for low realizations of x). Consequently, any variation in x results in less drastic
changes in E0 in the presence of renegotiation option. The responsiveness of the stock
price to the earnings surprises is magniﬁed by introducing the growth option. This
results from the fact that higher realizations of x not only give rise to the present value
of cash ﬂow but also enhance the value of the growth option. As a consequence, the
derivative
∂E0
∂x increases and so does the responsiveness to the earnings surprises.
Credit Spreads. The riskiness of debt reﬂected by the credit spread is highly
inﬂuenced by the presence of both an investment and a renegotiation option. On the








it can be concluded that for a given coupon and a riskless rate, the credit spread
is inversely monotonic in the market value of debt. Consequently, the results of the
analysis of Section 6.3 can be translated into implications for the credit spreads.
The ﬁrst theoretical prediction is that the presence of growth options reduces
ceteris paribus credit spreads. Anticipated future exercise of such options is associated
with the prospect of lowering both the bankruptcy and renegotiation thresholds, which
negatively aﬀects the riskiness of the debt. In the absence of a renegotiation option,
introducing the growth option the results not only in a decreasing the after-investment
bankruptcy threshold but also in lowering the initial bankruptcy threshold. The latter
holds since the opportunity cost of declaring bankruptcy is higher in the presence of the
growth option. Consequently, in the absence of the renegotiation option, the impact
of the investment opportunity on credit spreads is substantial.
When the renegotiation option is allowed for, a lower renegotiation threshold,
which arises after completing the investment, reduces the riskiness of the debt even
before the investment project is undertaken. However, there is a second eﬀect that
can increase the ﬁrm’s credit risk. Contrary to the bankruptcy case, the impact of
the growth option does not have to make the debt restructuring less likely. In the
situation described in Proposition 6.3, the presence of the growth option increases the6.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS 187
renegotiation trigger. This can lead to a higher riskiness of the debt, resulting in a
higher credit spread. The magnitude of both opposing eﬀects highly depends on the
shareholders’ bargaining power and the creditors’ outside option. Higher shareholders’
bargaining power results in a higher magnitude of the latter eﬀect, whereas a higher
creditors’ outside option has an opposite eﬀect. In general, for an extensive grid of
the model parameters’ values, the presence of the growth option reduces credit spreads
even in the presence of strategic debt restructuring.
The impact of the market parameters such as interest rate, return shortfall
and earnings volatility, as well as of the indirect bankruptcy costs is consistent with
the literature on ﬁrm-value based models of credit risk (cf. Anderson and Sundaresan,
2000).
Social Value of the Firm. According to Hege and Mella-Barral (2000), the
social value of the ﬁrm is not aﬀected by the distribution of the bargaining power
among the debtors and the creditors. The reason is that any loss of the tax shield,
which is associated with premature renegotiation due to a higher bargaining power
of the debtors, is just a transfer to the government. Contrary to that observation,
in the current model the distribution of the bargaining power has an externality on
the investment and the liquidation decision. Despite the fact that the changes in the
present value of the tax shield do not directly inﬂuence the social value of the ﬁrm
(they merely change the redistribution of wealth), they do aﬀect the investment and
liquidation policy. Consequently, in order to assess the impact of the distribution
of bargaining power on the social value of the ﬁrm, one has to compare the ﬁrst-best
investment and liquidation thresholds calculated under all-equity ﬁnancing assumption
with the ones determined in the presence of a mixed capital structure.
In our set-up debt distorts the optimal investment and liquidation policies.
As it can be seen from Figure 6.6, the optimal equityholders’ investment threshold
is higher than in the all-equity case. Moreover, the optimal investment threshold
increases with the shareholders’ bargaining power coeﬃcient. Consequently, a high
shareholders’ bargaining power exacerbates the underinvestment problem, in this case
the ineﬃciently late exercise of the option to expand (i.e. beyond the point at which the
marginal cost of investing equalizes with the marginal revenue from expansion taking
into account irreversibility and uncertainty).
Allowing for the possibility of renegotiating the original debt contract results in
the liquidation trigger being a function of the shareholders’ relative bargaining power.
This is because the liquidation trigger is determined so as to maximize the value of the188 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
ﬁrm. The latter quantity is endogenous and depends on the renegotiation trigger that
in turn is aﬀected by the distribution of bargaining power. As it can be concluded on
the basis of Table 6.2 the optimal liquidation threshold is an increasing function of η.
The optimal liquidation threshold in the presence of debt ﬁnancing and renegotiation
lies between the all-equity liquidation threshold in the world without taxes and the
all-equity threshold with when corporate tax is suﬃciently high. Therefore, reducing
the shareholders’ relative bargaining power mitigates the negative externality of debt
on the optimal liquidation decision.
We conclude that there are two negative welfare eﬀects of a high bargaining
power of the debtors. The ﬁrst is associated with an excessively delayed investment,
and the other with a too early liquidation.
6.5 Conclusions
The investment policy of the ﬁrm is aﬀected by its capital structure. Introducing
debt ﬁnancing results in an ineﬃcient delay in exercising the growth option. We show
that eliminating costly bankruptcy by introducing the possibility of debt restructuring
does not solve this problem. In fact, underinvestment is higher if the renegotiation
option exists.
The departure from the all-equity ﬁnancing aﬀects the ﬁrm’s liquidation pol-
icy. If renegotiation is not allowed for, the decision to liquidate the ﬁrm is made by
the creditors who become the owners of the ﬁrm upon the bankruptcy. This results
in an ex ante ineﬃcient liquidation and this ineﬃciency constitutes part of the indi-
rect bankruptcy costs. The introduction of a mixed capital structure combined with
a renegotiation option inﬂuences the optimal liquidation policy twofold. First, the
presence of the tax shield delays liquidation since ceteris paribus it enhances the value
of the ﬁrm. Second, partial debt ﬁnancing leads to the departure from the ﬁrst-best
investment policy, which results in the value of the ﬁrm being deteriorated and in the
opportunity cost of its liquidation being lowered. For suﬃciently high taxes the for-
mer eﬀect dominates, thus liquidation occurs later than under all-equity ﬁnancing but
not as late as under the optimal liquidation all-equity ﬁnancing in the world without
taxes. Since there exists a positive relationship between the liquidation trigger and
the shareholders’ bargaining power, reducing this power brings the liquidation policy
closer to the optimum.
Furthermore, we show that the debt restructuring policy is aﬀected by the pres-
ence of the growth option. The growth option positively inﬂuences the renegotiation6.6. APPENDIX 189
trigger if a high shareholders’ bargaining power is combined with a substantial wealth
transfer to the creditors occurring upon investment. In the opposite situation, this is
when the creditors possess higher bargaining power and if they do not gain much upon
investment, the renegotiation trigger falls.
Finally, we would like to indicate several extensions that may potentially con-
stitute interesting research areas. A more realistic setting would include constructing
a model with multiple investment opportunities (cf. Morellec, 2001). The model can
also be extended to provide a pricing framework for a renegotiable debt with ﬁnite
maturity where the coupon ﬂow is a function of the underlying state variable (cf.
Shackleton and Wojakowski, 2001). Moreover, the current analysis can be modiﬁed to
incorporate the impact of product market interactions on the ﬁrm’s investment behav-
ior (the area pioneered by Fries et al., 1997, and Lambrecht, 2001). Another extension
would include investigating the impact of Chapter 11 regulation on the intra-industry
bankruptcy intensity. Current anecdotal evidence often indicates that artiﬁcially sus-
tained capacity results in a lower sector proﬁtability and, as a consequence, a higher
chance of exit of other players.23 The choice of the second-best solution in the current
modeling set-up calls for an introduction of an executive compensation scheme that
would allow for aligning the incentives of the self-interested managers with the value
of the ﬁrm. Such alignment may prove to be ex post optimal from the equityholders’
point of view. Finally, the divergence of the stakeholders’ objectives may lead to an
asset substitution problem, which will inﬂuence the equityholders’ investment policy
(cf. Leland, 1998, and Subramanian, 2002, in an agency, and Dangl and Lehar, 2002,
in a banking regulation application).
6.6 Appendix
Derivation of (6.29). The value of the tax shield, TS i, satisﬁes ODE (6.2) with the





(0,bτ) x ≥ xNB
i .
Consequently TS i can be written as
TSi =
 
M1xβ1 + M2xβ2 x<x NB
i ,
bτ
r + M3xβ1 + M4xβ2.x ≥ xNB
i .
(6.53)
23Cf. The Economist, 7th September 2002, The ﬁrms that can’t stop falling: Bankruptcy in America,










TS i =0 , (6.55)
it holds that M2 = M3 =0 . The only remaining unknown constants are M1 and M4.














































 −β2 . (6.59)
Derivation of (6.31). The value of the ﬁrm at the optimal liquidation trigger
satisﬁes the Bellman equation (6.2) with B = θ(1 − τ)a n dC = 0, subject to the





























































The constant L1 can be directly calculated from (6.60). Multiplying both sides of
(6.60) by β2xLN
1 and subtracting it from (6.61) yields the implicit formula for xLN
1 .
Derivation of (6.34). When the shareholders’ optimal renegotiation trigger
is approached from above, the value of equity satisﬁes the Bellman equation (6.2)









































































































































Calculating the derivative of (6.62), and applying value matching and smooth pasting
at xNB
1 yields the formula for xNB
1 .
Proof of Proposition 6.1. First, on the basis of (6.28), (6.33), (6.36)-(6.38),













































































































































































so that A12xβ2 is the equityholders’ value of the option to renegotiate. The implicit
formulae for the optimal investment threshold, x∗, optimal renegotiation trigger, xNB
0 ,
and liquidation trigger, xLN
0 , are obtained by rearranging equations (6.39), (6.41) and
(6.43).
Proof of Proposition 6.2. Proposition 2 directly results from replacing equation
(6.39) by (6.47) in the system of equations (6.37)-(6.43).
Proof of Proposition 6.3. The optimal renegotiation trigger can be calcu-
lated on the basis of equations (6.40) and (6.41). After multiplying (6.40) by β2 and
subtracting (6.40) from (6.41) we obtain that
(1 − β2)
xNB





(1 − τ + ητ)












b(1 − τ + ητ)δ










(1 − η (1 − ρ))(1 − τ)
.
The ﬁrst row in (6.69) equals the optimal renegotiation trigger in the absence of the
investment opportunity (cf. (6.34)). Consequently, xNB
0 is higher than such a trigger
if and only if ηK0 − A01 is positive.
Derivation of the First Passage Time Probabilities. In general, the proba-
bility that an event (i.e. bankruptcy, renegotiation or investment) will occur within the6.6. APPENDIX 193















subject to the following boundary conditions
p(x,T)=a, (6.71)
p(x,T)=b, (6.72)
p(x,0) = 0. (6.73)
where the lower bound, x, upper bound, x, and parameters a and b are given in the
following matrix.
Probability
x,x;a,b of investment of debt restructuring
Growth option present
Renegotiation possible xLN






Bankruptcy upon default xB







Renegotiation possible - xNB
0 ,∞;1,0
The function q(x,y) denotes the the probability of reaching the lower trigger y before
time T conditional on starting at x. It can be obtained by applying a change of

































where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal cumulative density function.
As an example, let us interpret the boundary conditions for the probability of
debt renegotiation in the presence of the growth option. Condition (6.71) implies that
the renegotiation is certain if the level of cash ﬂow hits the boundary xNB
0 . Equation
(6.72) means that upon reaching the investment threshold, x∗, the renegotiation trigger
switches to xNB
1 and the probability of renegotiation is described by (6.74). Finally,194 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION
when the length of the time interval tends to zero, the probability of renegotiation
approaches zero as well.
Since an analytical solution to the PDE (6.70) with boundaries (6.71)-(6.73)
has not been found, a numerical procedure has to be applied. To calculate the relevant
probabilities, the explicit ﬁnite diﬀerence method is used (cf. Brennan and Schwartz,
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1623-1653.Samenvatting
Investeringsmogelijkheden kunnen gezien worden als (re¨ ele) opties om kapitaalgo-
ederen te verwerven. Een juiste identiﬁcatie van de optimale uitoefeningsstrategie¨ en
van re¨ ele opties speelt een cruciale rol in het bepalen van het optimale investeringsge-
drag en in het maximaliseren van de waarde van een onderneming.
De meeste standaard leerboeken in de ﬁnanciering beschrijven de netto con-
tante waarde (Net Present Value of NPV) regel als het criterium voor het waarderen van
investeringsprojecten. Volgens deze regel moet de contante waarde van de verwachte
kasstroom, die gegenereerd wordt door een nieuwe fabriek of een productielijn, geschat
worden. Vervolgens moeten de uitgaven, die noodzakelijk zijn om de fabriek of de
nieuwe productlijn te lanceren, van deze kasstroom afgetrokken worden. Een positief
verschil (een positieve NPV) impliceert dat het project uitgevoerd zou moeten worden.
Zoals aangegeven door Dixit en Pindyck (1996) leidt het NPV-criterium alleen
tot optimaal investeringsgedrag wanneer een van de volgende cruciale en dikwijls ge-
negeerde aannames gelden: de investering is ofwel helemaal omkeerbaar (in dit geval
kan het ge¨ ınvesteerde geld teruggekregen worden indien de toestand van de markt ex
post slechter is dan verwacht), of de investering is een nu-of-nooit beslissing. In de
meeste gevallen wordt aan geen van de bovenvermelde voorwaarden voldaan. In feite
geldt voor de meeste investeringsprojecten dat ze onomkeerbaar zijn, dat de resul-
terende kasstroom onzeker is en dat het mogelijk is de investering uit te stellen.
Onomkeerbaarheid betekent dat de investeringskosten verzonken kosten zijn.
Dit houdt in dat het onmogelijk is om de investeringskosten terug te krijgen nadat de
investering is gedaan. Daarom is de investeringsuitgave equivalent aan de uitoefen-
ingsprijs van een ﬁnanci¨ ele optie. Onomkeerbaarheid is een gevolg van tenminste een
van de volgende drie factoren: het investeringsproject is alleen van belang voor het
betreﬀende bedrijf of industrie, of er is sprake van adverse selection op de tweedehands
markt voor deze goederen.
In de meeste situaties is de kasstroom die voortvloeit uit een investeringspro-
ject onzeker. In veel gevallen worden de opbrengsten van de investering in een nieuw
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product be¨ ınvloed door onzekerheid in de productmarkt. De waarde van een invester-
ingsproject in de oliesector is een functie van de vari¨ erende olieprijs op de internationale
markt. In de literatuur wordt aangenomen dat de ontwikkeling van de huidige waarde
van deze kasstroom beschreven kan worden door een stochastisch proces. Daarom
spelen bij het bepalen van de waarde van een investeringsmogelijkheid dezelfde soort
eﬀecten een rol als bij een ﬁnanci¨ ele optie.
Voor de meeste projecten bestaat er een mogelijkheid om de investering uit te
stellen. Uitstel is in principe kostbaar omdat de onderneming tot het tijdsstip van de
investering geen opbrengsten heeft. Het voordeel van wachten met investeren is echter
dat de onderneming meer informatie over de waarde van het project kan vergaren
alvorens tot investeren over te gaan. Een soortgelijke trade-oﬀ speelt ook een rol bij
de optimale uitoefeningsbeslissing van een Amerikaanse optie.
De noodzaak van het ontwikkelen van waarderingsmodellen die investeringsken-
merken als onomkeerbaarheid, onzekerheid, timing en ﬂexibiliteit in het beslissingspro-
ces opnemen, heeft geresulteerd in een groot aantal publicaties op het gebied van re¨ ele
opties en investeren onder onzekerheid (zie o.a. Myers, 1977, Brennan en Schwartz,
1985, McDonald en Siegel, 1986, Dixit, 1989, en een gedetailleerd overzicht door Dixit
en Pindyck, 1996).
Re¨ ele optiemodellen kunnen niet alleen gebruikt worden om de waarde van
een investeringsproject te berekenen, maar ook om het optimale investeringsbeleid van
een onderneming te bepalen. In veel situaties moeten de modellen bekend van de ﬁ-
nanci¨ ele optieliteratuur uitgebreid en aangepast worden om rekening te houden met
de economische omgeving. Hierbij valt te denken aan exogene discrete veranderin-
gen in de economische omgeving, strategische interacties tussen ondernemingen of de
ﬁnancieringsaspecten van een investeringsproject.
De huidige literatuur verschaft betrekkelijk weinig inzicht in de invloed van
structurele veranderingen van de economische omgeving op het investeringsgedrag van
de onderneming. Bestaande artikelen analyseren meestal continue veranderingen in
de waarde van een relevante economische variabele. Evenwel is het vaak realistischer
om de economische variabele te modelleren als een proces dat op bepaalde tijdstippen
discrete sprongen maakt. In zulke gevallen wordt er gebruik gemaakt van een Poisson
(sprong) proces. Dit gebeurt bijvoorbeeld in Hassett en Metcalf (1999), waarin de
invloed van een verwachte reductie van een investeringssubsidie geanalyseerd wordt.
Het uitgebreide proces van deregulatie en de golf van fusies en overnames die
plaatsvonden in het vorige decennium hebben geresulteerd in een oligopolistische mark-
tstructuur in een groot aantal sectoren. Imperfecte concurrentie in de productmarkt209
impliceert dat de onderneming rekening moet houden met strategische interacties met
andere marktparticipanten. Het opnemen van imperfecte concurrentie in re¨ ele op-
tiemodellen vereist dat het resulterende model gebaseerd moet zijn op bijdragen op
het gebied van timing spelen in de niet-co¨ operatieve speltheorie (zie o.a. Reinganum,
1981, en Fudenberg en Tirole, 1985).
In geval een investeringsproject wordt geﬁnancierd met vreemd vermogen zouden
er twee soorten agencyproblemen kunnen ontstaan, die suboptimaal investeringsgedrag
tot gevolg kunnen hebben. Ten eerste leidt ﬁnanciering met vreemd vermogen tot een
keuze van riskantere projecten, hetgeen het welzijn van de houders van vreemd ver-
mogen reduceert (Jensen en Meckling (1976)). Een ander eﬀect van ﬁnanciering met
vreemd vermogen op het investeringsgedrag van de onderneming is beschreven door
Myers (1977). Hij heeft aangetoond dat de investering ondernomen door de houders
van eigen vermogen gepaard gaat met een welzijnstransfer aan de houders van vreemd
vermogen. Deze transfer impliceert dat sommige goede investeringsprojecten (waar-
voor geldt dat de NPVniet opweegt tegen de welzijnstransfer) niet uitgevoerd worden.
In dit proefschrift worden de drie bovenvermelde aspecten van re¨ ele opties
geanalyseerd.
In Hoofdstuk 2 ontwikkelen we een niet-strategisch model waarin de invloed van
een plotselinge beleidsverandering op het investeringsgedrag geanalyseerd wordt. Voor-
beelden van zo’n beleidsverandering betreﬀen het opheﬀen van een investeringssubsidie
of een verandering in de voorkeursbehandeling van een buitenlandse investeerder. In
het model leidt de beleidsverandering tot een opwaartse sprong in de eﬀectieve invester-
ingskosten (zie Hassett en Metcalf, 1999). De sprong vindt plaats op het moment dat
de waarde van het project een bovengrens bereikt. De onderneming heeft incomplete
informatie over de drempelwaarde van het proces waar de sprong plaatsvindt, en ac-
tualiseert haar schatting betreﬀende die drempelwaarde middels de regel van Bayes.
De invloed van de onzekerheid aangaande het moment van de beleidsverandering kan
geanalyseerd worden door het eﬀect te bepalen van een verandering in de variantie
van de onderliggende waarschijnlijkheidsverdeling. In dit hoofdstuk wordt de opti-
male investeringsdrempel die de waarde van de onderneming maximaliseert afgeleid.
Verder wordt aangetoond dat de drempel een niet monotone functie is van de mate
van beleidsonzekerheid.
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert de beslissing van de onderneming om een bestaande
technologie te vervangen door een nieuwe, kosteneﬃci¨ entere versie. Kulatilaka en Per-
otti (1998) leiden af dat, binnen een tweeperioden model, een stijgende productmarkt
onzekerheid de onderneming kan aanmoedigen om eerder strategisch te investeren in210 SAMENVATTING
een nieuwe technologie. We breiden hun raamwerk uit tot een model in continue tijd en
tonen aan dat, in tegenstelling tot het tweeperioden model, meer onzekerheid impliceert
dat de onderneming naar verwachting later investeert. Daarnaast wordt aangetoond
dat onder stijgende onzekerheid de waarschijnlijkheid van een optimale vervanging van
het productiegoed binnen een bepaalde periode altijd daalt, indien de betreﬀende pe-
riode het optimale deterministische vervangingstijdstip omvat. Voor kortere periodes
zijn er tegenovergestelde eﬀecten in werking, die bewerkstelligen dat de verhouding
tussen onzekerheid en de investeringswaarschijnlijkheid een omgekeerd U-vorm heeft
(zie ook Sarkar, 2000).
In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt een model bekeken met twee ondernemingen die ver-
schillende investeringskosten hebben. We analyseren de invloed van de onderlinge
verschillen in die investeringskosten op de ondernemingswaarde en op de optimale in-
vesteringstijdstippen. Beide ondernemingen hebben de mogelijkheid om te investeren
in een project dat ceteris paribus de kasstroom verbetert. We tonen aan dat drie
soorten evenwichten bestaan. Bovendien bepalen we de kritische niveaus van de koste-
nasymmetrie die de bestaansregio’s van de evenwichten begrenzen. De aanwezigheid
van strategische interacties leidt tot contra-intu¨ ıtieve resultaten. Ten eerste kan een
marginale toename in de investeringskosten van de onderneming met het kostennadeel
een toename in de waarde van deze onderneming veroorzaken. Ten tweede kan zo’n
kostenstijging leiden tot een daling van de marktwaarde van de concurrent. Vervolgens
bespreken we de welzijnsimplicaties van het optimale investeringsgedrag en tonen aan
dat kostenasymmetrie kan leiden tot een sociaal meer gewenste uitkomst. Tenslotte
bewijzen we dat winstonzekerheid altijd leidt tot uitstel van de investering. Dit laatste
geldt zelfs in een situatie waarin het zeer gewenst is om eerder te investeren dan de
andere onderneming.
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt de waarde van ﬂexibiliteit in strategische kwaliteitskeuze
bekeken. Ondernemingen beslissen over de kwaliteit van hun producten op het moment
dat ze een productmarkt betreden. Flexibiliteit in kwaliteitskeuze impliceert ceteris
paribus dat eerder investeren optimaal is. Verder wordt afgeleid dat de waarde van
ﬂexibele kwaliteit toeneemt als er sprake is van meer onzekerheid in de vraag en/of bij
aanwezigheid van een potenti¨ ele concurrent. We tonen aan dat ﬂexibele kwaliteit ook
dienst kan doen als afschrikking van potenti¨ ele concurrentie, waarbij het niet eens nodig
is om het kwaliteitsniveau af te laten wijken van het optimale monopolistische niveau.
In bestaande re¨ ele optiemodellen is het bepalen van het optimale investeringsmoment
vaak de enige beslissing die genomen moet worden. In het onderhavige model komt
daar de kwaliteitsbeslissing bij. Wij tonen aan dat dit impliceert dat de timing van211
investeren van de tweede investeerder van invloed is op het investeringstijdstip van de
leider, hetgeen normaal gesproken niet het geval is in re¨ ele optiemodellen waarin de
rollen van eerste en tweede investeerder vastliggen. Dit betekent een uitbreiding van
de theorie van strategische re¨ ele opties. Tenslotte tonen we aan dat als de vraag groot
is de leider de mogelijkheid heeft om door een “agressieve” kwaliteitskeuze de volger
uit de markt te stoten.
Hoofdstuk 6 analyseert het optimale investerings- en liquidatiebeleid van de
onderneming wanneer ﬁnanciering met vreemd vermogen en heronderhandelen van het
oorspronkelijke schuldcontract mogelijk zijn. We tonen aan dat de aanwezigheid van de
optie tot heronderhandelen (”zachte schuld”) het onderinvesteringsproblem beschreven
door Myers (1977) versterkt. De nadelige invloed van de optie tot heronderhandelen
op het investeringsbeleid wordt veroorzaakt door het feit dat op het moment van de in-
vestering deze optie de welzijnstransfer aan de houders van vreemd vermogen verhoogt.
Dit is het gevolg van een signiﬁcante reductie in de waarschijnlijkheid van een strate-
gische wanbetaling die voorkomt op het moment van de investering. Bovendien vinden
we dat, als ﬁnanciering met vreemd vermogen mogelijk is, het liquidatiebeleid verschilt
van het optimale liquidatiebeleid onder volledige ﬁnanciering met eigen vermogen. Zelfs
als we belasting wegdenken, hetgeen eﬀecten van het belastingsschild elimineert, wordt
het liquidatiebeleid be¨ ınvloed door het second-best investeringsbeleid. Dit impliceert
dat liquidatie te vroeg zal plaatsvinden. Ook wordt de invloed van de groei optie op de
optimale timing van faillissement en heronderhandelingen geanalyseerd. Aangetoond
wordt dat een combinatie van hoge onderhandelingsmacht van de houders van eigen
vermogen met de aanwezigheid van groei opties kan leiden tot een grotere waarschijn-
lijkheid van strategische wanbetaling.  Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands 
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